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This dissertation surveys the constitutional evolution of the Canadian governor
general's role between 1847 and 1878. It analyses incidents in the terms of five
consecutive governors general—Elgin, Sir Edmund Head, Monck, Lisgar, and
Dufferin—and explores how each interpreted his loosely-defined role. While
Confederation in 1867 is usually seen as the watershed in Canadian constitutional
history, its effect on the viceregal role was limited. The most profound change—the
transition to responsible government—had already occurred in 1848. After 1848 it
was understood that in internal matters the governor general would follow the advice
of his Canadian ministers. Elgin played a key role in putting this new experiment in
colonial policy into practice. The advent of self-government for Canada did not
mean that the governor general became insignificant, however. The governor
retained a role as guardian of the constitution, and the prerogative of refusal of assent
to ministerial advice still existed, even if it was infrequently invoked. Elgin, Head,
Monck and Dufferin all encountered situations in which at least some political
observers believed such refusal would be warranted. In the event, only Head
exercised this prerogative. In the formative years of Canadian party politics, the
viceregal office afforded an opportunity to exercise informal leadership. Monck in
particular played a much-underestimated role in helping to negotiate alliances among
political antagonists. Lisgar, by far the most politically seasoned of the five
incumbents, paradoxically presided over a stable ministry during his entire term of
office. His comparative inactivity in the political realm has led historians to dismiss
him as indolent. Lisgar was involved, however, in behind-the-scenes negotiations
leading to the 1871 Treaty of Washington. Canadian disappointment over the terms
of the treaty, combined with the absence of any archival collection detailing Lisgar's
activities, has unfairly cast Lisgar as a historical scapegoat. The study ends with the
drafting of a permanent set of Letters Patent and Instructions for the governor general
in 1878, a constitutional milestone that has been largely overlooked in Canadian
historiography. This initiative on the part of Canada's Liberal minister of justice,
Edward Blake, to more clearly spell out the limits of the governor general's role was
spurred in large measure by Dufferin's intrusiveness. Throughout this formative
period, the evolution of the viceregal role was influenced both by circumstance and
the character of the individual office holders.
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The Office of Governor General, 1847-1878
This dissertation addresses the office of the Canadian governor general between 1847
and 1878. During this period, five British appointees held the position: Lord Elgin
(1847-54); Sir Edmund Head (1854-61); Lord Monck (1861-68); Sir John Young,
later Lord Lisgar, (1868-72); and Lord Dufferin (1872-78). Anyone attempting to
study Canada's nineteenth-century governors general comes up immediately against
a fundamental conceptual problem. This is the difficulty in distinguishing between
the office of the governor general, and the individuals who filled it. For the most
part, those who have addressed the viceregal role have done so through the medium
of biography. To a great extent, this is a valid approach. The role of the governor
general has been an elastic one, and its parameters could extend and contract in
response to the inclinations and interests of the incumbent. Further, for as long as the
governor general remained answerable to the British cabinet, as he did until 1926,
much depended on his personal connections with statesmen at home. Those with
enough influence—and confidence—could have a direct bearing on the colonial
policies that would affect Canada. The direct constitutional role of the governor
general in Canada's domestic affairs receded after the advent of responsible
government under Lord Elgin in 1848. Yet self-government for a colony was a new
experiment and Canada's executive council and its titular head had to iron out how it
would work in practice. The personality of the governor general was crucial.
Someone with significant parliamentary experience, who nevertheless had an
appreciation of Canada's legislative autonomy, might exert an influence over his
Canadian ministers. Even after 1848 there were instances where the overt
intervention of the governor general was possible constitutionally, if not always
welcome. Prerogative powers remained, but the governor himself had to decide
whether to exercise them. Before Confederation in 1867, no single party dominated
Canadian politics, and the occasional instability caused by the rise and fall of various
coalitions ensured an active role for the governor general. Sir Edmund Head and
Lord Monck were drawn into the turbulent waters of Canadian politics and their
7
personal attributes as political mediators were of critical importance. The governor
general's skill in international diplomacy was another variable. Lord Lisgar chose to
take a proactive approach to resolving Canada's differences with Washington in
1871. This duty was only a peripheral part of his mandate, and Lisgar's involvement
sparked criticism both of Lisgar himself and of the imperial connection. Personality
also came into play in the episode that marks the terminus of this study. The
alterations to the governor general's official Letters Patent and Instructions at the end
of Lord Dufferin's term in 1878 were a direct product of dissatisfaction with
Dufferin's intrusiveness. In addition to these political and constitutional factors, it
should be noted that the individual governors general had considerable leeway to
define their own positions in Canada's social and cultural life. The concept of
noblesse oblige was by no means extinct, and those with sufficient private resources
might choose to entertain and travel more lavishly than the modest salary and
allowances alone would permit, creating a higher profile for the office. Dufferin's
grander scale of social leadership and more regal approach to his office marked a
departure from the quiet functionalism of his immediate predecessors, and
established a precedent for those who would follow. As the office evolved, a whole
collection of "invented traditions"2 began to cluster around it. It is, in short,
impossible to ignore the personalities of those who filled the viceregal role.
Yet a purely biographical approach is inadequate. To understand the position
of the governor general, and the importance of that office in the evolving imperial
relationship between Canada and Britain, it is necessary to look at more than one
office holder. This is not least because the individual stamp one governor general
put on his term could establish a new set of expectations for his successor. This was
obviously true in the case ofElgin's new constitutional approach under a system of
responsible government, the event that marked the single greatest change in the
viceregal role. Yet precedents did not always function in a positive way. A viceregal
appointee might draw lessons from mistakes made by his predecessors, and steer an
opposite course. An examination of the terms of five consecutive governors general
who held office during a pivotal era in Canadian history may offer some
generalisations about the role that go beyond individual biography. The period
covered, 1847 to 1878, begins with the introduction of colonial self-government,
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includes Confederation, and ends with the redrafting of the governor general's
permanent instructions.
Of the five governors to be considered, Elgin and Dufferin have attracted the
most attention historically. Elgin has been the subject of a number of biographical
studies, most of which appeared in the early decades of the twentieth century. The
earliest, by Theodore Walrond, published in 1872 as Letters and Journals ofJames,
Eighth Earl ofElgin, despite its name is actually a biography punctuated by excerpts
from his correspondence. Four substantial biographies appeared before the
publication of the Elgin-Grey correspondence in 1937. Of the four, two were
published in 1905. George Wrong's treatment is sound but concentrates on the
whole of Elgin's career and therefore is able to devote only a chapter to his Canadian
career; John Bourinot's study focuses on Elgin in Canada. W.P.M. Kennedy's
biography, which appeared in 1926, and J.L. Morison's two years later, are both
comprehensive treatments of Elgin's entire career which reveal a sound grasp of the
constitutional significance of his term in Canada. Two more recent biographies have
focused on the Elgin dynasty in a broader way, putting the eighth earl into the
context of his forbears and descendants. Sydney Checkland's work in 1988 and the
more sensationalist 1997 treatment of Theodore Vrettos provide tantalizing details of
the marital scandals and financial hardships that clouded the Elgin family name prior
to the eighth earl's succession. Neither Checkland nor Vrettos are hampered by the
gentlemanly reticence that compelled earlier biographers to keep unsavoury details
under wraps. Vrettos's unsparing examination of the seventh earl's frailties of
character may in part be explained by resentment over the appropriation of Greek
cultural treasures. All of these biographies are useful, but the insights they can offer
to a general study of the viceregal office must be qualified. It remains to be seen
how Elgin's successors interpreted the constitutional precedents he established.3
Sir Edmund Head's Canadian career has been surveyed in two key studies.
James A. Gibson's 1938 Oxford D. Phil., "The Life of Sir Edmund Head" and
D.G.G. Kerr's 1954 publication, Sir Edmund Head. A Scholarly Governor both put
Head's term in Canada into the larger context of Head's life, including earlier
colonial service in New Brunswick. Once again, however, Head's interpretation of
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his role is not contrasted with that of his predecessors and successors; the focus is on
the man, rather than the office.4
Monck attracted little historical attention until late in the twentieth century.
A selection ofMonck's letters and journals was compiled and published with
insightful commentary by W.L. Morton in 1970 and a biography by a descendant,
Elisabeth Batt, appeared in 1976. Both provide a useful glimpse into Monck's
character and family circumstances and paint a detailed picture of the social aspects
of the viceregal role.5 The collected letters are largely restricted to family
correspondence, however, and access to correspondence with Newcastle, secretary of
state for the colonies during much ofMonck's term in Canada, is limited.6 The Batt
biography focuses almost exclusively on Monck's Canadian term, which is not
surprising, as Monck did not hold any other major office. Despite its many merits, it
is marred by sloppiness in citations and an occasional failure to emphasise the
historical significance of some of the issues that are explored.
Lisgar has not been the subject of a full biography, save one relatively recent
article published in Australia.7 He has no archival manuscript collection, since his
papers were destroyed after his death. Lisgar's correspondence must be
reconstructed through the use of other manuscript collections. The Granville and
Kimberley papers contain much useful correspondence, as each held the Colonial
Office portfolio during Lisgar's time in Canada. The correspondence of Prime
Minister John A. Macdonald is also a valuable source. Presumably, the logistical
difficulties presented by the absence of any comprehensive manuscript collection
have discouraged any historical analysis of Lisgar's term.
Dufferin had a high profile in life and in death. A collection of his speeches
was published at the close of his term. His correspondence with Carnarvon,
secretary of state for the colonies during most of his term, was printed in 1955. In
addition, a number of biographical studies have been produced, beginning with two
in 1878, the year he left Canada. Naturally, these focus on his Canadian term. One
of these, by William Leggo, is especially useful insofar as it includes a significant
amount of official correspondence. Two more biographies, by Charles Black and
Alfred Lyall, followed in 1903 and 1905, respectively. The latter of these is the
more reliable and also provides valuable excerpts from Dufferin's personal
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correspondence with family members, friends, and prominent political and social
figures. Harold Nicolson's 1937 biography, Helen's Tower, is an affectionate and
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colourful account of the life of a favourite uncle. While all of these studies provide
assessments of Dufferin's character, none directly considers the extent to which that
character guided Dufferin in the performance of his duties, and his term of office is
not explicitly compared to that of any other governor.
These individual biographies are essential background to an understanding of
the viceregal office. They provide material that supplements the manuscript
collections of each governor general. But the manuscript collections of the
individual governors and secretaries of state—where they exist—are in themselves
the single most valuable source for this study. The official despatches, part of the
Colonial Office correspondence in the Public Record Office's CO 42 and CO 537
collections, are important, but do not usually contain the detail found in the private
letters. The governors tended to be personally acquainted with the cabinet ministers
who held the Colonial Office portfolio, and it was often thought prudent to restrict
in-depth discussions to private letters. Many of these letters are surprisingly candid.
Letters and journals of family members are also an important source. Elgin's letters
to his wife in the early days of his term provide details of his plans to implement
responsible government. As the daughter of Lord Durham, she evidently took an
interest in constitutional reform and welcomed the vindication of her father's views.
Monck's sister-in-law and Dufferin's wife each kept a journal of activities at
Government House. Contemporary newspapers also offer the opportunity to gauge
public opinion in both Canada and Britain when controversial issues arose.
In addition to this primary material, this study relies upon secondary
observations surrounding the key events that marked each governor's term of office.
The key secondary material on such issues as the 1871 Treaty of Washington and the
Pacific Scandal has been surveyed, in addition to more general histories of Canada.
In addition, this study has consulted the works of constitutional experts ranging from
Walter Bagehot and Alpheus Todd to Arthur Berriedale Keith, W.P. Kennedy and
Eugene Forsey.9 Each of these has drawn together and offered commentary upon
contentious constitutional episodes in Canada and the Empire. As such, these studies
have much to offer. Nevertheless, a gap remains to be filled.
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The present study aims at a marriage of constitutional history and biography.
It seeks, on the one hand, to survey a range of viceregal appointees, rather than one
alone. This will enable comparisons to be drawn around how each interpreted
similar circumstances, and will offer the opportunity to assess the importance of
precedent. In addition, and perhaps paradoxically, looking at more than one
governor general better enables us to weigh the significance of the individual
character of each. During the period in question, constitutional conventions
governing the viceregal role were in a much more fluid state, and the degree of
activism exhibited by the office holders was in large measure determined by their
personal inclinations. The backgrounds of the men themselves are therefore of
considerable consequence. Their past experiences, political convictions, social
connections and personal judgement all play a role.
The lack of any comprehensive study of the governor general's office has
contributed to a pervasive misunderstanding of Canadian constitutional history.
Many Canadians imagine that Confederation in 1867 is in some respects a more
peaceful equivalent of the Americans' 1776, that it heralded a separation from
Britain and achievement of nationhood. The true hinges of Canada's constitutional
history—the achievement of self-government in 1848, and the Statute of
Westminster in 1931—do not resonate with Canadians at all. The outward continuity
of the governor general's office throughout this period masks the fundamental
changes in function that occurred. Interestingly, while historians and other observers
ignore the real and significant change that occurred in how the office functioned after
1848, they impose an artificial and misleading break in events at 1867. Lord Monck,
the governor general at the time of Confederation, had in fact filled the role since
1861, yet most sources describe him as having assumed the office in 1867.10
Confederation in 1867, the event usually seen as the watershed in Canadian history,
did not herald any substantial change in the governor general's role. He was
thenceforward officially styled the "governor general", rather than "captain general
and governor in chief', but this adoption of the title that had long been used in
practice was not immediately accompanied by any revised set of duties. The
negotiation of the coalition government that was a key enabling force behind
Confederation allowed the governor general to retreat from his former level of
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political involvement. But the coalition, and not Confederation itself, was the causal
agent that brought this about. Going along with this fundamental distortion in the
historiography of the office is a tendency to discount any continued role for the
governor general after 1867. Any function he carried out as resident head of state
and guardian of the constitution is dismissed as being merely ceremonial, or, at
worst, a misguided attempt at imperial interference.
Prior to any consideration of each office holder, it is necessary to come to
some understanding of the bare, constitutional parameters of the role—the letter, if
not the spirit, of the office of governor general. Until the documentation was
standardised in 1878, each governor general brought with him specially drawn up
Letters Patent and Instructions. The Letters Patent offered vague direction at best,
and many of the powers they conferred upon the governor general were, if not
obsolete, then certainly misleading. The governor was empowered to appoint
Judges, Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, and other officers and ministers, and
to remove or suspend any of these from office. He was authorized to grant a pardon
or respite to any offender convicted of any crime. He was authorized to exercise all
of the sovereign's power in respect to summoning, proroguing, or dissolving
Canada's legislature. He was further empowered to give authority to the several
lieutenant governors and to appoint deputies. He was authorized to exercise the
Queen's power with respect to marriage licenses, letters of administration, probates
of wills, and with respect to the custody and management of those with mental
illnesses or disabilities and their estates. The Letters Patent also instructed that "We
do hereby require and command all Our Officers and Ministers, civil and military,
and all other the inhabitants of Our said Dominion of Canada, to be obedient, aiding
and assisting unto you in the execution of this Our Commission".11
The accompanying Instructions are likewise unhelpful in forming a clear
concept of the actual duties of the viceregal office. The Instmctions required the
governor general to take an Oath of Allegiance, and to administer the oath to those
holding offices of trust. The governor general was instructed to communicate to
Canada's privy council these instructions and any other that should be imparted to
them from time to time. He was to summon the privy council, which was not to
conduct any business unless four members were present. If the governor saw
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"sufficient cause to dissent from the opinion of the major part... of .. .said Privy
Council" he was authorized to execute his powers in opposition to their opinion,
although the privy council was to record the reasons for any advice. The privy
council was to keep a full journal of all its proceedings. The governor was to ensure
that all laws assented to by him in the Queen's name were transmitted to Her
Majesty, accompanied by any explanations necessary. He was also to transmit
copies of the proceedings of Canada's parliament. Until 1878, the governor
general's instructions forbade him to give assent to any bill for divorce; for granting
land or money or gratuity to himself; for making paper or any other currency legal
tender; for imposing differential duties; contrary to treaty obligations; interfering
with the discipline or control of naval or military forces of the Crown; interfering
with the royal prerogative, or the rights and property of British subjects outside
Canada, or with the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom and its dependencies;
or containing provisions to which the royal assent had already been refused or which
had been disallowed.12 The instructions referred to the power granted to the
governor general by his Commission to pardon criminals and indicated that, while
the advice of the privy council should be sought, such pardons should be granted
"according to your own deliberate judgment", whether or not members of the privy
1 -2
council concurred. The only references the instructions made to the privy council
thus implied that the governor general was free to override its advice if he was
satisfied that he had sufficient reason. A governor who chose to follow this written
guide to the letter would have quickly found himself embroiled in controversy.
The written description of the office took little account of the constitutional
usages that had limited viceregal power since 1848. "Doubtless this is all very
indefinite," admits Arthur Berrriedale Keith of the Letters Patent and accompanying
instructions, "but it is in accord with the British love for leaving matters of this kind
to be regulated by practice."14 Goldwin Smith, an ardent nineteenth-century critic of
the viceregal office, described the Canadian constitution as having "a false front of
monarchy". The governor general represented the King "who reigns and does not
govern". While everything was done in the names of "these images of Royalty", "if
they dared to do anything themselves, or to refuse to do anything that they were told
to do, they would be instantly deposed". Canada, he noted, "prays each Sunday that
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they may govern well, on the understanding that Heaven will never be so
unconstitutional as to grant her prayer".15 Clearly, the written documents
surrounding the office of governor general do not in themselves provide a very clear
picture of the actual duties and powers that might be exercised.
Then, as now, however, the powers of the viceregal office were shaped to a
considerable extent by convention.16 Elgin, of course, is most significant in the realm
of establishing conventions, since the granting of responsible government was
entirely by convention and not enshrined in any statute. Yet not all conventions had
hardened into firmly established constitutional principles. The question of acting on
ministerial advice in the dissolution of parliament is a good example: Sir Edmund
Head and Lord Monck interpreted their duties differently under similar
circumstances. Monck granted a dissolution to John Sandfield Macdonald's ministry
in 1863, although an alternative ministry might have been formed. He deviated
deliberately from Head's example of 1858, rather than citing it as a precedent,
believing that it was necessary to redress the perceived injustice of Head's refusal of
a dissolution to George Brown's Liberal administration.17 Revealingly, both Head
and Monck were criticised for their actions at home. Long delays in trans-Atlantic
communication meant that, while it was possible for the Colonial Office to issue
directives about long-term goals, the governor was left to his own best judgement in
dealing with an immediate crisis. He could only hope that no emergency might arise
during his term of office that might require a decision about the use of his reserve
powers—the need to disallow legislation, refuse ministerial advice, dismiss an
administration, or exercise his own judgment in appointing a prime minister when
1 R
the choice was not obvious. The infrequency of such actions does not mean that
these powers had lapsed, only that great risk was attached to using them, and that
other, less provocative, remedies were usually available. Frank MacKinnon has
likened the modem governors general (and lieutenant governors) to "constitutional
fire extinguishers with a potent mixture of powers for use in great emergencies".
Like real extinguishers, they appear in bright colours and are strategically
located. But everyone hopes their emergency powers will never be used; the
fact they are not used does not render them useless; and it is generally
understood there are severe penalties for tampering with them.19
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As early as 1839 Lord John Russell recognized that responsible government hinged
upon all parties exercising restraint, and not pushing to the limit those powers they
possessed. Both in Britain and in a colony, "a sovereign using the prerogative of the
Crown to the utmost extent, and the House of Commons exerting its power of the
purse, to carry all its resolutions into immediate effect, would produce confusion in
the country in less than a twelve-month", he explained. "Each must exercise a wise
moderation".20
Despite the frequently asserted axiom that the role of the governor general is
analogous to that of the monarch, the conventions governing each are markedly
different. By Victoria's reign, it was understood that the monarch would act on the
advice of her ministers. This was not necessarily true in the case of a governor, but
in his case less risk was attached to such controversial action. Keith argued that
since the governor was "not permanent like the King... if he err[ed] he...[could] be
recalled".21 Walter Bagehot, too, seemed to see the governor's impermanent status
as at least partially advantageous. In his assessment of the English constitution,
Bagehot remarked on the need for an impartial arbiter to check party zeal and the
self-seeking impulses inherent in parliamentary government. "But can such a head
be found?" he asked.
In one case I think it has been found. Our colonial governors are precisely
Dei ex machina. They are always intelligent, for they have to live by a
difficult trade; they are nearly sure to be impartial, for they come from the
ends of the earth; they are sure not to participate in the selfish desires of any
colonial class or body, for long before those desires can have attained fruition
they will have passed to the other side of the world, be busy with other faces
and have other minds, be almost out of hearing what happens in a region they
have half forgotten.22
Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, during his brief tenure as colonial secretary, sent a few
"desultory hints" to Sir George Bowen, a new appointee to the governorship of
Queensland. "Remember", Bulwer Lytton admonished, "that the first care of a
governor in a free colony is to shun the reproach of being a party man. Give all
parties and all the ministries formed the fairest play." Alpheus Todd insisted that
the governor's position must be one of "strict neutrality". "He must manifest no bias
towards any political party, but on the contrary be ready to make himself a mediator
and a moderator between the influential of all parties".24
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This impartiality would especially be required if the governor general should
find that no single party was able to form a government and negotiations to form a
coalition became necessary. Factional bitterness between political rivals could make
it difficult for smooth negotiations to take place, and the role of the governor general
as the instrument through whom adversaries could come to terms should not be
overlooked. The governor general—like the sovereign—would presumably be
someone with considerable parliamentary experience, who could enable warring
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politicians to co-operate for the public good, yet still save face.
Definition of the governor general's duties is further complicated by the dual
nature of that role before 1926. Responsible government implied that he would act
on the advice of his ministers under normal circumstances, but this did not, of course,
obviate the necessity to follow instructions from the Colonial Office. The governor
general was required to disallow or reserve any Canadian legislation that was
contrary to any imperial statute which extended in its operation to Canada.
Legislation concerning trade regulations and tariffs, and that touching upon British
treaty obligations was especially subject to scrutiny. In this respect, the governor's
role differed considerably from that of the Queen: the royal veto of the governor
9 f\
general was very much "an active and not a dormant power".
Further, the governor general could be called upon to fulfil a quasi-diplomatic
function with respect to the United States. Elgin's successful negotiation of the
Reciprocity Treaty in 1854 is one example of this. The Reciprocity Treaty, however,
was sought in the interests of the British North American provinces, and only
indirectly those of the empire at large. At times, British interests would be at stake,
and the governor general would be in the unenviable position of having to pursue
simultaneously the diplomatic agenda of both Canada and his home government.
The Times remarked on Dufferin's appointment that "the intimate relation in which
the Dominion stands to the United States" was what "chiefly distinguishes the
position of a Governor-General of Canada". The example of the Washington Treaty
of 1871 was cited as an occasion "on which our Governors-General have been called
on for considerable diplomatic skill".27 Herman Merivale, permanent under-secretary
at the Colonial Office, pointed out that the governor, who was "the only political link
connecting the colony with the mother country... must see that the mother country
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receives no detriment. In this duty he cannot count on aid from his advisers: they
will consult the interests either of the colony or of their own popularity".28
As the first to hold office under the new system of responsible government,
subject to direction from two sets of ministers, Elgin looked optimistically to the day
when his changed duties as governor general should be clearly defined, but
complained that:
until that middle term which shall reconcile the faithful discharge of his
responsibility to the Imperial Gov[ernmen]t and the Province with the
maintenance of the quasi monarchical relation in which he now stands
towards the community over which he presides, be discovered and agreed
upon,—he must be content to tread along a path which is somewhat narrow
and slippery, and to find that incessant watchfulness and some dexterity are
requisite to prevent him from falling, on the one side, into the neant of mock-
sovereignty, or on the other, into the dirt and confusion of local factions.29
Interestingly, Head described his dilemma in strikingly similar terms. He had been
flattered to hear second-hand reports of how pleased the colonial secretary was with
his governorship ofNew Brunswick, but reported that it was unlikely to make him
vain as "I have a deep conviction as to the fallibility of Governors and the slippery
nature of the paths on[?] which they have to walk".30 Almost three decades later, the
ambiguity had not been resolved. Dufferin remarked that
A Colonial Governor is like a man riding two horses in a circus—no matter
how completely he has the one beast under control, the other will be sure to
play him some unhandsome trick, by flying off at a tangent on the strength of
a false rumour, or some extraneous hallucination.31
It should be stressed, however, that the fact that the governor general was answerable
to the imperial government in no way implied that he would be likely to intervene in
a domestic constitutional matter. The tendency of liberal historians to conclude that
the decision of the 1926 Imperial Conference reduced the governor's role to that of a
rubber stamp and signalled the end of his role in safeguarding the constitution arises
from a muddled grasp of the two distinct areas of gubernatorial responsibility.
Even when convention dictated that he carry out his duties on ministerial
advice, Elgin believed that the governor general still had an important role. By
acting with tact and firmness he "may hope to establish... a moral influence in the
Province which will go far to compensate for the loss of power consequent on the
surrender of patronage to an Executive responsible to the local Parliament."33 John
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W. Cell has noted that responsible government did not mean a simple diminution of
the governor's powers, but a profound change in how they were exercised:
He had to be more subtle, giving way gracefully before an incident could
develop, planting an idea in the mind of a politician only to feign surprise
when it was suggested to him a few days later.... The government of colonies
became if anything a more difficult and exacting job. It did not, at least at
first, become less important.34
The governor general, Elgin had concluded by the end of his term, could have "great
weight in the Colonial Councils" and could "constitute himself in a special manner
the patron of those larger and higher interests—such interests for example as those of
education and ofmoral and material progress in all its branches, which unlike the
contests of party unite instead of dividing the members of the body politic".35 The
governor general's "exalted position", Todd agreed, enabled him "to encourage
public and private morality". Dufferin immodestly described the governor general
as "a representative of all that is august, stable, and sedate in the country; incapable
of partisanship, and lifted far above the atmosphere of faction".37 In 1910 Wilfrid
Laurier praised Earl Grey, whose term as governor general was coming to an end,
asserting that "his constant object was to advance and to elevate the national
character in everything, and in all the human speculations which go to make up the
highest expression of civilization".38
This open-ended question of influence, along with the matter of constitutional
convention, left the limits of the viceregal role largely undefined. "The Governor
General of a great Colony has a singularly composite character", The Times
explained helpfully. "He is something of a constitutional King, something of a Prime
Minister, something of a Home Secretary, and last, not least, something of a
hospitable country gentleman."39 The Marquis of Lome, who succeeded Dufferin in
office, confessed his ignorance of the requirements of the position, and gallantly,
expressed to Dufferin his conviction that no one could adequately follow him. "So I
shut my eyes, shudder and say 'I'll try'. I rely on your footsteps to give me all the
help you can." There followed a list of questions about the current state of Canadian
politics, personal staff, accommodations, entertainment, and protocol. "I want... in
short to know all instead of next to nothing". "I am in fear & trembling", he
confessed.40 His fears were well founded. A governor general like Lisgar who kept
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a low profile was likely to be accused of indolence,41 but an active one, like Dufferin,
was viewed by some as meddlesome. A more active governor was not necessarily a
better governor.
Given the elastic nature of the governor general's role in the constitutional,
social, cultural and moral spheres, it becomes especially important to consider the
circumstances under which each incumbent operated, and their individual characters.
In large measure the grey areas of the governor general's role might be reduced to a
dynamic interplay of character and circumstance.42 It is helpful, and indeed
necessary, to come to some understanding of the nature of the individuals who held
the viceregal role. "Character", W.L. Morton observed in a study of Lord Monck, "is
of more than usual importance to a man who, by the nature of his office, must
persuade rather than command."43 Yet assessments of character must be made with
extreme caution. The historian is forced to construct a mental image using only the
tools of surviving correspondence, which may represent only a portion of the whole;
contemporary descriptions by acquaintances and colleagues who were not without
their own biases; and simple extrapolation derived from actions taken. Photographs
and other visual images are an intriguing supplement, but it is easy to use them
simply to confirm preconceived ideas. The long exposure times of nineteenth century
photographs gave portraits a frozen quality that hides subtle clues to character. This
caveat notwithstanding, a mental image of historical figures as flesh and blood
people can be a helpful means of remembering that they were, in fact, individuals.
Though it might be intriguing to attempt a kind of prosopographical study of
the viceregal office to arrive at a profile of a "typical" governor, attempts that have
been made to do something of the kind have not yielded any clear findings.44 The
five office holders considered in this study did share a number of attributes in
common, but they prove resistant to treatment as a "type". All were aristocratic,
broadly speaking, seen in the Canadian context, but only Dufferin, and arguably
Elgin, belonged in the innermost circle of the peerage. All, save Sir Edmund Head,
originated in the Celtic fringe of the British Isles. Head was also unique in that he
remained a baronet, and was not made a peer. Of the others, Monck, and Dufferin
originally held Irish titles, while Elgin was a Scottish peer. Even before his
Canadian appointment, Dufferin was a member of the United Kingdom peerage, and
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enjoyed considerable wealth and influence in court. Elgin was rewarded for his
service in Canada with a United Kingdom peerage, and was well connected at court,
but his estate was heavily encumbered. Although Monck and Lisgar were granted
titles in the United Kingdom peerage, they did not have Dufferin's wealth or
connections.
The five had varied backgrounds and experience, yet none seems to have
been chosen for any specific skill. Up until the 1840s, governors general were
frequently military men. In fact, Head recommended to Newcastle that his successor
should be "a distinguished military man", venturing that, given the climate of the
American Civil War, an experienced military governor "would be worth as much as
3,000 or 4,000 troops". Newcastle resisted the idea, however, noting that "the
government of military men in Canada has not been upon the whole very
encouraging for a repetition of the experiment".45 With the exception of Dufferin's
brief adventure as an observer in the Crimea, none of the five had any military
background. In the event, military affairs occupied Monck to an great extent during
his years in Canada. Three of these governors general had previous colonial
experience, although the utility of that may be questioned. Elgin's stint in Jamaica,
or Lisgar's in the Ionian Islands and New South Wales may not have offered much
useful basis for comparison. Although New Brunswick was a much smaller and less
politically advanced colony, Head's experience there might have been marginally
more useful. All five spoke French, Elgin with real facility. This offered the
governor general a real advantage in political negotiations and was an important
social asset, something that would contrast sharply with the limitations hampering
anglophone politicians. Most of the problems that each governor had to contend
with cropped up quite early in his term of office. Elgin arrived in 1847 and his
struggle over responsible government reached its crisis in 1849. Monck and Dufferin
were even less fortunate. The Trent crisis erupted when Monck had been in Canada
mere weeks. Dufferin had to contend with the Pacific Scandal after less than a year
in office. All except Head had some parliamentary experience, and Lisgar was
distinguished by having a great deal of it. Ironically, Lisgar was the only one who
faced a completely stable political climate in Canada, with John A. Macdonald
solidly in office during the whole of his term. Head, who had never sat in
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parliament, had to contend with a highly factious and tumultuous political
environment. Dufferin was the only one of the five with actual diplomatic experience
at the time of his appointment, although both Elgin and Lisgar were drawn into
diplomatic questions with the United States during their tenure.
The fact that the post carried a salary seems to have weighed heavily with
most of the men who accepted the appointment. Yet Elgin was only the first of the
five to discover that the financial rewards of the office were illusory. He found that
he bore heavy expenses in maintaining his official residence, and was constantly
surprised as new costs were revealed. He learned that he was financially responsible
for keeping the road to Monklands, his official residence in Montreal, clear of snow,
and that travel outside the capital, which was expected, was to be at his own expense.
He was expected to give frequent dinners for members of parliament "about 20 men"
two or three times a week.46 "The fact is", he confided to his wife, "that without
care I do not think my income here will cover all expenses. It amounts to about
£6,500 a year though it is called 7000". He resolved to write to the colonial secretary
about it, although there is "nothing I dislike so much as writing begging letters".47
He reported to Grey that he had been told that Metcalfe spent £6,000 per year of his
own money over and above his official income: "A little hard this on poor
successors".48 Monck confessed to his son Henry that money "one of the principal
objects I had in coming out to Canada". The family estate was encumbered with
inherited debt of some ninety thousand pounds, and Monck's financial obligations
included the support of his wife's five unmarried sisters as well as two of his own.
The sacrifice seems to have been in vain, since Monck found the expenses of office
such that he was unable to save a penny while in Canada.49 Sir John Young's
appointment came at a time when a Canadian bill to reduce the governor general's
salary—set at £10,000 at the time of Confederation—was being scrutinized in
Britain. It was widely rumoured that several high-profile candidates, including Lord
Mayo, had consequently declined the post. Sir Charles Tupper worried that owing to
the "mischief' over the salary, the British government would " now have to fall back
upon some third-rate man".50 In the event, the bill did not receive Royal assent and
the salary remained unchanged. Mayo, meanwhile, accepted the post of Viceroy of
India and was killed there in 1872. Dufferin had more resources than most of his
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predecessors in the office, yet the evidence suggests that he too experienced financial
strain. Lord and Lady Dufferin spent their own money lavishly to raise the standard
at Ottawa's Government House, redecorating and outfitting Rideau Hall for
entertaining. The Canadian government bore the expense of a new ballroom, while
Dufferin himself paid to have a curling rink built.51 He also had a steep wooden
toboggan slide constructed for the amusement of the family and guests. The
Dufferins began to use the Citadel in Quebec as an additional official residence,
Spencer Wood becoming the home of the lieutenant-governor of Quebec.53 The
Duke of Argyll wrote scolding Dufferin "so you are going to set up a 'permanent
house' in every city of Canada by turns. You will infallibly ruin your Paddy self'."54
A Canadian observer noted that "[i]t was Dufferin's failing that he had little or no
sense of the value of money." Dufferin reportedly considered it undignified to
receive his salary by cheque, and proposed instead that the amount be deposited to
his credit at the Bank of Montreal. This led to complications and some degree of
awkwardness when the governor general overdrew the account heavily.55 Near the
end of his term Dufferin calculated that he would "be able to cry quits with Canada,
or make my wife a Christmas box of £1000 as the fruits of my industry".5
All five of the governors were married men; indeed a suitable wife was
almost an essential qualification for the role, especially in the later part of the period
when the ceremonial and social aspects of the office grew. As the governor general's
political duties receded, this nebulous function became more conspicuous and the
wives of the governors general took on greater importance.57 An early twentieth-
century observer commented that "so many high traditions have clustered around
Government House at Ottawa that it now requires a woman ofmore than ordinary
endowments to live up to them".58 Only with the advent of the Dufferins were the
social possibilities of the viceregal role fully exploited. Lady Elgin, the former Mary
Louisa Lambton, was not present in Canada during the whole of Elgin's term, and
was absent from the social sphere at other times because of pregnancy and childbirth.
Yet, as the daughter of Lord Durham, she proved to be, one biographer noted, "a
passport to the hearts ofmany in Canada".59 Lady Head, who emerges from
photographs as a plain but dignified-looking woman, has been described as "a
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woman of fine presence, bright and intellectual", much given to acts of charity, but
she did not seem to take a high profile socially.60
Lady Monck was resident in Canada for only four of the seven years that
made up her husband's term of office. Part of this was attributable to the need to
seek out specialized education in Paris for Frances Mary, or "Fan", the Monck's
eldest daughter, who became deaf and mute at an early age because of scarlet fever.61
Lady Monck had been similarly reluctant to leave Ireland while Monck served as an
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MP and had declined to enter into London society. On the second anniversary of
sailing from Derry, Lady Monck remembered her trepidation and tears upon
departing for Canada: "I do not think better of the whole thing now than I did then,
but there must be some reason why God has moved us from home... He must know
best." The move from Spencer Wood in Quebec to Rideau Hall in Ottawa did
nothing to reconcile Lady Monck to Canada. "The members [of parliament] are so
angry at being brought here, no wonder", she confided to her son Henry. "I hate it
for Papa." She admonished him to keep her complaints secret from Lord Monck. "If
it was a life fit for him, I should not mind; but you see it is not, except for the
money."64 When Monck's term of office drew to a close, Lady Monck rejoiced to
her absent children that "this very dark time is nearly over".65 Lady Monck was
reputed to be a very private person who was sometimes taken aback by the informal
Yankee customs that had crept into Canadian society.66 A 1907 feature in Canadian
Magazine praised the "clever, tactful and winsome wives" of the governors general,
and pronounced that each—"with, at most, one exception"— was a great success.
The exception, in the reporter's view, seems to have been Lady Monck. She was
criticized for being too formal and lacking warmth. The obligatory social duties
that might not trouble a more extroverted nature, were torture for Lady Monck. "I
think these Saturday evenings are such bores—", she confessed to her son, "such a
drove of horrid people there and no others. My back gets quite stiff—drawing
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myself up lest they should insist on shaking hands with me." She was not
impressed with many of the wives of Canadian politicians. The wife of John
Sandfield Macdonald was, she allowed, "more presentable than Mme Cartier, tho' I
don't like her much".69 Despite her failure to win widespread popularity, Lady
Monck did make some friends among Ottawa's elite political circle. Thomas D'Arcy
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McGee called her "my Governess General" and described her as "one ofmy best
friends".70 John Rose and his family were also on intimate terms with the Moncks, as
was Edmund Meredith, a senior civil servant. Meredith found Monck "most
affable", while Lady Monck was reportedly very gracious, thanking Meredith for
making her laugh and letting her growl about life in Canada. She promised to send
him a card whenever she wished to have a growl about Ottawa, putting "growling"
instead of "music" or "dancing" in the corner.71 John A. Macdonald, according to
the Monck children, earned a place in their mother's bad books by vomiting on the
new chair covers in the drawing room.72 Monck's sister-in-law, Lady Frances
Elizabeth Monck, or "Feo" as she was known, also spent considerable time at Rideau
Hall, and was no more impressed with Canadian life and social customs. At the
Governor's New Year levee she hid behind a windowed door and watched in
fascinated horror at all the tradesmen who came to call. She strongly suspected that
many of them had only come for the lunch and lamented that "the G.G. had to shake
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hands with everyone of the dirty people".
Lady Lisgar has been excused by historical observers from the usual social
duties on the grounds that she and her husband were elderly and in indifferent health
and "therefore cut no great swath in the life of the country".74 Their dinners for
Canadian ministers have been described as gloomy affairs, punctuated by long
silences. Parties at Rideau Hall ended early, and abruptly, Florence Hamilton Randal
reported: "when guests were invited till the hour of eight p.m., the gas went out at
the fateful stroke, and the forlorn guests, huddled in the dark on the steps, waited
impatiently for their carriage to 'block the way.'"75 James Young, another
contemporary observer, contradicted this impression by asserting that
Rideau Hall gained in reputation for hospitality and gaiety under Sir John and
Lady Young. Her Ladyship was still a remarkably beautiful English-woman,
accomplished in music and art, and her charming manner made her as popular
a hostess at Rideau Hall as she had been at Phoenix Park, Dublin, and in New
South Wales.76
Henry J. Morgan agreed, asserting that Lady Lisgar
For years led society in its most brilliant phase, and made her social state
resplendent by her social attributes. As mistress of The Lodge, in Phoenix
Park, no one ever excelled her in the art of rendering her salons the centre of
the reunions of a brilliant city.77
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While Lisgar was almost sixty-two when he came to Canada—and by some accounts
"constitutionally older than his years"78—his wife seems to have been considerably
younger. She was reportedly born in 1821, which would have made her only
fourteen years old when she married the twenty-eight-year-old Young in April
1835,79 and forty-eight when in Canada—not in the first blush of youth, but hardly
elderly. Lady Lisgar, the former Adelaide Annabella Dalton, described as "one of
the noted beauties of her day",80 was the daughter of Edward Tuite Dalton and his
wife Oliva, afterwards Marchioness of Headfort.81 Agnes Macdonald, wife of the
prime minister, called upon the new governor general's wife soon after her arrival,
but Lady Lisgar was clearly not among her favourite chatelaines. She disapproved of
the sedentary luxury in which Lady Lisgar lived and thought she kept the rooms
overheated. Such self-indulgence was neither healthy, nor wise, the more austere
Lady Macdonald believed.82 Madame Desbarats, the wife of the Queen's printer in
Ottawa, was dismayed by Lady Lisgar's haughty and cold manner when she dined at
Government House. She only learned later that the gown she was wearing was an
exact copy of one of Lady Lisgar's own favourites, carefully reproduced by an
Ottawa dressmaker.83
Lady Dufferin marked a clear departure from her predecessors, and proved to
be a strong ally in Lord Dufferin's quest to exploit the social potential of his role.
Sandra Gwyn aptly suggested that Dufferin and his wife did not "so much
embroider... upon the office of Governor General as reinvent" it. The Dufferins
brought their two youngest children, Hermione and Basil, to Canada with them,
initially leaving the others—Helen, Archibald, Lord Clandeboye, and Terence—
behind to try "to learn a little French".85 Two additional children, Victoria and
Frederick, were bom in Canada. The arrival of her sixth and seventh child scarcely
seemed to slow down the redoubtable Lady Dufferin, who quickly resumed a
punishing schedule of social engagements, touring, and entertaining. Her energy
and enthusiasm were truly astonishing. Her journal entry for 15 February 1878 is not
atypical. After a late night banquet, she and Lord Dufferin played a morning curling
match, "the Viceregal Club against the Three Rivers—for the Caledonian medal".
("[Ajlas! we lost by one point"). This was followed by an hour's skating, after
which the viceregal couple hurried home to dress for a reception, and then played
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host to the chief justice, who had been invited for tea. After a dinner engagement
they opened an exhibition for the Art Association of Montreal. "Some of the
principal people came to our room afterwards", she records.87 Lord and Lady
Dufferin seem to have been kindred souls in this regard; her memoir of Burma noted
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that Dufferin gave seventeen speeches in one day. In Canada, dinner parties for
twenty-five were an almost daily occurrence, punctuated by larger, more formal
affairs—balls, receptions, skating and garden parties— where the guest lists could
exceed one thousand. The viceregal couple never seemed to tire of official duties that
other incumbents found tedious. Lady Dufferin wrote with genuine warmth and
enthusiasm of receiving bouquets from schoolchildren, of listening to their songs ("I
cannot tell you what a pretty ceremony it was"),89 of overseeing decorations for balls,
ofmaking arrangements for amateur theatricals to entertain guests, of touring
factories, convents, asylums, prisons and hospitals.
Yet Lady Dufferin appears to have been happiest salmon fishing and
canoeing at Tadoussac. She was unperturbed by sleeping in a rain-soaked tent with a
pen knife under her pillow in case she had to cut her way out to escape from bears.
She was only mildly dismayed when she and Lord Dufferin burned the only boots
they had with them by sitting too close to the fire, and she gamely ate squirrels for
dinner, although they were "very nasty" and tasted of turpentine.90 The viceregal
couple accepted an impromptu invitation to a fellow fisherman's shanty on the St
John River but learned after several hours' journey that their host had no blankets.
"We swear that we like doing without blankets, and he is happy". Not surprisingly,
Lady Dufferin caught cold, but that did not prevent her from visiting a fish salting
operation at Perce, the details of which she noted in her journal with genuine
interest.91 Likewise, an inspection of the local coal mines was something she "did
not like to miss".92
The seemingly boundless energy of Lord and Lady Dufferin made them
unparalleled in their fulfilment of the social and cultural duties of the viceregal
office. They set a new, higher tone for the office of the governor general, one that
would perhaps guarantee its continuation in the future when the direct constitutional
duties of the post receded. From Dufferin's term of office, the viceregal role became
primarily associated with its burgeoning ceremonial, social and cultural traditions.
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The governor general increasingly would be expected to travel throughout the
Dominion, giving speeches, awarding prizes, touring facilities, and promoting
cultural pursuits.93 This function has now become the most visible aspect of the role,
and perhaps the most obvious focus for a study of the governor general. The present
study, however, will only address the ceremonial component of the office in a
peripheral way. The constitutional element of the role, by its very nature, has usually
been obscured, except in time of crisis. As the governor general's function in the
political and constitutional spheres has been less understood, it is an inviting topic
for study. Most significantly, the confluence of constitutional precedents and
conventions, and the element of personality merits closer attention.
The following chapters will consider incidents in the term of office of each of
the five governors general between 1847 and 1878. Collectively, these incidents help
to reveal the evolution of the governor's constitutional role. As part of this analysis,
elements of character will be discussed. Despite some attributes in common, it is
undeniable that these five men were not only distinct, but very different individuals.
Elgin, while family-oriented and often sentimental, was matter-of-fact and pragmatic
in dealing with the demands of colonial government. Head was highly cultured and
educated, but perhaps lacked the common touch that might have enabled him to
smooth over political factions. Monck's previous experience was not especially
promising, yet his personal attributes enabled him to successfully negotiate
considerable diplomatic and political challenges. He was intelligent and open-
minded, and possessed the right mix of flexibility and firmness. Lisgar, in keeping
with his previous parliamentary experience, tended to exercise most of his influence
behind the scenes. He attracted little attention to himself or his role, either from
contemporaries or later historians, and his activities have been consequently
underestimated and misjudged. Dufferin, by contrast, was flamboyant by nature. He
frequently had to vigorously resist his own impulses to get involved in political
controversies, but, on the positive side, his high-profile social and cultural efforts did
much to elevate the status of the viceregal office. These intangible factors—the
elusive question of character—mattered a great deal. Even if on occasion a governor
general with specific skills—military, political, or diplomatic—had been sought,
there were no guarantees that the circumstances that arose during his term would be
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those requiring that experience. Indeed, events usually transpired otherwise. The
chapters that follow are an attempt to trace this interplay between character and
circumstance that makes up the history of the governor general's office.
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The "Great Experiment":
Elgin, Grey and Responsible Government
Elgin is deservedly remembered as the governor general who made the single most
important contribution to Canada's constitutional evolution. Arguably as significant
as Confederation, Elgin's acceptance of and adherence to the principle of responsible
government heralded a new era in Canada's political life. It also marked a profound
change in the office of the governor general. The year 1848 might be properly seen
as the "hinge" of the imperial relationship. Elgin demonstrated that the idea of a
self-governing colony, an idea some had dismissed as a contradiction in terms1, was
indeed workable. Such a system, however, would call for a new approach by Elgin
and his successors. Still a guardian of imperial interests where external matters were
concerned, the governor's role in internal matters was far from extinct, although it
had become more sensitive than ever. The governor continued to fulfil the function
of constitutional watchdog in the event of a political crisis but, under normal
circumstances, left the day-to-day operation of domestic politics to his ministers.
Whatever sway the governor might exercise over domestic policy would be
• 9
determined by his influence, and not by any definable power. The character,
personality and prestige of the governor as an individual became more important
than ever. The introduction of responsible government was not firmly fixed in any
statute. Elgin's actions, animated by his instructions from Earl Grey, the colonial
secretary, and his own philosophy of empire, helped to establish a precedent, a new
constitutional convention, that his successors would be bound to follow. Like most
trail blazers, Elgin bore the brunt of the difficulties of the transition. The attacks
were not only personal but physical. The story of the stormy passage of the
Rebellion Losses Bill in 1849 is a familiar one in Canadian history. Nevertheless,
the events surrounding it merit attention in a study of the office of the governor
general, as they heralded the single most dramatic shift in the nature of that role.
James Bruce, eighth Earl of Elgin and twelfth Earl of Kincardine, was bom
20 July 1811 in London, the son of Thomas Bruce, the seventh Earl of Elgin and
eleventh Earl of Kincardine, and his second wife, the former Elizabeth Oswald.
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From an early age, James Bruce must have been conscious of the notoriety
associated with his name. His father, while serving in Constantinople as an
ambassador to the Sultan of Turkey had cultivated an interest in Greek antiquities,
alarmed by the apparent indifference of the Turks to ancient Greek treasures under
their control. He secured permission from Turkish authorities to remove the so-
called "Elgin Marbles" from the Parthenon and transport them to Britain. The
Foreign Office declined Elgin's request to finance this rescue—or raid—of neglected
antiquities, but Elgin pressed ahead, spending an estimated £62,440 to recover the
treasures. The episode played a significant part in the financial hardships that
encumbered the family for generations. In 1812, the seventh Earl's liabilities were
estimated at £123,440.3 By 1853, when James Bruce held the Earldom, debts on the
estate amounted to £170,000.4 But debt was only part of the problem. The seventh
Earl's bid to save Greek architectural treasures was condemned by many
contemporaries as the act of a rapacious despoiler, intent on stripping the Greek
people of their rightful cultural legacy. Lord Byron called him "the last, the worst,
dull spoiler" of Athena's sacred shrine.5 "The Curse ofMinerva" re-visits the theme,
extending Byron's condemnation to "all his seed: /Without one spark of intellectual
fire,/ Be all the sons as senseless as the sire".6
The seventh Earl also had to bear the notoriety of his widely-publicized
marital troubles. While based in Turkey, Elgin fell victim to a mysterious ailment
that ate away his nose. He claimed to suffer from an ague, but rumours circulated
that the disease was in fact syphilis, contracted in the local brothels.7 His beautiful
young wife, the bright-eyed and vivacious Mary Hamilton Nisbet, after bearing five
children in five years, announced that they should henceforward live as friends, and
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not husband and wife. While detained in Paris by Napoleon's forces, she sought
comfort in the arms of Robert Fergusson, the young and handsome heir to an estate
in Fife. Her husband learned of her adultery through correspondence intercepted by
friends and began divorce proceedings. He sought damages of £20,000 from her
seducer, and all the sordid details were aired in court. Servants were called upon to
testify about mysterious stains on sofa cushions, and newspapers promised "All the
details of her Ladyship's private life! Exclusive accounts of her affairs in France and
England!" While she went on to marry Fergusson, the erring wife found herself
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deprived of her children, and was ultimately buried in an unmarked grave because of
the enduring shame associated with her name.9
James Bruce, the eldest son by Elgin's second marriage, was raised in an
atmosphere of evangelical Christianity,10 and seems to have been inculcated with a
strong sense of familial responsibility. His later correspondence showed a deeply-
rooted spirit of obligation to the duties associated with Broomhall, the heavily-
encumbered Scottish estate to which he fell heir. The seventh Earl and his new wife
Eliza spent most of their time in France, where expenses were lower and creditors
more distant. Their four children became French speakers.11 James was educated at
Eton, and Christ Church, Oxford where his contemporaries included Lord Canning,
James Ramsay (later Lord Dalhousie), the Duke of Newcastle, Sidney Herbert and
William Ewart Gladstone. Gladstone described the future Lord Elgin as the most
eloquent speaker of all those he had known at Eton and Christ Church.12 Perhaps
reacting against his father's profligate habits, James developed what Sydney
13
Checkland described as "an evangelical hatred of waste and ostentatious spending".
In 1832 he was elected Fellow ofMerton College. One of the examiners was Sir
Edmund Head, who later succeeded Elgin as governor general of Canada.14 For
seven years, James took over the thankless task ofmanaging Broomhall, which at
least offered the opportunity to gain business experience. The estate included coal
and lime mining operations, and a railway.15
In 1840, James' elder half-brother, George, Lord Bruce died. This meant that
the estates of the seventh earl's first wife, who was still living, would never be united
with those of the Elgin family. It also meant that James was now heir to the earldom;
his succession came the following year, when the seventh Earl died in Paris. In the
meantime, James had accepted the financial help of Sir Robert Preston and launched
a political career. In July 1841 he was elected Conservative MP for Southampton.
While a Tory, committed to the idea of a hierarchical society, he pragmatically
accepted the trend toward democracy and free trade, and believed government must
protect the interests of the working class and the weaker members of society. James
had also been influenced by his friendship with the renowned Scottish Church leader
Thomas Chalmers, whose sermons he committed to memory.16
35
The year 1841 also marked James' marriage to Elizabeth Mary, the only child
of Charles Lennox Cumming Bruce, a distant relation, and Mary Elizabeth Bruce.
Only twenty years old, Elma, as she was known, was a beauty, and heir to the
Cumming Bruce fortune. James' elevation to the Scottish peerage rendered him
ineligible to sit in the House of Commons, so the new Lord Elgin looked to the
option of a colonial appointment.17 A salaried post was a necessity, given the legacy
of debt he had inherited. The appointment of Augusta, Elgin's sister, as lady-in-
waiting to Queen Victoria's mother, the Duchess of Kent, offered increased
opportunities to bring the family to the attention of the Court. In April 1842, Elgin
was offered the post of governor of Jamaica by Lord Stanley, colonial secretary in
Peel's government. Shipwrecked en route to Jamaica, Elgin's pregnant young wife
suffered a shock that appears to have permanently damaged her health. In August
she was very ill after the birth of her daughter Elizabeth Mary, but recovered, only to
die after giving premature birth to another daughter in June of the following year.
The child lived only hours. While Elgin had the support of his sister Charlotte, who
came to Jamaica to help care for little "Elma", and his brother Robert, who acted as
his secretary, his grief weighed heavily upon him, and made it difficult for him to
fulfil his social role. In the spring of 1846, while on leave in Britain, a discouraged
Elgin asked to be relieved of his post.18
Stanley had earlier suggested to Elgin that the governor generalship of
Canada could be his if he wanted it, but by the time Elgin returned to Britain, Peel's
government had fallen, and a Whig ministry was in office. Elgin assumed that this
would put an end to any further patronage appointments, but the new colonial
secretary, Lord Grey, proved to be supportive, and made a formal offer of the
Canadian post.19 While Grey was personally unacquainted with Elgin at the time of
his appointment, they were soon to be related by marriage.
Within a few months of his return to Britain, Elgin met and married Grey's
niece, Mary Louisa Lambton, daughter of Lord Durham. Mary had accompanied her
father on his famous mission to the Canadas in 1838. Indeed, Elgin vowed to his
wife that he would make every effort to govern Canada under the system Durham
had recommended, and that once this was implemented, "[Durham's] title to be
considered a great benefactor to his country could no longer be disputed".20 The
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Lambtons were far wealthier than the Elgins, although the Elgin name was more
prominent and had a longer history. Widely read and cultured, Mary was personally
acquainted with Queen Victoria; they had been childhood playmates. In addition to
these assets, Elgin's new wife proved a source of domestic comfort and a steadying
influence in his life.21 During the times when Elgin's duties dictated a separation
from his wife, he wrote to her constantly, adding new pages each day until the post
would leave. He shared the trials of his Canadian experience, and included details
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that were to be shared with "King Henry", as he secretly called Grey. Married
only two months when he had to depart for Canada, his wife already pregnant, Elgin
wrote to Mary in a melancholy tone of his "heavy heart" while the Hibernia carried
him further from her and "the Atlantic rolls between us".23
Elgin, for all his apparent calm pragmatism, was a sentimental man, devoted
to his wife and children. In addition to his daughter by his first marriage, Elgin and
Mary Louisa had other children. A child was still-bom in Canada in August 1847.
Their eldest son, Victor Alexander, who would inherit his father's title, was bom in
May 1849, followed by two more sons and a daughter. Near the end of his Canadian
term of office, Elgin had mixed feelings as he returned alone to the governor
general's residence at Spencer Wood in Quebec, lamenting the absence of "merry
little voices" at home. While he had been eager to rejoin his family in Britain, his
emotions upon returning to Spencer Wood surprised him. He landed quietly at the
coves so as not to attract attention on a Sunday but was touched by the genuine
warmth of the people who put their heads out of their windows to greet him. One old
lady whispered "Welcome home again!" and the words seem to have struck a chord
with Elgin. He even considered the idea of remaining in Canada:
Might I not, if I had chosen, have gone on living in this lovely spot, in a good
climate, with my family around me, with sufficient business to engage and
some source of usefulness to cheer me? I feel surprised that this did not
strike me more forcibly before— why do such thoughts press themselves so
much more strongly now? Is it only because of the beauty of this spot and
the associations belonging to it? Not perhaps only—for as you know I
always had a strong bias toward remaining in Canada ....24
For Elgin, the separation from family was clearly the most difficult aspect of the
life he had chosen. While en route to a mission to China in 1857, he confided, "I
have got dear B[ruce]'s large speaking eyes beside me while I am writing, and mine
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(ought I to confess it) are very dim, while all these thought of home crowd upon
me."25 On his birthday he found himself especially sorry to be alone. He thought
with longing of "the smiling countenances with which I should have been surrounded
at home, and the joyous laugh when papa, with affected surprise, detected the present
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wrapped up carefully in the paper parcel on the breakfast table." Yet Elgin was
convinced that overseas service was the route to the elusive financial security he
desired for his family. He grew reflective while the ship carried him to take up the
post of governor general of India in 1862:
What a strange career it has been! How grateful I should be to Providence for
the protection I have enjoyed! How wild it seems, to be about, at the close of
twenty years, to begin again. At any rate, if this does not answer to me
personally, I hope that it may enable me to put the children in a better
position.... 27
Sadly, a little over a year later, Elgin learned of the sudden death of his youngest
son, Charles who was at school in Britain. Soon afterward, Elgin himself suffered a
heart attack while crossing a twig bridge over a gorge of the Chandra River. He
lingered for a few weeks, his wife and daughter Louisa by his side, drawing comfort
from a portrait of his "angel boy", but died 20 November 1863 at Dhurmsala, aged
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fifty-two. While the viceregal post was regarded as the plum imperial appointment,
it proved fatal to Elgin just as it had to his predecessors, Dalhousie and Canning.
Portraits ofElgin in Canada suggest a man of short stature, short-waisted and
thick bodied, with thinning hair swept over a bald crown and greying mutton chop
whiskers. His jaw was firm, and his eyes dark, clear, and bright with a kindly
intelligent expression. American newspapers described Elgin as "John Bullish in
walk, talk, appearance and carriage".29 Another observer noted that while some men
in the service of the British empire have looked their part, others, like Elgin "have
been plain men in plain clothes". A later writer described him as
a middle-aged, middle-sized man, approaching corpulence, with a kindly
Scots face expressing bonhomie rather than intelligence. His character did
not belie his rosy visage: he loved good cheer and was not averse to a glass of
champagne.30
Only thirty-six at the time of his arrival in Canada, and in rude health, Elgin
contrasted well with his predecessors in the post. When resident at Monklands, three
miles from the parliament buildings in Montreal, Elgin enjoyed making his way to
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his office on snowshoes.31 To the people of Canada, Elgin would have seemed a
refreshing change from the series of delicate specimens who had held the viceregal
office in recent years.32
Even as harsh a critic as Goldwin Smith had to acknowledge that, as governor
general, Elgin was "calm and wise".33 Lord Tweedsmuir considered Elgin "the
ablest... of nineteenth century viceroys".34 Elgin's personality enabled him to
maintain an attitude of tolerant impartiality and firm determination, even under very
tumultuous circumstances. While his cautious conduct during the Rebellion Losses
Bill crisis drew criticism from many quarters, he was rewarded with elevation to the
peerage of the United Kingdom. Elgin recognized, however, that there were
occasions on which a little posturing was useful. Elgin's secretary, Laurence
Oliphant, who accompanied him to Washington to negotiate the Reciprocity Treaty,
remarked with admiration on how readily Elgin put aside his aristocratic reserve,
adapted himself to American society, and won popularity with his American hosts.
"Lord Elgin's faculty of brilliant repartee and racy anecdote especially delighted
them".35 As envoy to China in 1857-8, Elgin made up his mind to act the part of the
"uncontrollably fierce barbarian", a strategy which seems to have won the respect of
the Chinese plenipotentiaries. At times, Elgin experienced difficulties reconciling
his duties as a servant of the British empire with his ideal of Christian conduct. Sent
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to punish the Chinese for the capture of British subjects from the lorcha Arrow and
the desecration of the British flag, Elgin was also charged with enforcing the terms
TO
agreed upon at the end of the Opium War of 1842. He won praise for his mission,
and especially for his decision to send the troops at his disposal to Canning's aid
during the India Mutiny, but Elgin seemed unable to take any pride in his role in
subduing the disturbance. He read Russell's account of the events in India as he
made his way to a second mission to China in 1860. "Can I do anything", he
wondered to Mary, "to prevent England from calling down on herself God's curses
for brutalities committed on another feeble oriental race? Or are all my exertions to
result only in the extension of the area over which Englishmen are to exhibit how
hollow and superficial are both their civilisation and their Christianity?"39
The decisions that he had to make in Canada were less awesome, but Elgin
nonetheless experienced considerable strain. Despite the appearance of equanimity,
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he was an emotional man. Canadian politician William Howland recalled that when
he and some Reform colleagues visited Elgin at the height of the Rebellion Losses
Bill crisis to assure him of their support, "he was so much affected by it that he
actually shed tears. He was evidently much gratified".40 Elgin was a complex man;
normally able to maintain an air of calm conviction, he struggled inwardly.
Even as he attempted to implement Grey's directives, and interpret for
himself and for Canada how responsible government would function, Elgin walked
the tightrope of imperial and colonial interests and goals. His campaign to secure
British financial compensation for Canada for immigration costs, and his efforts to
see the repeal of the Navigation Laws, have been addressed in detail separately.41
These points are relevant also here to an extent, insofar as they offer an example of
how one governor general visualised his role. Elgin's assertiveness in pursuing
justice for Canada is in some respects surprising, given his lack of financial
independence. Elgin's early private letters to Grey betray some concern over
personal finances, and it might be expected that he would be eager to curry favour
with his chief at Downing Street.42 "The first desire of a colonial governor", Walter
Bagehot wrote, "is not to get into a 'scrape', not to do anything which may give
trouble to his superiors—the Colonial Office—at home, which may cause an
untimely and dubious recall, which may hurt his career".43 The voluminous private
correspondence between Grey and Elgin, published in 1937, reveals much more than
the rather spare official despatches, and suggests a very frank and candid
relationship. Historians who did not enjoy access to this material would not have
been in a position to appreciate Elgin's plainspoken nature. W.P. Morrell
acknowledged that there were private letters between governors and colonial
secretaries, but maintained that "the great mass of the correspondence was conducted
by the numbered series of dispatches".44 With respect to Elgin and Grey this was
clearly not the case. Early in his tenure as governor general, Elgin noted to Grey that
"should you have left office the Colonial Minister will have little idea ofwhat is
going on in Canada unless you let him see my private letters to you".45 These private
letters show that Elgin exercised strong advocacy for Canadian interests when he
believed they were not being adequately taken into account by imperial authorities.
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The exodus from Ireland in the wake of the 1847 famine presented an
immediate crisis for Canada and the newly-arrived Elgin. Immigration agents on
Canadian shores inspected the conditions on board immigrant ships and warned of
imminent disaster, a warning that Elgin conveyed to British authorities: "all the
Cork and Liverpool passengers are half dead from starvation", the chief agent at
Quebec lamented. "Good God! What evils will befal [sic] the cities wherever they
alight".46 The Times reported on the "Horrors of the Exodus to Canada", concluding
that "the Black Hole of Calcutta was a mercy compared to the holds of these
vessels". The implication was clear that a lack of regulation in Britain was to
blame.47 Yet Grey adhered to his laissez faire convictions both in terms of assisting
emigration, or regulating it. "[I]t would have been utterly impossible...to interfere
directly... without doing far more harm than good", he later reflected.48 Elgin, for
his part, strongly advocated assistance to Canada on the grounds that the colony was
being forced to bear the costs ofBritain's crisis. The provincial treasury was
depleted and "serious embarrassment" was looming, he warned.49 He rejected
Grey's arguments that Canada would ultimately benefit by such large-scale
immigration, and insisted that the condition ofmany of the immigrants made it
inevitable that they would become a public charge. As the province's financial crisis
became acute, Elgin wrote to Grey that "I am much annoyed at being obliged to dun
you again about Immigration expenditure... But I cannot help myself—My Ministers
have No Money".50 He also challenged Grey's argument that Canada enjoyed
military protection at British expense. Elgin pointed out that some Canadians
maintained that Canada would enjoy the same benefits through annexation to the
United States.51 After many months of pressure, and after Grey had consulted with
the British treasury, a grudging concession was made, and Canada was reimbursed
for the 1847 immigration expenses.52
Elgin also played Canada's advocate in the debate over the repeal of the
Navigation Laws. These laws required Canadian produce to be transported in British
or colonial ships and often meant that shipping rates were significantly higher from
Canadian than American ports, or even at times that transport was unavailable. Elgin
argued that the retention of these laws when all of the protective aspects of
mercantilist doctrine had been eliminated was an injustice to the colonies. He wrote
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to Grey very frankly about the economic devastation Canada faced in the wake of the
abandonment of British preference. Canada's hardships, he insisted, were "directly
... chargeable on Imperial legislation". What was more, "all the prosperity of which
Canada is thus robbed is transplanted to the other side of the lines as if to make
Canadians feel more bitterly how much kinder England is to the children who desert
her than to those who remain faithful".53 In the case of the Navigation Laws,
however, Elgin did not need to convince Grey that repeal was necessary. Grey was
firmly committed to free trade principles, and urged Elgin to express his views in
official form. The discontent in Canada which exploded in the Rebellion Losses Bill
riots could carry political weight in Britain, Grey confided as his government
struggled to secure the passage of the Navigation Bill.54 In this instance, Elgin's
usual candour could be used as a political tool.
Both of these episodes leave little doubt that it was not in Elgin's character
meekly to follow imperial directives in which he had no faith. It can be extrapolated
from this that he had a firm commitment to the principles of responsible government.
Fortunately, he and the colonial secretary were of one mind on the question. Grey
communicated his philosophy of colonial self-government to Elgin, but colonial
government could not be administered by remote control. It was up to the governor
on the spot to decide when and how to implement policy.
While at least one contemporary observer labelled the new system
"Elginism",55 Elgin did not invent the idea of self-government for a colonial
possession. The notion had been under discussion for many years.56 In 1836 the
Canadian reformer Robert Baldwin referred to the principle in a memorandum to
Lord Glenelg, pointing out that it had been part of the political creed of reform
politicians from as early as 1820.57 The best known advocacy of the concept came
with the publication of the Durham Report in 1839.58 Durham himself insisted that
his proposal amounted only to a decision to "follow out consistently the principles of
the British Constitution". It needed, he said, "no change in the principles of
government, no invention of a new constitutional theory". The Crown, he said, must
"submit to the necessary consequences of representative institutions". Durham
acknowledged the probable objection that such a system was not applicable to a
colonial dependency, but dismissed it with the assurance that the imperial
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government could continue to control those aspects of government which were its
own concern.59 As for legislation on internal matters, the colonists "have a greater
interest in coming to a right judgment on these points, and will take greater pains to
do so than those whose welfare is very remotely and slightly affected".60 Charles
Buller, a radical member of parliament who had accompanied Durham on his
mission to Canada, published a pamphlet in 1840 that explained the necessity for
responsible government in the colonies that enjoyed representative institutions.
Buller complained that the political philosophy of some "official wiseacres" was that
no colony should have self-government "until it becomes strong and discontented
enough to achieve its entire independence". Buller pointed to the smooth working of
the British system since 1688 as a successful model for any constitution with
representative government. To have representation but not executive responsibility
was an even greater evil than no representation at all: "It is better to be without a fire,
than to have a fire without a chimney", Buller warned.61 Edward Gibbon Wakefield,
the colonial reformer, who was also among the party that came to Canada in 1838,
echoed Durham's protestation that responsible government was, "after all, nothing
new". It was a "mere extension to our Colonies of an old rule or two of Government
long reduced to every-day practice by ourselves at home".
Elgin referred to responsible government as "y[our]r father's system" when
writing to his wife soon after his arrival in Canada. "I told you in those early
days", he reassured her on another occasion,
that I thought it ought to be possible (not easy)[?] to govern Canada under the
system introduced by y[ou]r father, and that if it was found to be possible to
carry on the Gov't under that system his title to be considered a great
benefactor to his country could no longer be disputed. I am fortified in this
conviction by all that I have learnt since I came here.
Elgin admitted that he did not know whether "Mary Lambton's husband" would be
the instrument to carry out this work, or whether he would "break down in the
attempt", as others had, but he remained optimistic that "the thing may be done". It
might fall to another "to effect that object which my affection for you as well as my
regard for my own fame would render me so desirous to achieve".64
To appreciate Elgin's success, it is necessary to review the issue of
responsible government in Canada since 1840. Two points become clear. The
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definition of responsible government was frustratingly opaque, and, secondly, much
depended upon how the individual governors general operated. Elgin was right that
there had been a long line of others who had "broken down in the attempt", either to
implement some form of responsible government or hold the line against it during
the ten year interval between Durham's Report and Elgin's recognition of the
principle. None openly avowed support for the idea, and their alternate actions and
reactions contributed to the condition of political uncertainty that prevailed in British
North America. The instructions sent by Lord John Russell to Durham's successor,
Poulett Thomson, (later Lord Sydenham) were ambiguous and contradictory,
susceptible to a range of interpretations.65 Russell warned Thomson that "you may
encounter much difficulty in subduing the excitement which prevails on the question
ofwhat is called 'Responsible Government'", but instructed him to refuse any
explanations that could be construed as acquiescing in the principle. The term's very
vagueness, he feared, could pose a danger. Russell rejoiced that the English
constitution had evolved into one in which the authority of the Crown remained
untouched but was never invoked without advice. "But if we seek to apply such a
practice to a colony," he cautioned, "we shall at once find ourselves at fault.... It
may happen... that the Governor receives at one and the same time instructions from
the Queen, and advice from his executive council, totally at variance with each
other". Russell allowed that "I have not drawn any specific line beyond which the
power of the Governor on the one hand, and the privileges of the Assembly on the
other, ought not to extend". He preferred to rely upon the "wise moderation" of
each.66 Nevertheless, Russell subsequently instructed that public offices in Canada
should no longer be held indefinitely, but instead "such officers [should] be called
upon to retire from the public service as often as any sufficient motives of public
policy may suggest the expediency of that measure". This in itself seemed an
important concession to principles of responsible government.
Thomson was not disconcerted by the ambiguity. A short while into his
tenure he boasted to a friend that "I am not a bit afraid of the responsible government
cry". He claimed that he had "already done much to put it down in its inadmissible
sense; namely, the demand that the council shall be responsible to the assembly", and
that the governor should be bound by their advice. Most people admitted "the
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absurdity of claiming to put the council over the head of the governor.... Either the
Q
governor is the sovereign or the minister". As Sydenham's term of office was cut
short by his death in September 1841, the extent to which he would have carried
responsible government into effect is open to speculation. His actions often belied
his words.69 One of Sydenham's successors, Sir Charles Metcalfe, believed that,
despite the objections he voiced to the principle of responsible government,
Sydenham in fact strengthened it. His practices had "ensured, with the certainty of
cause and effect, that the Council of the Governor should regard themselves as
responsible, not so much to the Governor as to the house of Assembly". Sydenham
adopted "the very form and practice of the Home Government". If this was not his
intention "he was more mistaken than from his known ability one would suppose to
be possible; and if he did intend it, he, with his eyes open, carried into practice that
very theory of Responsible Colonial Government which he had pronounced his
opinion decidedly against."70
This uncertain legacy made the appointment of Sydenham's successor a very
sensitive matter. A Conservative ministry took office in 1841, with Lord Stanley
serving as colonial secretary. The change in administration did not herald a
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significant change in policy toward Canada, however. Sir Charles Bagot, the new
governor, was still meant to resist any concessions to the principle of responsible
government, and Bagot's instructions from Lord Stanley were strikingly similar to
those Sydenham had received. Stanley advised Bagot to steer the populace away
"from the discussion of abstract & theoretical questions, by which the Government of
Canada, in former times, has been too often and too seriously embarrassed". He was
to avail himself of the services of the "ablest Men, without reference to distinction of
local party". Yet Stanley's apparent rejection of the doctrines of responsible
government, which was implicit in his dismissal of party politics, was tempered by
the warning that "it would be matter of great regret, that measures should be
repeatedly & deliberately affirmed by large Majorities of the Assembly, &
subsequently rejected by the Legislative Council." 72
Events would not permit Bagot to avoid the issue of responsible government
altogether. A ministerial crisis in September 1842 compelled Bagot to invite
Reformers Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine and Robert Baldwin to his Executive
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Council, along with several of their colleagues. The cabinet still contained some
Tory members, and Bagot made the appointments before the previous ministry had
fallen to a threatened no-confidence vote, but the episode dealt an important blow to
the ideal of personal rule by a governor with a hand-picked council. Bagot felt
obliged to explain the pressures behind his concession. He hoped Stanley and his
cabinet colleagues would approve of his actions, since his only alternative would
have been to appoint a new council "prepared to act without the sympathy and
against an overwhelming majority of the House of Assembly.... The consequences
would have been most disastrous." 3 Bagot realised the implications of what he had
done. "Whether the doctrine of responsible government is openly acknowledged, or
is only tacitly acquiesced in," he informed Stanley, "virtually it exists".74
Like Sydenham, Bagot died before the full implications of what he had done
could be put to the test. His successor, Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, a veteran
administrator with experience in Jamaica and India, came to Canada in March 1843.
Unlike Bagot, who proved to be more liberal than his reputation promised,
Metcalfe's earlier reformist tendencies75 gave no hint of the reactionary flavour that
would mark his tenure in Canada. His clear-eyed analysis of the real implications of
Sydenham's concessions to responsible government suggests that he was less
comfortable than some of his predecessors with apparent contradictions. While
finding much to admire in the man's character, generosity, and courage, W.P.M.
Kennedy concluded that "it is impossible to read Sir Charles Metcalfe's life or to
study his dispatches without regretting that he came to Canada".76 Upon accepting
the appointment, Metcalfe himself admitted that the Canadian conundrum was
beyond his power: "I never undertook anything with so much reluctance, or so little
hope of doing good".77
Soon after his arrival, Metcalfe complained to Stanley that the precedents
established by his predecessors meant that the council was no longer selected by the
governor. He denounced the "evil" of party government which earlier concessions
had encouraged, and asserted that, while he would not shrink from a contest with the
Assembly if duty demanded it, he wished to avoid the "continual warfare" which he
realised would result if he dismissed his Reformist council. Metcalfe explained his
fear that some acts of the legislative assembly might be hostile to the interests of the
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mother country. "This ought to have been well considered before ... Responsible
Government was established. It is now, perhaps, too late to remedy the evil".78
A dispute with his advisers over control of the distribution of patronage
brought the inherent clash of ideals between governor and assembly to the fore. In
November 1843 Metcalfe's entire Executive Council, save one, resigned in protest
when the governor general took it upon himself to make an appointment without
cabinet approval. This act, along with his reservation of a controversial bill aimed at
curbing the activities of secret societies such as the Orange Order, demonstrated that
responsible government did not in fact exist in Canada. Metcalfe's actions,
supported by "loyal" Tories in Canada, also found favour with many influential
sympathisers in Britain. Edward Gibbon Wakefield voiced his approval,79 as did
opposition leader Lord John Russell. Even more meaningfully, Metcalfe was
rewarded with a peerage.80 In contrast to Sydenham who railed against responsible
government even while tacitly conceding it, Metcalfe insisted to Stanley that "I have
avowed my adherence to Responsible Government views to the fullest extent which
it can be avowed in a Colony". Only "Blindness or Disaffection" would account for
a desire to push the principle any further.81 By equating reform with disloyalty and
appealing to imperial patriotism, Metcalfe succeeded in securing a narrow
conservative majority in the elections of 1844. A clear-cut conflict between the
legislative assembly and the governor was thus averted. Illness cut Metcalfe's term
of office short and he returned home in November 1845 to live out the final few
months of his life. Unwittingly, Metcalfe might have advanced the process of
colonial self-government, not least because of the heavy reliance his illness forced
upon William Draper, who led his conservative executive council.82 Grey reflected
later that "the Governor, by his rupture with one party, was placed to a far greater
degree than was desirable in the power of the other, by which he was supported, and
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lost the means of exercising his proper authority".
Metcalfe was succeeded by Earl Cathcart, who was already in Canada as
commander of the forces. While it was usual for the military commander to assume
the governor's role during an interregnum, Cathcart was commissioned himself as
governor general in April 1846. A looming crisis over the Oregon boundary raised
the spectre of a military contest with the Americans, and Cathcart's qualifications as
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a soldier now seemed more relevant than finesse in placating Canadian political
dissidents. By July 1846, a treaty having averted war, and another change in
administration having taken place in Britain, this policy was reconsidered. Now,
under the administration of Lord John Russell, the new colonial secretary Earl Grey
decided it was "inexpedient that the same person should be both Governor General,
and Commander of the Forces, in British North America".84
The combination of Elgin in Canada and Grey in the Colonial Office is now
generally seen as the true driving force behind the shift in colonial policy. The
degree of influence each exercised over the development of colonial policy has been
questioned, however. Phillip Buckner has correctly pointed to a dramatic shift in
Grey's historical reputation.85 As late as 1928, Grey's political career could be
dismissed as "a distinguished and most creditable failure". The publication of the
Elgin-Grey correspondence in 1937, which lays bare the progress of Elgin's
implementation of the policy of responsible government, has no doubt contributed to
the belated recognition Grey has earned. J.L. Morison had earlier called the Elgin-
Grey correspondence "the most enlightening series of documents in existence on
mid-Victorian Colonial policy".87 This is not to say that Grey always had a clear
goal or unerring vision of imperial policy. He was known to have doubts even as he
gave encouragement to his colonial governors to pursue the new policy. Peter
Burroughs has cautioned against oversimplifying and homogenising Grey's views
and added that the idiosyncratic Grey "was not necessarily a typical or representative
spokesman of contemporary public opinion on imperial affairs".88 Of course, as
secretary of state for the colonies, and one who took the leading role in determining
policy, it does not really matter if Grey's ideas were reflective of popular views.
Grey left to posterity a memoir of his political career, which he modestly called The
Colonial Policy ofLord John Russell's Administration. Yet the degree to which
Lord John Russell shared Grey's vision for empire is open to question. Morison
maintained that Russell's chief virtue lay in "doing nothing to hinder a movement
which he only partially understood".89 W.P. Morrell likewise questioned the degree
to which Russell played a role in implementing the new colonial policy. Morrell
cited Palmerston's condemnation of Russell as "infirm of purpose, changeable in his
views" and suggested that Grey's experience bore this out.90 Helen Taft Manning
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has viewed Russell more generously, asserting that "no English statesman and few
Canadians made as great a contribution ... to the application of English
constitutional principles and practices to the government of British North America".
He had, she argued, "every intention of moving toward cabinet government on the
English model whenever the governor general thought it wise". The evidence cited
for this is an early draft of Grey's political memoir in which he recalled that Russell
contemplated introducing such a system into Canada during Sydenham's
administration but refrained because of the fear of creating fresh animosity so soon
after the insurrection.91
Phillip Buckner has taken issue with the prominence twentieth-century
historians have given to Grey's role in re-thinking colonial policy. He rejected the
idea that Grey's arrival at the Colonial Office heralded a watershed in Britain's
approach to the colonies. Buckner argued that there was more similarity between
Stanley's approach, and that of Grey, than is usually acknowledged. The evidence
for this assertion remains unconvincing, however. "Both", Buckner noted, "were
scions of wealthy aristocratic families"92—as indeed were most nineteenth-century
cabinet ministers. More significantly, Buckner pointed to the fact that Stanley did
not repudiate Bagot's concession to responsible government,93 overlooking the fact
that the Colonial Office would be unwilling to spark a fresh crisis in Canada in 1842,
and that Stanley also gave his approval to Metcalfe's resistance to responsible
government two years later. Buckner also cited as evidence the fact that Wakefield
and Buller, "with whom Grey was closely associated during the early 1840s", had
publicly defended Metcalfe.94 Yet this provides no indication of Grey's own views.
In 1848 Grey told Elgin very plainly that "you are right in your belief that by acting
on the very different policy of L[or]d Metcalfe (wh[ich] you know I never approved)
you w[oul]d have got into inextricable difficulties".95 In later years Grey again
concurred with Elgin's view that Metcalfe had been wrong in attempting to
manipulate Canadian politics. "What you say of L[or]d Metcalfe coincides
singularly with the opinion I have always entertained of him & his measures", Grey
wrote. "The truth is he did not comprehend representative Gov[ernmen]t at all, nor
from his Indian experience is this wonderful".96 Buckner appears to have attached
great importance to the timing of Grey's decision to embrace responsible
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government, suggesting that when Grey assumed office in July 1846 "there is no
indication that he was prepared to commit himself in advance" to responsible
government.97 Yet only a few weeks after his arrival in Canada, Elgin announced to
Grey that, while he would give his ministers "every constitutional support", he was
"equally determined... to act with the opposite Party if it is forced upon me by the
Representatives of the People".98 Grey replied that "the course you are taking
appears to me quite right".99 Buckner also based his conviction about Stanley and
Grey's philosophical similarities on the commitment each had to preserving a stable
constitution in an age of reform, a constitution in which the monarchy, aristocracy,
and popular will would be held in balance.1 0 Yet Grey's adherence to the ideals of
aristocracy and monarchy do not contradict his views about responsible government.
An executive council answerable to an elected assembly does not imply wholesale
democracy.101
Grey began his career in the Colonial Office as parliamentary undersecretary
in 1830. Lord Goderich, the colonial secretary, reputedly exerted such loose control
over his portfolio that Howick—as Grey was then known—was able to, in his own
words, exercise "all the power and authority of a Secretary of State".102 Howick's
intensive study of colonial questions ensured that, as Bell and Morrell noted, he
"soon knew far more and had formed much more definite opinions than his superiors
at the Colonial Office, that embarrassed nonentity Goderich, or ... the brilliant and
dictatorial Stanley". He had, they added, "too many principles, too quick a mind,
and too sharp a tongue to make an agreeable colleague in a government of
impressive, well-intentioned but inwardly rather bewildered amateurs".103 The
reform-minded Howick counted Wakefield and James Stephen, the permanent
undersecretary, as his early influences, although his disapproval of Wakefield's
personal misdeeds meant that he refused to maintain a friendship.104 Stephen
continued to be an influence throughout Grey's career, and was frequently consulted
on colonial questions.105 As secretary of state, Grey displayed a keen devotion to his
duties, carrying on a voluminous private correspondence with colonial governors in
addition to the official despatches.106 Sir William Molesworth speculated that Grey's
lack of popularity was attributable to his earlier associations with colonial reformers
who entertained great expectations of his policy once he was installed in the Colonial
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Office; "those exaggerated expectations have been disappointed", he explained.107
Another observer, while dismissing Grey as "singularly unhappy in his management
of colonies", allows—mistakenly it would seem—that he "deserves the entire credit
of the appointment of Lord Elgin as governor of Canada".108
The lodestar ofGrey's policies was free trade, and this was a key to his
convictions about the inevitability of colonial self-government. Grey was stout in his
opposition to any form of protectionism, which he regarded as robbery of the
community at large. He has been cited as an important influence in converting Lord
John Russell to free trade principles.109 Ged Martin contended that the real divide in
British policy came, not with the Durham Report, but with the introduction of free
trade in 1846.110 Helen Taft Manning remarked on Lord John Russell's 1848
proclamation in the House of Commons on the success of responsible government
and observed that "the coincidence of dates was a fortunate one. With the coming of
free trade and the opening of the Far East and China to British merchants, there was
no longer much interest in financial circles in England in the development of British
North America, and the mother country could offer nothing in compensation for the
loss of imperial preference in timber and wheat."111 The word coincidence is
misleading, however. The willingness to grant colonial self-government was clearly
linked with the dismantling of the mercantilist system that provided the original
justification for imperial control.
Since the governor was on the spot, and the secretary of state for the colonies
was not, it is tempting to attach more importance to the actions and ideas of the
former. Sydenham and Bagot, after all, acted in ways that advanced the principle of
responsible government, whether or not they had the concurrence of their chiefs at
Downing Street.112 "Colonial governors", Helen Taft Manning wrote, "applied their
own theories of government, sometimes rather eccentric ones, and they were too far
away and too much the source of all the official information reaching England to
make any effective supervision of their actions or policies possible".113 In the main
this is true, yet a qualification must be made with respect to Elgin's term of office.
Elgin had clearly been given an overall directive, and could count on active support
and encouragement, as opposed to the passive acquiescence that characterised the
policy of Grey's predecessors in the Colonial Office. Grey recalled later that "I had
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the opportunity of communicating with him very fully previously to his departure"
about the goal of implementing "the system of constitutional government which it
seemed to be the desire of the inhabitants of British North America to have
established among them". The "best explanation" of these views, Grey added, could
be found in his instructions to the lieutenant governor ofNova Scotia, Sir John
Harvey, a copy of which Elgin was given.114
In November 1846, before Elgin arrived in Canada, Grey issued the despatch
that has come to be seen as one of the key documents in the constitutional history of
British North America. In it Grey suggested that Harvey conform his practices to
analogies in the mother country. He should carry on the government through his
executive council as long as they possessed the confidence of the legislative
assembly. Any transfer of power from one political party to another should be the
result "not of an act of yours, but of the wishes of the people themselves, as shown
by the difficulty experienced by the retiring party in carrying on the government of
the Province according to the forms of the Constitution". It was essential, Grey
stressed, that the governor not identify himself with any one party. This did not
eliminate the reserve powers of the governor to refuse to sanction measures "which
may appear to you to involve an improper exercise of the authority of the Crown for
party rather than for public objects". Nevertheless, this power "depends entirely for
its efficacy upon its being used sparingly and with the greatest possible discretion".
The governor's refusal to accept the advice of his council would necessitate their
resignations. Therefore, such action must be avoided on "any matter not of very
grave concern, or upon which you cannot reasonably calculate upon being in the end
supported by...[public] opinion". Grey encapsulated his views in the much-quoted
admonition that "it cannot be too distinctly acknowledged that it is neither possible
nor desirable to carry on the government of any of the British Provinces in North
America in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants".115
Sir John Harvey did not reveal Grey's instructions to the people of Nova
Scotia at once, however. Instead, he continued to work toward a coalition of the
leading parties, a solution which Joseph Howe, leader of the Liberals of Nova Scotia,
and a staunch advocate of responsible government, refused to accept. Joseph Howe
had meanwhile been in frequent correspondence with Charles Buller, who applauded
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his resistance to a coalition and assured him that the new administration in Britain
was firmly committed to responsible government. Charles Buller also proved to be a
conduit of information for Grey, providing him with a perspective absent from
Harvey's despatches.116 When, at length Harvey informed Grey about the
impossibility of forming a coalition in the face of Liberal intransigence, Grey was far
from surprised.117 He responded with another despatch on 31 March 1847, which,
like his communication of 3 November 1846, emerged as a definitive statement of a
new colonial policy. Whereas Harvey had seized upon Grey's earlier warnings
against partisanship on the part of the governor to support his idea of a coalition, this
despatch put to rest any ambiguity and reiterated Grey's conviction that mainland
colonial governments in British North America should be modelled on the British
constitution.118 In an earlier draft of the despatch, which he showed to Buller,119
Grey reflected that "as every free government necessarily is a party government, I
think it is better that Nova Scotia should submit to the evils of party government
rather than be without the privileges of freedom".120 The defeat ofNova Scotia's
Conservatives in 1847 was not formalised until the next legislative session in January
1848. At this time, Harvey revealed the existence of Grey's two despatches and
accepted the resignations of his defeated council. Howe remarked to Buller that the
lieutenant governor had in the meantime been conducting matters "in direct
opposition to... [the] general tone and spirit" of Grey's despatches. Had the
Conservatives triumphed in the election "we should never have seen the despatches
at all", he marvelled. Howe vowed that Grey would not be disappointed in the
"generous confidence" he had placed in the people of the province. "It will be our
pride", he added, "to make Nova Scotia a 'Normal School' for the rest of the
colonies showing them how representative institutions may be worked... in
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subordination to the paramount interests and authority of the Empire". Joseph
Howe does indeed deserve full credit for his role in the introduction of responsible
government in Nova Scotia. He was, W.P. Morrell explained "the living
embodiment of the truth that it was not anti-British feeling, but love of British
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freedom, that gave the impetus to the demand for colonial self-government".
David Farr has remarked that, while responsible government was applied a
few months earlier in Nova Scotia, the Canadian experience made it decisive.123
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Certainly one key difference is that Nova Scotia's lieutenant governor only embraced
responsible government when it became apparent that all other avenues had been
exhausted. Elgin, by contrast, came to Canada in January 1847 with the idea firmly
fixed in his mind. The change in policy was not immediately apparent, since
William Draper's Conservative ministry continued to hold a majority in the
legislative assembly and Elgin was determined to do nothing to hurry them from
office.124 He wanted, he explained, "to avoid if possible giving the impression that I
am ready to jump down every body's throat the moment I touch the soil of
Canada".125 The introduction of responsible government in Canada, Chester Martin
has argued "was epochal for the whole Empire". The population of the united colony
was much larger than any other in British North America. What is more, the
problems of Canada—most notably the presence of two distinct and almost evenly-
matched national groups—made it especially challenging to govern.126 Joseph Howe
liked to boast that responsible government had been achieved in Nova Scotia without
blood being shed, a blow being struck, or a pane of glass shattered, but the violent
agitation for reform in Canada no doubt helped shape the colonial policy that was
applied in Nova Scotia.127
The particular choice of Elgin as governor general might easily be seen as
part of an overall scheme to implement responsible government in Canada. Yet this
seems not to have been the case. Elgin's family was well-connected in court circles
and Queen Victoria had reportedly suggested Elgin's name to Stanley before the fall
of the Tory government. The new Whig ministry set party considerations aside and
adhered to this plan.128 While Grey was not the first one to propose Elgin's name, he
was clearly optimistic that he would be the one to carry out his colonial policies
successfully. He insisted to Elgin that his talents were needed and that there was no
one whom he could recommend with as much confidence. He also hinted at the
prospect of elevation to the House of Lords, noting that both of the last two
governors of Canada had been made peers.129.
Moderate political reformers in Canada believed Elgin's appointment was
grounds for optimism as well. "[Cjhacun 1'attend comme devant apporter avec lui la
panacee politique universelle", Denis-Benjamin Papineau, brother of the radical
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Patriote Louis-Joseph, wrote with a hint of sarcasm. Of course, to radicals such as
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Papineau, no concession, no well-meaning attempt to include French Canadians in a
united legislature, would be sufficient. The fact of the union itself was an
insurmountable obstacle. Elgin insisted that the success of Canadian politics
depended upon the inclusion of French Canadians in a united government, and one of
1-3 1
his earliest acts was to try to bring this about. Unlike some of his predecessor—
and his famous father-in-law—he recognized the folly of forcing assimilation.
"Attempts to denationalize the French ... produce the opposite effect from that
intended, causing the flame of national prejudice and animosity to burn more
fiercely", he maintained.132 In February 1847 he delivered a confidential
memorandum to Augustin Morin, a French Canadian reform politician, with the
suggestion that he consult his friends about it. The memorandum explained that
Elgin was "sincerely desirous" that the interests and feelings of "that important
Section of the inhabitants, which is of French Origin, should meet with the fullest
attention & consideration". He expressed his wish to "have the means of including
in his Executive Council, Some of those Gentlemen, who enjoy in a high degree their
Esteem & confidence". He stressed that he had too great a respect for them to
suggest that they make any sacrifice of principles, but hoped that "personal or party
differences (if Such Exist) will yield to the dictates of Patriotism & Public Duty".133
Elgin's efforts were directed to bringing French Canadians into his council as
individuals, rather than through party representation. Indeed, Elgin labelled the
alliance between Baldwin and LaFontaine "unnatural", despite their shared
ideological convictions.134 Jacques Monet has speculated that "too new in Canada to
know better,...[Elgin] may have made the same mistake as Durham who had seen
'two nations warring in the bosom of a single state'" rather than a contest for
political reform. Elgin believed that it would be divisive to treat the French
Canadians as a separate element in Canadian society, requiring distinct political
representation. 135 He confided to Grey that "I believe that the problem of how to
govern United Canada would be solved if the French w[oul]d split into a Liberal &
Conservative Party and join the Upper Canadian Parties bearing corresponding
names". "The great difficulty hitherto", he continued, "has been that a Conservative
Gov[ernmen]t has meant Gov[ernmen]t of Upper Canadians which is intolerable to
the French—and a Radical Gov[ernmen]t a Gov[ernmen]t of French w[hich] is no
less hateful to the British". He marvelled that the so-called Radical party was that
group most opposed to progress, but expressed his belief that if this split of the
French nationality along political lines occurred, "the national element w[ould] be
merged in the political". As it was, Elgin explained, the coherence of the French
Canadians "enables them to organize a powerful opposition to any Ministry from
which they are excluded, but it no less certainly provokes among the British both of
Lower and Upper Canada a feeling of antagonism to one of which they form a part".
While his attempts to negotiate the entry of French Canadians into Draper's ministry
failed, Elgin at least took comfort in the conviction that he had convinced the French
that he did not distrust them.137 Elgin's conviction about the paramount importance
of nationality in the canadiens' political consciousness was fortified by his further
observations. "They adopt at second hand the political dogmas of the English
liberals and assert them, whenever it is convenient to do so, with becoming force", he
told Grey.
But they are unwilling to admit—I might almost say they seem incapable of
comprehending—that the principles of constitutional Gov[ernmen]t must be
applied against them as well as for them—and whenever there appears to be a
chance of things taking this turn, they revive the ancient cry of nationality,
and insist on their right to have a share in the administration, not because the
Party with which they have chosen to connect themselves is in the ascendant,
but because they represent a people of distinct origin.138
Elgin grasped a simple truth about Canadian politics: mere political representation
according to their numbers would not be enough to satisfy the aspirations of French
Canada. Elgin took care to eliminate some of the aspects of union that were most
objectionable to the canadiens, most notably the restrictions on French in the
legislative assembly. He also recognised that attempts to de-nationalise the French
were doomed to failure.139 In this respect, he was more far-seeing than his famous
father-in-law. Responsible government would be an important step toward
accommodating the needs of French Canada, but once it was achieved, subsequent
events revealed that it was not indeed a panacea.
Elgin left little doubt that he meant to introduce reform. In his reply to a
welcoming address in Montreal, he announced that he would adopt "frankly and
unequivocally Lord Durham's view of government".140 Elgin gleefully reported to
his wife that "for once there seems to be unanimity in this distant part of the world,
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and the subject on which they are good enough to concur is approbation of the
Governor's first announcement of his principles".141
In December 1847, Elgin dissolved the legislature on the advice of his
ministers. The moderate conservatism of the administration had earlier given way to
a more ardent Toryism when Draper resigned to take up a judicial post in May 1847
and Henry Sherwood had become the attorney general of CanadaWest and
ostensible party leader.142 Elgin confessed to Grey that he was uncertain as to the
probable results of the election, but ventured that the present administration would
have more credibility than before if re-elected, since "so much discredit" had been
thrown on it "on the ground of alleged interference on the part of the Gov[erno]r
Gen[era]l at the last General Election".143 Elgin was determined not to make that
mistake, and it was widely reported that the governor would take no part in
attempting to influence the contest.144 The moderate Canadian reformer Francis
Hincks recalled that from the time of his arrival, Elgin made it understood that he
would not become embroiled in partisan controversies. Government House became
"neutral ground, where no party distinctions were recognized".145 The re-appearance
of "the notorious L.J. Papineau" threw French Canadian moderate reformers into a
quandary, Elgin observed. They did not wish to contradict the fiery words of "this
redoutable chief who has still a hold on Canadian sympathies", yet the disavowal of
responsible government contained in his provocative manifesto was awkward, given
that for the first time they were poised to assume positions of real power as a result
of the principle.14
The elections of the winter of 1847-48 overturned the Tory ascendancy in the
assembly. When that body met again in late February 1848 Morin was elected
Speaker by a vote of 54 to 19. A want of confidence motion by Baldwin on 3 March
passed by 54 votes to 20, signalling the final defeat of the ministry that Metcalfe's
machinations had installed. Now, the first avowedly responsible government in
Canada could be installed.147 On 7 March Elgin duly sent for LaFontaine and
Baldwin. In a "candid and friendly tone" he told them if they were moderate and
firm they had a fair prospect of forming an administration and could "count on all
proper support and assistance". Elgin optimistically ventured that his new ministry
would be eager to prove "by proper deference for the authority of the Gov[ernor]
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Gen[era]l" that they had been libelled when they were accused of anti-monarchical
tendencies. Already, he observed, Papineau had "been forced to swallow in silence"
an address in reply to the throne speech "in which one of Canada's choicest blessings
is ascribed to her connexion with a State which is both just & powerful". Elgin
further hoped that the lesson would not be lost on republicans south of the border
who were "crowing loudly over the alleged anti British tendencies of our new House
of Commons".148 Grey was undoubtedly reassured. He had impressed upon Elgin
that the experiment "will probably determine not only whether its connection with
this Country is to last, but also whether it is to have the advantage of a mixed & well
regulated Gov[ernme]nt or is to be given up to Extreme democracy". "These are
indeed marvellous & fearful times", he worried, looking to the wave of revolution
throughout Europe, "& it is impossible to look forward to what may be the events of
the next few months without the greatest apprehension". He looked to the
"Monstrous absurdities" in France, and "the changes by wh[ich] it has been followed
almost all over Europe", but trusted that enough good sense would prevail among the
majority in Canada to enable Elgin to succeed in his "great experiment".149
Elgin's new administration advised immediate prorogation. Under prevailing
constitutional rules, the ministers were required to seek re-election before taking
office. Before prorogation, however, the new government had to ask for a routine
vote of the usual supplies, and Papineau chose this opportunity to rail against the new
oligarchy. There was no canadien, he averred, who did not remember the eighteen
thirties—"le temps du refus des subsides". The new ministry was demonstrating that
they were no better than the old regime. It was unnecessary, he insisted, to allow the
new administration time to prepare a legislative programme: the repeal of the union
was all that was needed.150 Papineau followed up his poorly-supported legislative
attack with a further series ofmanifestos, denouncing the LaFontaine government
and demanding repeal. A series of protest meetings, which also attracted disaffected
Irish, gave cause for alarm among Canadian military authorities.151 Elgin, who had
previously included Papineau among his dinner guests and described him to his wife
as "a very well-bred, intelligent man"152 now poured out his frustration at the antics
of "Guy Fawkes Papineau" in a letter to Grey. Papineau was "actuated by the most
malignant passions, irritated vanity,—disappointed ambition, and national hatred
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which unmerited favor has only served to exasperate", Elgin filmed, but his support
was eroding.153 Jacques Monet has explained that Lord and Lady Elgin themselves
played a part in Papineau's final fall from favour by providing the canadiens "with
an alternative focus of loyalty". Elgin delighted the populace with an informal levee
at Chambly on Saint-Jean-Baptiste day, and delivered a speech at Saint-Hyacinthe
"avec une facilite, une aisance, qui indique qu'il est loin d'etre etranger a la
langue".154 To Grey, Elgin reverted to a favourite theme: French Canadian national
sentiment "may yet perhaps if properly improved furnish the best remaining security
against annexation to the States".155 Elgin's growing popularity with French Canada,
however, came at the expense of the support of the one element in Canadian society
whose loyalty had previously been assured.
Leading conservative anglophone merchants of Canada West and Canada
East—the groups known as the Family Compact and Chateau Clique,156
respectively—had long enjoyed privileged access to official positions and
gubernatorial favour. Protective imperial trade legislation and public works projects
to bolster export trade had seemed designed to ensure their continued economic
ascendancy. By the late 1840s, however, a clear shift in colonial policy—the advent
of free trade, and an unequivocal commitment to colonial self-government—showed
unmistakable signs that the dominance of this oligarchy was under siege.
The crisis came with the introduction of the controversial Rebellion Losses
Bill. LaFontaine, proposing the first reading on 13 February 1849, explained that the
bill followed from recommendations made in 1846 by a commission set up to
compensate Lower Canadians whose property had been destroyed during the 1837-8
Rebellions by persons acting in support of the civil authority. He noted that similar
legislation had been passed earlier to compensate those in Upper Canada. The
measure was important for more than financial reasons. It provided a crucial test for
responsible government and put the Baldwin-LaFontaine alliance on trial. If
reformers of Canada West refused to countenance the bill, which sought to benefit
predominantly French Canada East alone, Papineau and his Rouge followers would
be vindicated, proving that co-operation within a united Canada was untenable. If
Elgin objected to the bill and refused to give it royal assent, the claim that Canada
enjoyed responsible government would be exposed as hollow.157
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One of the chief reasons for objection to the bill was the well-grounded
suspicion that among those who would be compensated were the rebels themselves.
The commission originally appointed had answered inquiries about this by ruling that
only those whose guilt had actually been proved by a court conviction should be
excluded from compensation.158 Therefore those who had been pardoned by Lord
Durham's amnesty and those who had never been captured were all eligible.
Wolfred Nelson, known to have played a prominent part in the rebellions, did not
shrink from claiming compensation in excess of £ 12,000.159 Called upon by the
opposition to deny that it was the intention of the government to compensate rebels,
both Baldwin and LaFontaine kept silence. Reformers offered a variety of
explanations as to why no effort should be made to exclude possible rebels. Francis
Hincks asserted that it would be impossible to determine who was and who was not a
rebel. Baldwin maintained that it would be disrespectful to Her Majesty, and "an
outrage on the man seeking compensation, to enquire what part he took at the time of
the troubles". Others, more boldly, reasoned that it would be unjust to withhold
compensation from those who had been rebels, since the injustice and oppression of
the British and provincial government had occasioned the rebellion. Tories
beseeched Elgin to "think for yourself' and to "allow no man to thinkfor you".160
But the opposition had failed to grasp the enormity of the change that had taken
place. Elgin's personal feelings about the Rebellion Losses Bill—a bill he privately
described as a "questionable measure"161 - were no longer the point. As a domestic
matter, not touching upon imperial concerns, the correct course under responsible
government was clear. In the final division, the bill passed by forty-seven votes to
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eighteen, with a majority in both sections of the legislature; Elgin was bound to
give his assent.
The governor general expressed his hope to Grey that "no enduring mischief
will ensue" from the Rebellion Losses controversy. Elgin acknowledged that, while
the bill was not free from objection, his ministry could hardly have done other than
to implement it. He admitted that much of the discussion was of a "not very
temperate" character and that he himself was subject to "not very courteous
language".163 Cries of annexation were raised, a solution that Elgin wryly reported
was "invoked as the remedy for all ills imaginary or real". The Tory party "by
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menace, intimidation, and appeals to passion" were attempting to "drive me to a coup
d'etat", he complained. He reminded the colonial secretary of how such tactics had
been successful under Metcalfe's tenure, with Metcalfe thus becoming "the head of a
Party". Metcalfe "made it impossible for himself to act with the leaders of the Party
which he ousted" and succeeded in installing a majority "so wavering that no
consistent system of Policy could be reared upon it". The opposition were now
calling for a dissolution, Elgin reported. He resolved not to gratify their wish: the
parliament was elected only a year before, and the measure had passed by more than
two to one. Elgin likewise rejected the option of reserving the bill. He refused to
"throw upon Her Majesty's Gov[ernmen]t or (as it would appear to the popular eye
here) on Her Majesty herself, a responsibility which rests, and ought I think to rest,
on my own shoulders".164 Elgin noted a short time later that the "ultras"—extreme
Tories—expected him not to reserve the bill, but to veto it. He also drew Grey's
attention to the "curious fact" that almost all of the petitions against the bill were sent
to him, and not to the assembly or executive council.165 It was becoming evident that
the governor general would personally bear the brunt of conservative disappointment
with the new system of responsible rule.
Elgin continued to "get through this disagreeable affair... by maintaining
steadily my constitutional position, listening civilly to all representations addressed
to me against the measure, and adhering to a strict reserve as to the course which I
might deem it proper eventually to pursue". Eager to avoid adding "fuel to the fire",
Elgin abstained from making any statements which might appear to be a justification
of the Bill.165 For that reason, the colonial secretary did not receive the "good
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produceable Despatch" he wanted to justify Elgin's conduct, and implicitly his
own colonial policy, in Britain's parliament. Elgin acknowledged that, while he
wrote to Grey in depth privately, "you may have been annoyed by my not writing
officially to you on that matter". "You will percieve [sic]", Elgin explained, "that I
could not possibly have maintained this position here if despatches from me
vindicating the ministerial Policy had been submitted to the House of Commons".
They could not have been kept secret from the colonists, "and I should have found
myself in the midst of the melee a partizan".168 To Elgin it was clearly preferable
that he face uninformed criticism in Britain than be accused of partiality in Canada.
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He expressed his gratitude to Grey that "in the midst of the reproaches by which I am
assailed", the colonial secretary continued to be supportive. The course he was
taking, Elgin explained, was not only the right course, but the only course possible.
To succumb to Tory pressure and dissolve parliament would have produced a
rebellion without a change of ministry, he believed. "The leaders of the Party know
that as well as I do, and were it possible to play tricks in such grave concerns, it
would have been easy to throw them into utter confusion by merely calling upon
them to form a Gov[ernmen]t." They correctly calculated that the governor general
would be unwilling to make such a move "for the sake of discomfiting them", and so
"played out their game of faction and violence without fear of consequences".169
It cannot be sufficiently stressed that in the midst of this ostensible political
crisis, economic events exercised at least as much influence on the discontent of the
merchant class, especially in the seat of government at Montreal. The abrupt
removal of protective tariffs, that followed on the heels of legislation which had
bolstered colonial preference in the British market, spelled ruin for traders who had
staked their future on channelling wheat from the United States into Britain.
Additionally, the controversial retention of the Navigation Laws, which limited
colonial merchants to British ships, even when American ones were cheaper and
more available, exacerbated anger at a colonial policy that seemed at once punishing
and capricious. Elgin looked with alarm at the growth of annexationist sentiment
• 170
and warned his chief that commercial embarrassments were the real difficulty.
Elgin's hopes that he could weather the Rebellion Losses controversy with
calm and dignified neutrality were dashed when, on the cold morning of 25 April
1849, he rode in his coach from his residence at Monklands to parliament to give
royal assent to the bill. As the governor general signed the bill into law, groans and
hisses were heard from the galleries, which were packed with hostile Tory spectators
but, significantly, no ladies. The crowd mshed down the stairs and into the street
where Elgin attempted to enter his coach amid shouted insults and a hail of rotten
eggs and paving stones. With Elgin escaping the scene, attention turned to the
Champ de Mars, where an open air meeting was hastily organised for that evening.
The mob of fifteen hundred, many of whose mode of dress revealed that they were of
the "respectable" class,171 was ill-controlled by the authorities, who indeed helped to
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inflame its passions. The chief of the fire brigade led a crowd to the parliament
buildings. Stones lobbed through the windows shattered the shades of the gas lamps,
igniting the chamber where the speaker sat waiting to adjourn the house. Fire swept
unchecked through the parliament buildings.172 "I confess I did not before know",
Elgin marvelled, "how thin is the crust of order which cover the anarchical elements
that boil and toss beneath our feet".173
The disappointed mob had not yet finished venting its wrath. The ladies of
the viceregal household were insulted when they made their way to church on
Sunday. The following day—30 April—the governor general drove from Monklands
to receive an address of loyalty from the legislature and was again assaulted. He
protected his face from the rain of stones with his hat, but a large stone struck him in
the chest. Colonel Bruce, Elgin's brother, received a severe blow to the head.
Cavalry escorting the governor general, many of whom were the sons of Montreal's
disappointed merchants, sat back regarding the scene with amusement.174 Elgin
confided to Grey that petitions praying for his recall were being circulated. "I wish
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to God they had nothing more mischievous in hand", he added anxiously. In his
public despatch, Elgin provided a dispassionate narrative of events and reiterated his
goal of maintaining a position of "dignified neutrality". He expressed his willingness
to yield his position to another who, while not holding "views at variance with mine
with respect to the duties of a constitutional Governor", would have the advantage of
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"being personally unobnoxious" to any section of the province's inhabitants.
Believing that his presence was provocative to the crowds and determined
that "no stain of blood shall rest upon my name", Elgin remained sequestered at
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Monklands outside the city while feelings continued to run high. He declined to
prorogue parliament in person on May 30, delegating the authority to General
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Rowan. His aloof position was taken as evidence of cowardice by critics in
Canada and Britain. A Canadian political cartoon featured "The Hermit", "lately
discovered in the woods, near Monklands".179 Another satirist reported that
Monklands was being converted into a castle of refuge with egg-proof iron plates on
the windows.180 Thomas Carlyle mocked the governor's inactivity, likening him to
a "Canadian lumber-log" passively signing his name to objectionable legislation by
an automated "Birmingham shoulder crank". What was wanted, Carlyle insisted,
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was a true governor of men. "What the meaning of a Governor, if he is not to
overhaul and control such things, may be, I cannot conjecture".181 The Times, which
had been supplied with correct information by Grey, expressed support for Elgin
when news of the Montreal riots reached Britain, but the Morning Post, Morning
Chronicle and Spectator were all critical.182 The Morning Chronicle's sensationalist
coverage of the story may have been prompted in part by a wish to boost circulation
as a remedy for financial woes. Gladstone initiated a House of Commons debate
on the Rebellion Losses Act, being careful to avoid any direct criticism of Elgin, who
had been his contemporary at Oxford. J.C. Herries was prepared to go further, and
called for the disallowance of the act. While the motion was ultimately defeated, the
debate attracted much attention to the larger issue of British colonial policy and self
government. In the House of Lords, Brougham, Lyndhurst and Stanley joined in
denouncing both the act and the principle behind it.184
Grey's memoir recalled that "we agreed without hesitation to advise Her
Majesty to signify to Lord Elgin Her undiminished confidence in his ability and
judgement".185 An official despatch in mid June 1849 assured Elgin that "Her
Majesty's Servants have arrived at the conclusion that your conduct throughout these
transactions is entitled to their entire approbation". The despatch informed the
governor general that the Rebellion Losses Act would be left to its operation. It
added that if the Act had provided for the compensation of rebels, or "even to have
been drawn up so loosely as to afford facilities for such an abuse, we should have felt
1 8b
it to be our duty to advise Her Majesty to... disallow it". These protestations
notwithstanding, Grey was at least aware that potential claimants could indeed have
been rebels who were simply never convicted. He tacitly agreed with Elgin's earlier
private conclusion that "any kind of extrajudicial inquisition conducted... with the
view of ascertaining what part this or that claimant for indemnity may have taken in
1837 & 1838, would have been attended by consequences much to be regretted".187
Elgin was gratified by the many signs of support he received from the British
cabinet, by Queen Victoria's request to be godparent to his new bom son, and by his
elevation to the British peerage, but at the height of the troubles he stood, he recalled,
"literally alone". Although the home government expressed confidence in him,
"they were puzzled", he acknowledged later.
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The logic of the case was against me. Lord Grey and Lord J. Russell both felt
that either I was right or I was wrong. If the latter, I ought to be recalled; if
the former, I ought to make the law respected. And, lastly, I lost any chance
of moral support from the opinion of our neighbours in the States; for, like all
primitive constitutionalists, the ideas of government they hold in that quarter
are very simple. I have been told by Americans, "We thought you were quite
right; but we could not understand why you did not shoot them down\"
Many, especially at a distance, failed to grasp the complexity of the issue, and the
real principles at stake. "My choice", Elgin explained, "was not between a clearly
right and clearly wrong course: how easy is it to deal with such cases, and how rare
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are they in life! But between several difficulties, I think I chose the least."
Elgin's spirit of calm forbearance notwithstanding, he did take some action
calculated to show that he was not intimidated by, or prepared to countenance, acts
of violence or treason. He expressed his opprobrium towards those who had
officially voiced their disloyalty to the crown by signing a manifesto urging
severance from the empire and annexation to the United States. On the advice of his
ministers, Elgin let it be known that any who signed would be deemed unfit to hold
public office.189 In September 1849 Elgin set out on a tour of Canada West,
demonstrating bravery by choosing to be accompanied only by his brother Colonel
Bruce, and one servant.190 The tour was a personal triumph for the governor general
who was warmed by his cordial reception, and the many avowals of loyalty.191
Perhaps most significantly, the conduct of Montreal's elite during what Elgin termed
"the Canadian Tory rebellion of 1849"192 convinced him that the removal of the seat
of government from that city was inevitable.193 Montreal, he concluded, was "rotten
to the core".194
Elgin was fortunate to stay in Canada long enough to witness the vindication
of his policies. Even critics were forced to reconsider their opposition as subsequent
events educated them in the workings of responsible government. One of Canada's
"ablest men", not then in politics, admitted, "Yes, I see it all now, you were right, a
thousand times right, though I thought otherwise then. I own that I would have
reduced Montreal to ashes before I would have endured half of what you did.... I
should have been justified, too."195 Goldwin Smith later described Elgin as "the
public servant of the Empire whose only rule has been administrative duty in contrast
with the party leader and the demagogue". Smith noted Elgin's claim that, even
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under responsible government, he enjoyed a moral influence that compensated for
the loss of executive power. "This, with his personal gifts and graces, and while the
system was still in the green wood, he may possibly have done", Smith allowed.196
While 1849 provided the first opportunity for Elgin to demonstrate the proper
role of a constitutional governor, it was not the last during his term of office. By
1851, both LaFontaine and Baldwin had retired from office. The Liberal-Reform
ministry continued to hold power under Francis Hincks and Augustin Morin. In June
1854, the Hincks ministry faced an Assembly that was divided over the contentious
questions of reform of the seigneurial system and secularisation of the clergy
reserves, and eager to call Hincks to account for personal corruption in his handling
of railway financing. Motions censuring the government passed, and amid a general
atmosphere of denunciation, the ministry's resignation seemed certain. To the
astonishment of the opposition, however, Elgin accepted the sudden advice of Morin
and Hincks to prorogue parliament. Hincks rationalized the move to an early
election on the grounds that new measures for increasing the representation of each
part of the province should be put into effect before important legislation was placed
before the Assembly. This reasoning did not convince John A. Macdonald, who
angrily denounced the action as unconstitutional. An election was not due for two
years, and the move had the appearance of a brazen attempt to circumvent further
criticism.197 John Sandfield Macdonald, as speaker of the house, made use of the
opportunity to exact revenge on Hincks for earlier slights. His speech on the
occasion of the prorogation was not the mere formality that might have been
expected, but rather a thinly cloaked reproach to the ministry and Elgin himself.
Sandfield Macdonald observed that, while it was usually the custom to review the
principal measures passed during the session, he was unable to do so "inasmuch as
there has been no act passed or judgment of parliament obtained". The passing of
legislation was "held to be necessary to constitute a session of parliament", he
argued, but the assembly had been unable to accomplish this "owing to the command
which your Excellency has laid upon us".198 Elgin's face, according to one observer,
betrayed his "deep displeasure and annoyance" while the speech was read, and when
the same words were repeated in French, he made a gesture of angry impatience.199
Having written to his wife only days before about his fondness for Canada and his
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fanciful notion that he could remain after his term ended, Elgin now wryly confided
that "my Parliament has been trying to diminish my sentimentality for this country
by behaving very badly".200 While there is not enough archival evidence to fully
explore Elgin's reasons for accepting the advice of his ministers in this instance, his
actions were entirely in keeping with his conviction that in purely domestic matters,
the governor should act on ministerial advice. Of course, this general principle did
not eliminate the possibility that the governor could exercise his own discretion and
refuse such advice under exceptional circumstances. This possibility was realized by
Elgin's immediate successor, Sir Edmund Head, in 1858.201
Ironically, the event that most thoroughly vindicated Elgin was the rise to
power of his severest critics. The elections that followed the sudden dissolution of
parliament in the summer of 1854 had not rendered a clear verdict, but by September
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1854 Elgin resolved to call upon Sir Allan MacNab and Morin to form a ministry.
MacNab had earlier railed against French domination under responsible government
and Elgin rejoiced that "I have brought into office the gentlemen who made
themselves for years most conspicuous and obnoxious for personal hostility to
myself'. This, he explained, gave "the most complete negative to the allegation that
I am swayed by personal motives in the selection ofmy advisers.... This is certainly
for me, and I hope for the country, the most fortunate windup ofmy connexion with
Canada which could have been imagined."203 To the new secretary of state for the
colonies, Sir George Grey, Elgin expressed his pleasure that "the constitutional
impartiality of the Representative of the Crown will be fully vindicated".
They who have watched the course of Canadian History during the last few
years, who have noticed the part played in our local politics by Sir A. McNab
& his followers & their systematic endeavour to single out the Governor
General for attack & to make him personally responsible for administrative
measures which they condemned—will understand its full moral
significance.204
Nevertheless, Elgin admitted to his wife, "it is rather amusing for me to find myself
abused for my partiality for Sir A. M'Nab, and my selection of him ascribed to
personal feelings".205
In later years, Elgin insisted that his former chief, Earl Grey, edit his political
reminiscences to omit any allusion to the treatment he had suffered during the
Rebellion Losses riots. Such recollections were not entitled to the dignity of a place
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in the colonial secretary's narrative, he argued.206 He also refused to allude to the
incidents when he gave his farewell speech in Montreal just prior to leaving Canada
in 1854. "I shall carry away no recollections ofmy sojourn among you except such
as are of a pleasing character", he promised. He vowed to remember the "undaunted
courage" with which Montreal's merchants, "while suffering under the pressure of a
commercial crisis of almost unparalleled severity", urged forward the first steps
toward progress in the railway age. "And I shall forget—but no—what I might have
had to forget is forgotten already; and therefore I cannot tell you what I shall forget",
he graciously pretended.207
Elgin is thus able to enjoy a virtually unassailable reputation for his
contribution to Canada's constitutional evolution. The principles he helped to
entrench were not his own unique invention by any means, but his commitment to
them, in the face of vehement abuse and criticism, was firm. Few would challenge
Lord Tweedsmuir's assessment of Elgin as "the ablest... of nineteenth-century
viceroys".208 It must not be overlooked, however, that Elgin came to Canada with
clear instructions from Grey to implement responsible government. Grey's
despatches, even before Elgin's arrival in Canada, demonstrated a clear commitment
to the principle. Grey, of course, was himself swayed at times by Elgin's views. J.L.
Morison noted that "in tracing the growth of Grey's colonial policy, it is impossible
for anyone to mistake the evidences of Elgin's influence". He goes so far as to
suggest that the chapter on Canada in Grey's book "owes almost more to Elgin than
it does to the avowed author".209 This is probably an exaggeration, but it is difficult
to extricate the threads of each man's influence. The team of Grey in the Colonial
Office, and Elgin in Canada was a happy combination of two conscientious and
clear-thinking individuals, each with a strong commitment to public service and
constitutional government. Added to this was a Zeitgeist that favoured colonial
reform. It is revealing that historians have had so much trouble tracing the source of
the responsible government principle.
Subsequent events revealed that 1849, while pivotal, did not see all of
Canada's constitutional problems solved. Despite assumptions that the governor
could thenceforward fill a role analogous to that of the monarch, troubling
inconsistencies remained. The fact that external matters such as foreign treaties, or
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matters touching upon the constitution, were still subject to imperial control also
weakened the analogy. Responsible government notwithstanding, the governor was
still expected to scrutinize colonial legislation for any encroachments upon Britain's
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domain. The other key difficulty that was not solved by responsible government
was one that Elgin had recognised very early in his tenure. The new system gave
French Canadians equal access to positions of power in the united legislature. It did
not, however, guarantee that their interests as French Canadians would always be
addressed. Nationality was accorded no sacred status in the vicissitudes of provincial
politics. Even after Confederation, this would remain the central dilemma that would
defeat the best efforts of generations of Canadian politicians. That these looming
questions were not solved in 1849 does not diminish the success of Elgin's "great
experiment".
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"Fairly in Hot Water":
Sir Edmund Head in the United Canadas
Lord Elgin's selection of Sir Allan MacNab after the inconclusive election of 1854
demonstrated that, even under responsible government, an important role remained
for the governor general. The potential instability of Canadian politics during the
years leading up to Confederation forced Sir Edmund Head, Elgin's successor, to be
actively involved in the process of forming governments. He would not be permitted
the dignified aloofness of a constitutional monarch.
Sir Edmund Walker Head was bom 16 February 1805 at Wiarton Place, near
Maidstone, England, the only son of the Reverend Sir John Head, a country
clergyman, and Jane Walker. Head's paternal grandfather had been a prosperous
settler in Charleston, South Carolina, who had been elected a delegate to the second
Continental Congress, but was loyalist. After suffering imprisonment and
confiscation of his property, he fled to London and re-established himself as a
merchant. His son, Edmund Head's father, was bom in South Carolina but brought
up in London.1 Head played up these loyalist roots when serving as the governor of
loyalist-dominated New Brunswick.2
Edmund Head was educated at Winchester and Oriel College, Oxford, where
he took a First in Classics. After graduating in 1827, he spent two years travelling on
the Continent. In Germany, Head stayed with the celebrated mathematician, Charles
Babbage. Head was elected Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, in 1830, became a
lecturer in Classics, and later a university examiner. Head continued to travel over
the next few years, and spent considerable time in Italy, Spain and Germany. He
entered Lincoln's Inn in 1835 but was never called to the Bar.
Financial reverses in his father's family probably steered Head toward a
career in the civil service. In 1836 he was appointed assistant Poor Law
Commissioner, a post which paid a salary of £700. It is probable that Head owed
this appointment to his close friendship with George Cornewall Lewis, whose father,
Sir Thomas Frankland Lewis, was senior commissioner. Head enjoyed the support of
the Marquess of Lansdowne, who was impressed with Head's writings on Spanish
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painters,3 and of Sir James Graham.4 Head also enjoyed a friendly relationship with
Herman Merivale, permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office. This was
fortunate, as Merivale was able to defend Head on at least one occasion when his
actions in British North America came under criticism.5 With the death of his father
in 1838, Head inherited the baronetcy. In the same year, he married the thirty-year-
old Anna Maria Yorke, daughter of the Reverend Philip Yorke and great-
granddaughter of the first Earl of Hardwicke. By 1841 Head was serving as one of
three Chief Commissioners at a salary of £2,000. The younger Lewis had also
secured a commission in the Poor Law administration, until 1847 when a
comprehensive re-organization spurred by a parliamentary inquiry brought an end to
their posts. Allegations of what a biographer coyly calls "certain unsavoury
incidents" brought the Poor Law Commission under public scrutiny. Nevertheless,
Head survived the character-building experience of "being plunged into the midst of
a raging torrent of controversy".6 Head's academic distinctions, and his influential
supporters, gave rise to the expectation that if he entered the Church he would be
certain to rise to a bishopric. But he was, an admirer claimed, "deaf to the Syren
voice which wooed him to an early career of purple and fine linen".7
Sir Edmund Head's lifelong correspondence with George Cornewall Lewis
provides a window into his nature. Their letters are sprinkled with phrases in Latin,
Greek, French, Italian, and German, and range over a wide variety of topics. Word
origins appear to have been a special preoccupation of both men, and they speculate
at length on the etymology of such words as "thrall",8 the regional dialect of
Herefordshire,9 and peculiarities of the Maltese language.10 Indeed, both seem to
have highly prized trivial knowledge of all sorts. Discussions revolved around such
issues as the Oxford Movement,11 architecture, British India,12 kangaroos,13 Greek
and Roman history, the supposed intellectual defects of the people ofWales,14 the
Poor Law, 15steam navigation,16 the type of garments customary for American
immersion baptisms,17 current politics, political philosophy, and, always, books. The
two also shared a rather unbecoming tendency to exult in the errors and shortcomings
of others. Their letters are liberally sprinkled with references to mistakes they have
detected in translations from foreign works, and few matters would seem to be too
trivial to escape scrutiny. Most contemporary authors seem to have failed to pass
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muster with Head and Lewis, including Macaulay, Carlyle, and Charles Dickens.
Lewis predicted that the popularity of The Pickwick Papers "though rapid and
extensive, will, I think, be short lived".18
In 1837 Lewis congratulated Head on deciding against a career in colonial
service, remarking that "the scum of England is poured into the colonies: briefless
barristers, broken down merchants, ruined debauchees, the offal of every calling and
profession are crammed into colonial places".19 "I cannot tell you how glad I was to
receive the account of Lord Grey's offer", Lewis enthused ten years later when he
learned that Head had been offered the governorship of New Brunswick,20 although
he dismissed the post as "complete banishment into the backwoods" to another
friend.21 When Head won further advancement to the Canadian viceregal office,
Lewis again offered congratulations and hoped that Lady Head "likes the idea of
being Queen of Canada".22
Sir Edmund and Lady Head had three children, a son, John, who was born in
1840, and two daughters, Caroline and Anna, but it is difficult to imagine Head as an
actively involved family man. His ancestral motto was "Study Quiet", and this
seems to reflect his disposition very accurately. In addition to his philological
studies, Head was very knowledgeable about art, was a keen geologist and
crystallographer, and had a strong interest in the physical sciences.23 Head was
known to have a prodigious memory and his friend George Ticknor recalled that
Head could "repeat more poetry, Greek, Latin, German, and Spanish, than any
person I ever knew".24 Henry Taylor asserted that Head might have achieved a great
literary reputation, had he not been encumbered by the necessity of earning a living.
No one, he maintained, could equal Head in knowledge of both art and books "and
when I first knew him there was, along with this, a gaiety of heart, which, in so
laborious a student, made perhaps the rarest combination of all. It was subdued
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afterwards, though not extinguished, by some years of ill-health". The tragic loss
of his only son, who drowned while swimming in the St Maurice River in September
1859, undoubtedly cast a shadow over Head's life.26 Another admirer, Sir Henry
Wentworth Acland, gushed:
I am quite in love with Sir Edmund Head... full of knowledge, classical,
artistic, scientific. ... I wish I could stereotype his conversation... such a
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varied store of knowledge—such memory—such quotations—such
mildness—such taste and tenderness.27
Few seem to have praised Head as a warm human being, irrespective of the
admiration they may have had for his academic accomplishments. His secretaries in
Canada, Richard Pennefather and Lord Bury, did not appear to hold him in high
regard.28
Contemporaries saw in Sir Edmund Head's physical appearance a suggestion
of his character. Portraits reveal a slim, fine-featured man, with a thin straight nose
and wide narrow-lipped mouth. Forty-nine at the time of his Canadian appointment,
Head's greying hair recedes from his forehead, and frames his face in ample side
whiskers. While Head was Governor of New Brunswick, the Halifax Sun described
his appearance:
His Excellency is of slender make—5 feet 9 or 10 inches in height, and
apparently on the sunny side of 50. He has a slight stoop—as though he had
laboured long and studiously at the desk. His complexion is fair—his eyes
light blue, full and large—his hair is sandy, and scant. His address is easy
and familiar—but the close observer could not fail to trace in the lines about
his mouth indications of decision and firmness.29
A contemporary admirer described him as a tall, stately man "with thoughtful brow,
and complexion a little purpled by cardiac derangement". He admitted however that,
while Head would have been ideal as the don of a college, "as the Governor of a
30
Province with a self-asserting people, I doubt if he had found the true groove".
Head suffered from the petit mal form of epilepsy, an affliction that occasionally
caused him to break off conversation momentarily and stare blankly. It has also been
blamed for the irritability that affected Head, especially in his later life.
Despite his intellectual gifts, Head may have been unsuited to the office of
the governor general. His chief strengths—conscientiousness, thoroughness, and
painstaking attention to detail—were not those that were most in demand in a post
where interpersonal skills were emphasized. A contemporary observer, J.C. Dent,
allows that Head very often gave "more attention to the details of departmental work
than some of his ministers thought was quite the thing for the representative of the
Sovereign. He never put his signature to a public document without reading it
through, and finding out all the particulars".31 Head was, E.W. Watkin concluded,
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"one of the round men put into the square holes of Provincial Government by the
'authorities' at home".32 While governor of New Brunswick, Head took for granted
his superiority over the colony's elected representatives and compared them
unfavourably to those he had worked with while on the Poor Law Commission. "I
know", he confided to Lord Elgin, "7 am chairman of a much worse Board of
Guardians now in the form of our Assembly". He wrote to Lewis of one of the
"little squabbles" that was occupying New Brunswick's legislators: "Is not all this
thoroughly colonial & kleinstadtenischT'34 Head, noted Dent, was not a man of much
personal magnetism, and did not seem adept at forming friendships.35 James Young
agreed, asserting that the governor general was "by no means popular". "Seldom",
he continued,
has a Governor-General left Canada with fewer friends. The most favourable
thing I ever heard said of him was, that he possessed some artistic taste, was a
great admirer of Gothic architecture, and that we were mainly indebted to him
for the selection of the undoubtedly magnificent Gothic buildings which
adorn Parliament Hill in the Dominion capital. In other respects his career as
Governor-General was unfortunate, both in the interests of Canada and of his
own popularity.37
It is undoubtedly the case that much of Head's unpopularity—at least with
Reform politicians—stemmed from his contentious decision to refuse a dissolution to
George Brown with the collapse of his short-lived coalition government in 1858.
Brown, through his newspaper, the Globe, remained one of Head's most outspoken
critics. With the announcement that the Prince of Wales was to visit Canada in the
autumn of 1860, Thomas D'Arcy McGee rose in the Assembly to remark that he
hoped that the "unpopular and detested" governor general would not stand between
the Prince and the people. The speaker called McGee to order for his remarks but no
one spoke up to contradict his view.38 When a tightrope walker offered to transport
the visiting Prince across the Niagara Falls in a wheelbarrow, the Globe declared that
it was out of the question, but that the country would give thanks if he would wheel
"Sir Edmund to American soil, never to return.. ,.[T]he satisfaction would be
increased if the wheeler was Old Nick himself wheeling the Governor-General to
Hades amid the usual sulphurous smoke and flames."39 Complaints also arose during
the visit that Head's "officiousness" prevented some from making addresses to His
Royal Highness.40
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Head's sense of airy superiority extended not only to individuals but to entire
ethnic groups. He was contemptuous of the Welsh whom he believed could be
civilized "in about three centuries" by "the gradual action of Boards of Guardians,
railroads, and other opportunities of intercourse". He heartily agreed with a friend
who wrote "from the depths ofWales" wishing "that the devil would fly away with
this miserable race of Celtic savages".41 Nevertheless, Head allowed that certain
Welsh practices fell short of Irish ones in atrocity, especially where resistance to law
and order was concerned.42 While in New Brunswick, Head likened the local
politicians to the Irish, citing Graham's warning that "if you once turn your back they
will rush[?] in upon you".43 Head also managed to run afoul of the French Canadian
population for a supposed ethnic slur. He was criticized for characterizing them as
une race inferieure44 but this seems to have been a misunderstanding, arising out of a
poorly-chosen phrase. While speaking in Hamilton, Head had praised the advantages
enjoyed by that city's inhabitants, including "the superiority of the race from which
most of you have sprung" 45
Given that the viceregal role allowed latitude for each appointee to promote
his individual causes, it is not surprising that Head used his office to work toward
enhancing education in British North America. While governor ofNew Brunswick,
Head was instrumental in the reorganization of the University of New Brunswick.
He continued his advocacy while in Canada, making the most of his status as ex-
officio visitor of McGill University. He clearly saw his role as more than nominal
and surprised the university governors by making a number of practical
suggestions.46
Head also had a keen interest in political science and was much occupied
with federation schemes for British North America. The advantages and
disadvantages of such a scheme were discussed at length in his correspondence with
Lewis.47 Ged Martin has suggested that Head's interest in constitutional formulae is
in keeping with his character, and seems to reflect a conviction that all politics could
40
be reduced to a mathematical pattern. Nevertheless, Head does seem to have been
forward-thinking, and submitted to the Colonial Office detailed expositions of his
views on federation 49 and the annexation of the Hudson's Bay Company territory.50
The imperial government, however, was more inclined to act when a sudden crisis
dictated, rather than as a result of long-range projections. Little came of Head's
proposals for the future. The challenge of penetrating Head's hieroglyphic
handwriting would have in itself been enough to discourage a close reading of his
views.
On his return to England, Head accepted honorary degrees from Cambridge
and Oxford, became a member of the Royal Society, and "the Club", a literary and
dining society. He was named secretary and treasurer of the Athenaeum literary club.
He made an unsuccessful bid to represent the constituency of Pontefract in Yorkshire
before accepting an unpaid appointment as civil service commissioner in 1862. The
following year Head was elected governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, a post for
which Newcastle had proposed him. In 1864 Cardwell offered Head the
governorship of Ceylon but he declined, citing Lady Head's health. It is probable
that the Hudson's Bay Company position was more congenial to Head in that it
allowed him to continue to enjoy London literary society.51 He continued to busy
himself with his literary pursuits, when his duties permitted, publishing a translation
of an Icelandic saga, as well as various poems which appeared in Fraser's Magazine.
He died suddenly in 1868 at age sixty-three.
While in Canada, Head won the dubious distinction of being responsible for
what constitutional expert Arthur Berriedale Keith called the "most notorious"
CO
refusal of dissolution on the part of a governor general. In fairness to Head, the
circumstances surrounding the events of 1858, in which he refused George Brown's
advice to dissolve parliament and went on to countenance the unsavoury "double
shuffle" by the Liberal-Conservative ministry, were extremely complicated. The
term "political deadlock" has become a cliche for the impasse that was reached in
1864, but long before this government was only kept in operation by a tortuous
process of compromise and negotiation. By the late 1850s divisions over culture,
language and religion dominated the political landscape in the province of Canada.
With responsible government achieved, ideological differences between parties
began to blur. The equal political representation for Canada East and Canada West
decreed by the Act of Union in 1840 satisfied Protestants in the west when it gave
their votes more weight than their numbers warranted. As their population began to
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outstrip that of Canada East, however, the injustice of equal representation for
unequal numbers began to rankle. George Brown proposed a system of
representation by population, which would give Canada West the ascendancy over
the French Roman Catholics of Canada East that he believed was justified by their
superior numbers. Liberal John Sandfield Macdonald maintained that a system of
"double majority" would ensure fairness: measures must have the assent of each
section of the Assembly separately in order to take effect. While Sandfield
Macdonald saw double majority as an inherent necessity in the assembly of the
United Canadas, many agreed that it was desirable in practice.54 Still others looked
forward to a federation of the British North American provinces to resolve the
difficulty. But for the moment, this was in the future, and the equality of
representation in each section of the province, coupled with the growth of a more
vigorous Reform party to split the vote in Canada West, made for a climate of
political uncertainty.
Events had been building toward the controversy of 1858 for some time. A
ministerial crisis in 1856 brought the issue of double majority into the foreground.
Eager to oust the elderly and more extreme Conservative leader, Sir Allan MacNab,
moderate Conservatives led by John A. Macdonald manipulated the principle of
double majority to force his resignation. Early in May 1856 a supply bill which
included £50,000 for public buildings in Quebec sparked rancorous debate in the
House. The government had recently reached the controversial decision to make
Quebec the permanent seat of government, and the buildings were meant to serve the
needs of parliament there. Two want-of-confidence motions arising from the supply
bill were defeated, but it was found that the government, while possessed of an
overall majority, was in a minority position in Canada West. Many were of the
opinion that the seat of government was not a ministerial question. Indeed, many
who opposed the amendments to the supply bill— including Rouge members—did
so, not because they supported the government, but because they approved of the
choice of Quebec as capital. Nevertheless, the government resigned.55
Head's position was a difficult one. Faced with the resignation of a
government still possessed of a majority, he was very reluctant to dissolve
parliament. The supplies had not yet been voted, and a great deal of business was
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still pending. He accurately surmised that the resignation was of "a very
mischievous character", in which double majority was only a pretext; "the real
object.. .was to get rid of Sir Allan M'Nab who though laid up in bed for two
months consecutively would not relieve them by resigning voluntarily". Head had
decided previously not to take any action to force the resignation ofMacNab,
convinced that to do so would invite "a quarrel between me & the whole
Conservative party". Now, he was confronted with an even more challenging
problem, "the absurdity in one legislature of requiring two majorities", a practice he
maintained was "in fact...ignoring the Union". A new ministry was reconstituted
without dissolution, Etienne Paschal Tache and John A. Macdonald filling the key
posts in the new administration. While Head rejoiced that the "obnoxious doctrine"
of double majority was repudiated by the government, he admitted that it had been
"avowed & rightly that it would not do to [impose]... measures continuously and
systematically on Upper or Lower Canada by the voice of a majority of the other
half'. The government had "done what I wanted in staying in", despite a sectional
majority against them, Head reflected, and he had acted rightly in deciding to
"adhere to the sound principle of a majority of the House as one House not two—and
to get the business done".56 Privately, Head expressed his relief that, overall, he had
57
"escaped with less personal abuse than could be expected".
Given the divided political climate, it was not surprising that Head soon faced
a fresh ministerial crisis. In 1857 Tache retired and was replaced by George-Etienne
Cartier. Cartier and Macdonald formed two consecutive fragile ministries in which
the principle of double majority had to be completely abandoned. In fact, it was
increasingly difficult to hold on to any majority at all. On 23 July 1858 a
government measure to implement tonnage dues on the St. Lawrence River was
defeated by two votes. While Macdonald dismissed the adverse vote as "an
accidental majority" on a minor matter, Brown was quick to challenge the
government's policy on other matters, especially financial ones.58 Eager to detach
wavering Liberals who had supported the shaky coalition government, Brown took
advantage of discord over the seat of government. When Canada's legislature had
referred the question of the capital to the Queen, Ottawa was named as the royal
choice. An address to the Queen on the question was moved on 28 July, and a
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number of amendments were proposed, including one that rejected the choice of
Ottawa. Macdonald protested the insult to Her Majesty, but the vote went against the
government by 64 votes to 50. Brown maintained that the adverse vote was in effect
a condemnation of the Liberal-Conservative ministry's entire policy, and Macdonald
agreed to move an adjournment as a test of confidence. While the government
survived the vote on adjournment, the Macdonald-Cartier administration resigned the
next day. Macdonald had apparently decided that Brown's ability to garner support
should be put to the test. "A prudent fish will play around the bait for some time
before he takes it," Macdonald later scoffed, "but in this instance the fish scarcely
waited till the bait was let down. He jumped out of the water to catch it."59
Head concluded that "I had no alternative but to accept such resignation" and
called upon Brown to form an administration.60 Brown asked the governor general
for a delay while he consulted his supporters. The following day Brown reported
that he was still in consultation and would require one more day to gather sufficient
support. Head agreed and on the following day, 31 July, Brown wrote to the
governor general to accept office.61 Head could anticipate the difficulties that were
likely to arise, given the Reform leader's tenuous following in the House. He
attempted to protect his own position by presenting Brown with a memorandum
outlining what course he would and would not be willing to take. He warned Brown
that "until the new ministers meet Parliament His Excellency has no assurance that
they possess the confidence of the majority of the House". He made it clear,
therefore, that "the Governor-General gives no pledge or promise, express or
implied, with reference to dissolving Parliament". If he were advised to dissolve the
House, he would make up his mind based on the circumstances at the time. He
would be willing to prorogue the House, but only if certain "necessary steps" were
taken first—voting necessary supplies, and other important measures already in
progress.
Head's reservations were well founded. Brown, the champion of the English
speaking Protestants of Canada West, formed an unlikely alliance with Antoine-
Aime Dorion, the radical Rouge leader of Canada East. Brown cobbled together a
cabinet that consisted of the very elements he had fought so vigorously against.
J.M.S. Careless has generously concluded that this "showed that he could not have
86
been quite as intransigent, as impossibly anti-Catholic, as his enemies so often
urged". The alternative explanation, of course, is that Brown was willing to
abandon any principles for the sake of seizing the opportunity of office. The new
ministry was sworn in at noon on 2 August and was defeated in a want of confidence
vote sometime after midnight.64 While Brown's conduct may have been unseemly,
that of the opposition was scarcely less so. The law required those who had accepted
office in the new administration to vacate their seats and seek re-election. The
recently defeated Liberal-Conservatives appeared to take advantage of the temporary
absence of these members to help bring about the coalition's defeat. In fact, the
presence of those few members who had accepted cabinet posts would not have been
enough to stave off the adverse vote, but the episode showed that the late ministry
was disinclined to extend any parliamentary courtesy to their rivals, and seemed
eager only to secure Brown's humiliation.
Brown appealed to the governor general for a dissolution. He and his
colleagues respectfully submitted "they have a right to claim all the support which
His Excellency can constitutionally extend to them". They complained of the
"unprecedented and unparliamentary course pursued by the House of Assembly" and
argued that this "affords the most convincing proof that the affairs of the country
could not be efficiently conducted under the control of the House as now
constituted".65 Head's response was immediate. He acknowledged that he was
"bound to deal fairly with all political parties" but added that he "has also a duty to
perform to the Queen and the people of Canada paramount to that which he owes to
any one party, or to all parties whatsoever". The question to be decided, he
explained, was not "what is advantageous and fair for a particular party", but what
was most advantageous and fair for the province. The previous ministry had
resigned without being defeated on a direct vote of want of confidence. By contrast,
Brown's ministry had been defeated on a direct vote of want of confidence, carried
by a majority of 40 of the 102 members presently sitting (that is, 71 to 31 votes).
Even if all 130 members had been in attendance, Head pointed out, the government
would still have been defeated. It was "not the business of the Governor-General",
he demurred, to decide whether the action of the House "was, or was not in
accordance with the usual courtesy of parliament towards an incoming
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Administration. The two Houses are the judges of the propriety of their own
proceedings." Head reminded Brown that an election had taken place the previous
winter. There would have to be very strong grounds for submitting the province to
the expense and inconvenience of a second election. Further, several important
measures were before parliament, including reform of election procedures, and
should be dealt with. The time of year was especially inconvenient and burdensome
for an election, as the harvest was under way. "What assurance can His Excellency
have that a new election, under precisely the same laws, held within six or eight
months of the last, will differ in its character from that which then took place?" he
asked. Head alluded to the "ultimate danger" that the feelings between Upper and
Lower Canada posed to the union, and allowed that "if it could be shown that
measures likely to be adopted by Mr. Brown and his colleagues were a specific, and
the only specific, for these evils" a dissolution might be warranted. As it was,
Brown's administration had not formulated a policy, and the mere existence of
mischief on the part of the opposition was not in itself a good enough reason for a
dissolution. Head concluded that "after full and mature deliberation" he was not
satisfied that every alternative had been exhausted, and therefore declined to dissolve
parliament.66 This was the first occasion since the advent of responsible government
that the governor general had refused the advice of his ministers. Brown and his
colleagues tendered their resignations.
Head's "full and mature deliberation" notwithstanding, Brown's defeat in
parliament came as no surprise. "The fact was", Head confided to Lewis, "that
Brown knew & I knew that he could not get a majority of the present House—I told
him plainly I could not promise to dissolve for the reasons (among others) in my
printed paper." Brown knew this, but believed "that he could bully me into
dissolving and he was mistaken". Head recognised, however, that "the exercise of
this discretion is a very serious thing".
Having refused the advice of one set of ministers, Head was compelled to
look elsewhere. Alexander Gait, an independent who might have been able to draw
support from other moderates, was Head's first choice. Interestingly, less than one
month earlier, Gait had moved a series of resolutions emphasising the irreconcilable
68difficulties of the existing union and advocating federation, a solution which
appealed also to Head. Now Gait declined office, but recommended that the
governor general call upon George-Etienne Cartier.69 Cartier accepted and sought
Macdonald's support. Head's previous advisers had thus been returned to him, in an
atmosphere that was as volatile as before, and which had been poisoned by the
enmity arising from Brown's brief premiership. Knowing that the opposition would
be eager to take revenge for the indecent haste with which they were driven from
office, the reconstituted Liberal-Conservative ministry feared vacating their seats to
secure re-election in accordance with regulations. While the presence of those few
members seeking to hold office would not have been enough to prevent
parliamentary defeat in the case of Brown's government, in the case of the Cartier-
Macdonald ministry it could well prove decisive. The reinstated administration was
not willing to take the chance.
The exigencies of the situation pointed to another remedy: a clause of the
recently passed Independence of Parliament Act provided that if any office holder of
government resigned his office and accepted another one within a month, he would
not be obliged to seek re-election. This provision was obviously meant to allow
individual members of cabinet to change portfolios without incurring the expense of
an election, but the new administration saw no reason why, under the letter of the
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law, it would not apply to them. In a move that has ever since been derisively
called the "double shuffle", all of the previous cabinet ministers who held assembly
seats were sworn in to new cabinet posts on 6 August, and then switched the
following day to their original portfolios. Head, having refused the advice of Brown
and his colleagues, now acquiesced in his new ministry's use of this legal loophole.
Two days after the "double shuffle", Head apologised for not writing at
greater length to Lewis, in whom he usually confided; "in fact for the last 10 days I
have been fairly in hot water having had 3 Governments in the course of this time!"
He sent a selective synopsis of events, and admitted that "I have answered abuse &
probably shall go through a course of hanging & burning (in effigy) for some time to
come". He seemed heartened by the fact that he had been cheered when he went
down to assent to some bills, but suspected that the Reformers were waiting to
launch a demonstration against him. "The 'dead cats' etc. are yet to come."71
Curiously, Head avoided any direct mention of the "double shuffle". Lewis assured
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his friend that "the course you took was right and quite successful. You gave the
Opposition every chance, with the exception of a dissolution, which I do not think
that you were bound to give". He noted, however, that from the newspaper accounts
he had read "there appears... to have been a further stage in the drama, viz. A
fictitious tenure of offices for one day, in order to bring the ministers within the
provisions of an Act which saves them from vacating their seats and facing a new
election". Lewis admitted that he was "unable from the accounts which I have seen
to understand the rights of this question, which looks like a political manoeuvre to
keep in office a set of ministers who were afraid to go back to their constituents". He
asked for details so that he could be ready in case questions were raised in the British
House of Commons.72
Head prepared an official despatch on 9 August 1858 describing the events
since his last report on 31 July. He enclosed copies of his correspondence with
George Brown, and clippings from the Toronto Daily Atlas, a Conservative
newspaper, detailing the ministerial crisis. Of the "double shuffle", Head
commented blandly that "in several cases a double appointment was made. The
alleged necessity for this is to be found in a supposed error in the wording of the
Provincial Act 20 Vict: c. 22. S. 7." He explained that as it was "most desirable"
that the business of the session be finished "with all reasonable dispatch it was not
expedient to vacate more seats than was absolutely necessary". After a motion in the
House questioning the manoeuvre was defeated, the Assembly proceeded with
ordinary routine, "and got through a large amount of private business", Head
remarked with apparent approval. While a vote on a question of confidence could be
expected, he warned, he had "at present no reason to doubt the result".73
In Canada, accusations flew in the Assembly that the governor general and
the Liberal-Conservative ministry had colluded in the quick defeat of Brown's
ministry. "The whole plan", Thomas D'Arcy McGee charged, "had been arranged
before hand". When Macdonald's ministers resigned, he noted, they were in
excellent humour, and "looked not at all like disappointed men". McGee defended
his plain speech, pointing out that among English orators in parliament "their mode
of speaking was frank, even to rudeness". "They were not afraid to wound the
sensitive ears of kings", he added, in oblique reference to his criticism of the
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governor general. Macdonald defended Head, insisting that he and the governor
general had not been in communication from the time of his own resignation, and
rejecting accusations that there had been any collusion aimed at keeping Brown and
his colleagues from power. "It is a charge that I am a dishonorable man", he
protested, "—a charge that the representative of our sovereign, myself, and all of my
colleagues, if they have any concern in the matter, are alike dishonorable
conspirators, and here in my place in Parliament, I say it is false as heir.14 Years
later, Macdonald, while protesting that he was not bound to defend Sir Edmund
Head, insisted that "the sovereign of the day can send for any person he likes, and
can charge that person with the formation of a Government, stating on what
conditions he could form it.... Sovereigns have again and again, in English history,
given permission to form an Administration on certain terms."75
Not surprisingly, the Globe, George Brown's newspaper, was shrill in its
declaration of its "disgust" for the "odious character" of Head's conduct. Head was
motivated, it suggested, by a "resolve to frustrate the intentions of his constitutional
advisers, and while pretending to receive their counsel, actually to play into the
hands of their party opponents". The Globe railed against Head's supposed abuse of
the prerogative and asked, "with a Governor General of this sort, of what use is
Parliament? Of what avail are Ministers?" Both would be reduced to nullities. "If
interference like this is to be submitted to, we may as well allow Sir Edmund Head to
be Dictator de jure, as he already claims to be de facto." He had gone farther, it
alleged, "than any British king has dared to go since the days of the Stuarts".76 An
anonymous letter by one who claimed to have no political party affiliation suggested
that the newly laid Atlantic telegraph cable be used to send a request to Her Majesty
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to send another representative in the place of Head. Another letter by "An
Indignant Canadian" several days later called for the circulation of petitions for the
same purpose. Then, it declared, "shall the voice of Canada's sons be heard in a tone
that will be understood, their tricks and chicanery will obtain its reward, and Canada
be freed from bondage".78
A want of confidence motion from the opposition, which referred to the
"fraudulent evasion of the Act for the Independence of Parliament" and the "gross
violation" of the rights of the people, was defeated readily in the Assembly.79 Brown
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and his colleagues were determined to press the matter still further, however, and
launched a legal suit against Macdonald and two colleagues, Sidney Smith and Philip
Vankoughnet. Edward Blake, later a leading light in the Liberal party, provided the
or\
legal representation for the plaintiffs. They were disappointed, however, when
Chief Justice Draper and his associates—all of whom were Conservative in their
politics—ruled that the defendants had been within the letter, if not the spirit, of the
Independence of Parliament Act.81 Head let Lewis know that the judges had decided
unanimously that what was done was in conformity with law. "Whether it was
expedient or not is another matter", he added. "I thought & still think that it was not,
but this was a point on which I had to take the advice of those who were responsible
to the Colonial Parl[iamen]t. The Colonial Parl[iamen]t by its vote has already
supported the course which they took".82
The Colonial Office evidently found no immediate reason to criticise Head's
conduct. A minute on Head's despatch of 9 August noted that "it is to be presumed
that this despatch etc. is sent in order that the Imp[erial] Govt, may be in possession
of all the details... which have led to a change of Govt.". As for the results to the
province, "the Imp[erial] Govt., have, under the present system of Colonial Govt, no
responsibility".83 Herman Merivale concurred. His minute noted that dissolution is
"by far the most important discretionary power now vested in a Governor, under
responsible government". The very nature of dissolution meant that the governor
"cannot be bound under all circumstances to take the advice of his ministers". He
decided that Head "acted right, in a conjuncture of much difficulty". He added,
however, that the position of the imperial government could be compromised "by
any marked approbation which may be confused with siding with one party",
something that he evidently believed the governor exhibited a propensity toward.84
Carnarvon, then undersecretary, agreed with Merivale's note of caution, but
concluded that Head "acted rightly in refusing to dissolve". "It is clear", he averred,
"that the new ministry c[oul]d not stand—and from the circumstances reported I do
not think they deserved to stand".85
The official statement from the imperial government was cautiously non¬
committal. "You are well aware", Lytton wrote to Head, "that Her Majesty's
Advisers have no wish to interfere in any way in the domestic affairs of the great
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province under your Government". While they had read communications about the
late change of administration "with an interest proportioned to the gravity of the
subject... they abstain from expressing any opinion on their general contents". The
despatch gave approval to Head's personal conduct, noting that it was "in accordance
with ... principles of constitutional government". They had no reason to doubt the
soundness of Head's judgement, Lytton added, "although this is not a point on which
Q/r
they are qualified to judge".
The Times had no such scruples. It asserted that there was no question as to
the wisdom of the conditions Head imposed upon Brown before he would be willing
to prorogue parliament. Nor was there any doubt "that the course suggested by the
able and upright Governor General of Canada was one best calculated to serve the
public interest". It did, however, "lament that he should have thought it his duty in
this instance to deviate from the course which would undoubtedly have been pursued
by his Imperial Mistress under similar circumstances". The Queen, The Times
explained, has always treated each administration with complete fairness and
impartiality, and "made no conditions or capitulations with her Ministers". This
approach has "both strengthened the foundations of her throne and obtained the
esteem and respect of all who have been in contact with her". Such a course would
"surely... have been better" for Head. Likewise, the transactions connected with the
double shuffle contained "much to regret" and "we should have been better pleased
to have seen the Governor-General refuse to take any part in it". As for Macdonald
and his colleagues, the successes obtained by such means "are seldom durable", The
87Times predicted superciliously if inaccurately.
Head was eager to establish to his superiors and to the British public that he
had the support of the majority in Canada. In January 1859 he forwarded to the
Colonial Office a number of addresses that had been presented to him expressing
approval of his conduct.88 He wrote privately to Merivale a short time later. "The
whole matter of Brown's Government has been debated over and over again", he
reported, but "I am none the worse for what has passed". He still worried that he
might be attacked in the British parliament and enclosed one ofMacdonald's
speeches on the affair so that Lytton could use it to defend him if necessary.89
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For over a year Head bore the brunt of what one contemporary called
"persistent attacks more vile than I ever remember being directed against a public
man in this country".90 The attacks continued despite Head's devastating loss of his
only son, John, who drowned in September 1859 while swimming in the St. Maurice
River. "It is painful to witness", an observer remarked with ill-disguised indignation,
"that, at a time like this, when all men, whose natures political rancour has not
blunted, tender their liveliest sympathy with their Excellencies in their great loss, the
Globe still pours out its slanders".91
Historical reactions to the political events of the summer of 1858, and Head's
role in them, were—as might be expected—mixed. Liberal politician Richard
Cartwright described the episode in his memoirs and portrayed Head as misguided,
and completely under the spell ofMacdonald. Macdonald, he maintained,
"succeeded in inducing Sir Edmund Head... to refuse to grant Mr. Brown a
dissolution and to recall Sir John, himself, to office". Cartwright further claimed
that he had heard reports that the episode "cost Sir Edmund Head the peerage which
he would otherwise have received on ceasing to be Governor-General".92 Joseph
Pope, Macdonald's private secretary, defended the governor general, and was
especially adamant that Macdonald and Head had no communication from the time
of the resignation of the Liberal-Conservative administration. Insinuations to the
contrary were "utterly baseless", he insisted. "Sir Edmund Head was a statesman, a
scholar, and a man of the world. But, before all things, he was an English gentleman,
and all that the word implies." Head's only thought, Pope maintained, was to do his
duty independently.93 Another contemporary observer, James Young, a Liberal,
avowed that "Sir Edmund Head was by no means popular". Nevertheless, he
dismissed reports that Head was involved in any organized plot, attributing such
stories to "party and sectional bitterness".94 Goldwin Smith was not directly critical
of Head's constitutional position; "supposing that he still held the prerogative of
dissolution, it would seem that he did right", he allowed. He did marvel at the
brazenness of the "double shuffle", remarking that "nothing smarter was ever done
by any Yankee politician".95
The passage of time has not rendered a clear verdict either. J.L. Morison
called the "double shuffle" the "most notorious breach of the constitutional
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decencies". "Whatever apologists may say", he insisted, "John A. Macdonald sinned
in the very first essentials of political fair-play". Head, Morison found, acted with
great independence in refusing Brown a dissolution. "But," he added, "even if Head
were independent, it was not with an authority useful to the dignity of his position;
and the whole affair has a suspicious resemblance to one of John A. Macdonald's
tricks. The voice is Macdonald's voice, if the hands are the hands of Head."96 O.D.
Skelton defended Head's actions, noting that he did not exceed his constitutional
powers, yet entertained a suspicion that Head "was actuated by a strong partiality for
Macdonald, with whom he was on terms of intimate personal friendship, and by a
strong prejudice against Brown".97 W.P.M. Kennedy acknowledged that Head's
actions were interpreted as "a party trick engineered by John A. Macdonald" but
maintained that the governor general "acted in a strictly constitutional way, nor yet
QO
did he lower the dignity of his office". Eugene Forsey also supported the
constitutionality of Head's refusal of a dissolution to George Brown. The
introduction of responsible government in no way eliminated the power of
dissolution held by the governor general, he properly asserted. Head's actions had
nothing to do with imperial control.99 J.M.S. Careless described the "double
shuffle" as a "half unscrupulous, half ludicrous episode" having "the proper air of
midnight intrigue". The governor general, he wrote, "was a necessary partner to
these proceedings.... The contrast in Head's treatment of Brown and his cabinet and
Macdonald and his colleagues could scarcely have been more acute."100 Ged Martin
allowed that the double shuffle was a "squalid episode" but added that it "does not
merit all the indignation which some historians have poured upon it"; other
parliamentary machinations throughout the twentieth century have been equally
blatant.101 David Knight claimed that Head refused Brown and Dorion's advice to
dissolve parliament "to their surprise and absolute dismay", ignoring the fact that
they were warned in writing three days previously that the governor would not
necessarily accept advice to dissolve. "Why", Knight asked, "did the Governor-
General not call a general election? A short answer is that he felt personally slighted
by the Assembly's rejection of Ottawa, the place he had so strongly and carefully
recommended."102 There is no doubt that the Assembly's vote put Head in an
embarrassing predicament. But this consideration was surely secondary to the more
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immediate problem of finding a set of ministers who could hope to garner sufficient
support in the House. There is also strong evidence that Head preferred Macdonald
over Brown as his advisor on personal grounds. Yet this does not mean that this was
the basis for the governor general's decision. Macdonald and Cartier could
command a majority; Brown and Dorion could not. The fact that Head did not
prevent the double shuffle does not mean that he personally approved of it, any more
than Elgin approved of the Rebellion Losses Bill. It simply meant that he did not see
clear grounds to act in opposition to the expressed will of a parliamentary majority. It
is instructive to cite the complaint of a governor of New South Wales, William
Denison, that under responsible government "one sees much going on which is most
objectionable, yet one is powerless either to do good or to prevent evil."103
The tumultuous events of the summer of 1858 ended with virtually the same
administration in power as before and all of the same problems of representation
unresolved. Yet the crisis may have added urgency to the idea of federation, a notion
that the Cartier-Macdonald ministry adopted as a policy aim. Within days of
swearing in the new administration, Head busied himself drafting a series of
resolutions advocating a British North American federation.104 When he closed the
session of parliament soon afterwards, Head alluded to this objective. "I propose in
the course of the recess", he announced, "to communicate with Her Majesty's
Government and with the Governments of our sister Colonies" to discuss a matter of
very great importance: "the principles on which a bond of a federal character uniting
the Provinces of British North America may hereafter be practicable". 105 The idea
of federation was not a sudden one; while governor of New Brunswick, Head had
drafted a memorandum for Newcastle on the subject.106 He had similarly
communicated with Labouchere about it in 1857 and, according to Herman Merivale,
was "particularly requested... to take it in hand".107 Head's recent experience of
political turmoil in the united Canadas would only have fortified his conviction about
the need for a change.
His chief at the Colonial Office was not perhaps as forward looking as some
of his predecessors had been, and Head's remarks on the desirability of federation
did not fall on particularly fertile ground. Lytton, in fact, saw Head's apparently
impulsive announcement on federation as further evidence of the governor's
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indiscretion, especially in the light of criticism reaching Britain over the late
ministerial crisis. Head's speech had caused the "gravest displeasure", Lytton stated
in a departmental minute. Moreover, "I have great doubts of his conduct throughout
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the recent transactions". The official response, however, was much more muted.
While the constitutionality of the governor general's conduct was not questioned, the
Colonial Office politely threw cold water on the federation scheme. The imperial
government would receive any representations from the province with "the greatest
attention", but as the question was "necessarily one of Imperial character", it
properly belonged to the "Executive authority of the Empire, and not that of any
separate province, to initiate".109 Head, unaware of Lytton's behind-the-scenes
misgivings about his own conduct, responded that "I rejoice to find that the course
pursued by me appears to Her Majesty's Government to have been in accordance
with constitutional principles". As to his federation announcement, he readily
concurred that it is "only by the permission and authority of Her Majesty's
Government that the subject can be considered and dealt with". He had, the
governor protested mildly, "merely announced my intention of opening a
correspondence... in order to indicate the direction in which we were about to seek
escape from some of the difficulties pressing on the Government of Canada".110
Lytton's qualms were not instantly resolved, however. After having given general
approval to the course taken by Head in the ministerial crisis, he found that a closer
reading of events left him more unsettled. "The reference to the non vacancy of
cabinet [?] seats in Sir E. Head's despatch is so vague that it might well escape my
attention", he complained in an internal departmental minute, suggesting that it did in
fact escape his attention. He allowed that in this instance Head acted according to
advice, and that the responsibility therefore shifted to the ministers, but he reserved
judgment on this aspect of the affair. "I hold myself open to examine into [?] that
point when Sir E. Head's answer arrives[?]."in
Fortunately for Head, the anticipated questions in the British parliament never
materialised. If they had, it is unlikely that he could have counted on much support
from his superiors at the Colonial Office. Early in 1859, Head observed ruefully that
the Economist "has lately had a long article against me with reference to the affairs
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of last summer". The Times, of course, had already made its opprobrium clear.
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Lewis assured his friend that he expected no questions to be taken up in parliament,
unless there was any noticeable disturbance in Canada. Later that spring, he still was
able to report that all was quiet. "It is clear that the public opinion of the Province
has acquiesced in the course which you took at the change of Government. Not a
word has been said on the subject in the House of Commons since its meeting, and as
far as England is concerned the matter is concluded, unless it should be revived from
your side [of] the water."113 A flurry of petitions, indignant letters to the editor, and
blistering broadsides from the Globe notwithstanding, Head survived the incident
intact. He reported jauntily to Lewis that the debate over the ministerial changes
"has not damaged or annoyed me at all—on the contrary I am satisfied that the
opinion of the [country?] is strongly in my favour".114 His words had a slightly
hollow ring, however; Head would hardly have been human to be untouched by the
storm of abuse he endured at the hands of a vocal minority.
Three years after the event, Head could not resist justifying what he admitted
to be the "questionable character of the steps which I took myself in 1858". In July
1861 he reported to Newcastle, the colonial secretary, on the electoral rout of Brown
and his colleagues, and the success of his previous Conservative administration.
"The result is pretty much what I indicated", he remarked with satisfaction. "I do not
want to go back to old stories but I think I may point out to your Grace that the real
justification of the course pursued by me in 1858, is to be found in the results". He
reminded Newcastle that the outgoing parliament had carried on for three more
sessions "quietly and peaceably", and was only dissolved after completing the full
legal term, "which I believe has not been the case with any other Parliament since the
union". He further pointed out that the late election gave the Conservative
administration an even stronger mandate, "confirming in fact the justice ofmy
impression as to the real wish of the people".115 Despite this satisfactory resolution,
Head had not given up the idea that some constitutional change was imminent. "The
next Governor here", he predicted to the colonial secretary in a later letter, "will have
to deal with the question of Representation with reference to the increase in the
population of Upper Canada—I think the matter will be settled amicably at last but it
will probably cost some two or three ministers their (official) lives before it is done
with."116
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Head's words were prophetic. His successor, Lord Monck, would oversee
the important and delicate process of confederating the British North American
provinces. The question of representation could be delayed no longer. Monck too
would be forced into an active role, helping to mould together coalitions in an
unstable political climate. Perhaps his more genial and down-to-earth personality
made him better suited to such a role than the cerebral and superior Head. Yet Head
acted properly, and in the best interest of the colony. He did not refuse ministerial
advice because he wished to interfere with the operation of responsible government,
but rather because the ministry tendering the advice never had the support of the
Assembly. It was Head's misfortune that the political climate of the 1850s, coupled
with the unwieldy constitutional legacy of the Act of Union, put the governor general
in an acutely difficult situation. Bagehot's ideal of a constitutional monarch who is
"aloof and solitary", who "seems to order, but... never... to struggle", who is never
contentious, and is of no party, was impossible for a governor in the United Canadas.
The "apparent separation from business" of the crown "is that which removes it both
from enmities and from desecration [and]... preserves its mystery", Bagehot
explained.117 But until one of the touted constitutional remedies for Canada's
representational stalemate was adopted, the governor general would by necessity be
hip-deep in the mire of active politics. His retreat to a distant ceremonial role would
have to wait.
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"My last card in that suit": Monck as Political Mediator,
1861-1864
When Lord Monck arrived in Canada in November 1861 to take up the only overseas
appointment of his career, he was immediately bombarded with problems that would
have tested the most experienced of governors. The Trent affair erupted when he had
been in Canada scarcely two weeks.1 The violation of British neutrality represented
by the incident raised the spectre of war with the United States, with Britain's North
American colonies the likely battleground. Britain hurriedly dispatched some 14,000
troops across the Atlantic, but the crisis pointed up the deficiencies of defence
planning in British North America. Only some of the transport vessels were able to
make their way up the St Lawrence before the winter freeze; the others were only
able to go as far as St John, far from the terminus of the Grand Trunk Railway in
Riviere du Loup, and the soldiers had to travel hundreds of miles overland through
the snow.2 Monck, who had no military background, suddenly found himself
preoccupied with defence questions. The governor general was commander in
chief, but Monck recognised that, even though his instructions contained "no more
allusion to an executive council or responsible government than if I were autocrat of
Russia", his responsible advisors would have to be persuaded, not commanded, to
take proper defence measures.4
Canadian domestic politics were likewise unstable. Sir Edmund Head's bold
initiative in favour of federation of the British North American provinces in 1858 had
not received a sympathetic hearing from the Colonial Office, and all of the
difficulties inherent in the Union of 1840 remained unsolved.5 Principles of
responsible government notwithstanding, Monck was compelled to intervene directly
in the process of cobbling together administrations from the disparate elements that
made up Canadian politics. He claimed that the coalition of 1864 was "at least in
some measure—brought about by the exercise... of the personal influence of the
Governor General". In using his influence, Monck accepted that he was "in some
measure overstep [ping]... the strict line of his constitutional duties".6 The activist
role Monck assumed up to 1864 set the tone for a high degree of involvement, and
his success perhaps encouraged him to take an active role in promoting
Confederation. While Monck's inexperience might have seemed a liability when he
took on the governor generalship, his character suited him for the role in many
respects. Thick-skinned, frank and manly, Monck was also possessed of an
agreeable nature and pragmatic flexibility which made him far more successful than
the exacting and sometimes irritable Head. Head's intervention won him enemies
without gaining friends; Monck, by contrast, remained on relatively good terms with
Canadian politicians despite very trying circumstances.7 Donald Creighton
acknowledged that Monck was "not an original or profound political philosopher"
but credited him with "a clear eye for facts and a readiness to learn from
experience".8 Monck recognised when the occasion would demand a departure from
a narrow interpretation of his role, and expanded his influence with tact and
impartiality. Significantly for the future of Canada, Monck's activism in bringing
together political antagonists set the stage for the negotiations that resulted in
Confederation. It is questionable whether Monck was so far-sighted as to visualise
this process of reconciliation as the first step in a permanent solution to the
constitutional impasse of the Act of Union. More probably, he simply sought to find
a means of reconstituting the party affiliations that had stood in the way of stable and
effective government. Such activism on the part of a governor general in a self-
governing colony might well be expected to provoke censure. In this instance,
however, Monck's gamble succeeded, and his informal suasion was a key factor in
resolving what he called the "condition of chronic crisis" that characterised Canadian
politics9 and promoting an atmosphere in which solutions could be found.
The family name of Charles Stanley Monck, fourth Viscount Monck in the
Irish peerage, reportedly originated with the Norman French LeMoyne. With
Monck's appointment to Canada, Le Canadien remarked on the coincidence of
having a descendant of that family serve as governor during both the French and
British regime. Charles Le Moyne, later Baron of Longueil, had been the King's
lieutenant in Canada in the seventeenth century. Perhaps, Le Canadien speculated,
Monck was "intended to be the trait d'union, the social link to connect the various
provinces of British North America in a compact confederacy".10 Bom 10 October
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1819 in Templemore, Ireland, educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and qualified as a
barrister, Monck succeeded his father as fourth viscount in 1849. He was elected
Liberal MP for Portsmouth in 1852. He held the very junior appointment of a lord of
the treasury in Palmerston's government between 1855 and 1858, but was defeated in
the following election. On the basis of these rather slender credentials, Palmerston
appointed Monck to Canada.11 The reaction ofmost Canadians to the appointment,
10
according to the Quebec Morning Chronicle, was "who is he?" Monck was known
to be a protege of Palmerston but some had reservations about his ability to handle
the job. According to Edward Watkin, Monck was a "jolly wellbred Irishman and
nothing more."13 Robert Lowe described him as "an innocent lamb", and remarked
that the appointment was like "sending a cat into Hell without claws".14 Newcastle
assured Sir Edmund Head that his successor's geniality was "almost the only part of
the Irish character he shows".15 It has been suggested that Newcastle, who
considered himself an expert on Canada based on a visit with the Prince ofWales in
1860, believed that the Colonial Office could direct Canadian affairs from a backseat
and that the inexperienced Monck would be malleable.16 There is no question that,
in addition to Palmerston, Monck had influential friends. These included J.T. Delane
of The Times', Edward Cardwell, who succeeded Newcastle as colonial secretary in
1864; Abraham Hayward of the Saturday Review, prominent MP Edward Ellice,
whose Hudson's Bay Company background and knowledge of Canada were much
valued; and Charles Adderley (later Lord Norton), undersecretary for the colonies in
1866-67. Notwithstanding these connections, Monck's appointment may have
appeared surprising given that he had no military experience. The recent outbreak of
the American Civil War threatened to complicate British-American relations, and it
might have been expected that the Colonial Office would appoint someone able to
assess Canada's military preparedness with confidence.
Monck was physically an unremarkable man. Just turned forty-two at the
time of his Canadian appointment, he enjoyed good health and was fond of outdoor
pursuits. Monck was of medium height and build. His eyes were large and deep set,
his hairline receded from a wide forehead, and a long flowing beard streaked with
grey and luxuriant curled moustache dominated his pleasant, open features.
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Monck differed from other viceregal appointees in one important respect: he
did not share the cosmopolitan background ofmany of the others, and was firmly
rooted in his family seat of Charleville in County Wicklow. While Oxford was the
most frequent source of imperial viceroys, Monck's education was exclusively Irish.
Canada was his first and last overseas appointment. As a mark of his Canadian
service, Monck was raised to the United Kingdom peerage as the first Baron Monck
of Ballytrammon in the county ofWexford in July 1866,17 was made GCMG in June
1869, and was called to the Privy Council in August of that year, yet he never again
held a major office. When he returned to Ireland, Monck was appointed member of
the Church Temporalities and National Education Commissions, from 1882 to 1884
served as commissioner of the new Irish Land Act, and from 1874 to 1892 was lord-
lieutenant of County Dublin. He retired to his Irish estate with the death of his wife
in 1892, and died there himself in November 1894, aged seventy-five.18
It is evident that the Monck family felt the strain of being removed from their
beloved home in Ireland. Despite the long periods of separation necessitated by his
Canadian appointment, Monck was thoroughly a family man. Indeed, his devotion to
family is also exhibited in his choice of marriage partner: Elizabeth Louise Mary
Monck was his first cousin.19 Monck's brother Richard copied his example by
marrying Frances Elizabeth Owen Cole, the daughter of Lady Monck's elder sister,
and his own cousin.20
Surviving correspondence and journals of the Monck family suggest a close
and loving bond among the wide circle of relations and immediate family group.
Monck and his wife had seven children, although only two sons and two daughters
survived.21 Fond family nicknames abounded, and the Moncks were clearly
indulgent parents. Monck reassured his eldest son that it was no use crying over spilt
milk when Henry failed to pass his examination at Oxford.22 He later assured his
"own darling boy" that "you need not be afraid that I shall be annoyed with you if
you do not succeed, as I am sure you are doing your best—and no man can do more
than that."23 Five-year-old Stanley was reportedly an enfant terrible, allowed to
freely mingle with company.24
The residences of the governor general, both SpencerWood in Quebec and
later Rideau Hall in Ottawa, seem to have been transformed by the Moncks into
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menageries crowded with family pets. Including those kept by the staff, the count
numbered fifteen dogs, seven cats, various birds, and a tame owl. No doubt there
was always new talent available for inclusion in the flea circus kept by Brock, the
butler.25 All the family kept horses to ride, and Monck, unlike some others, was
pleased to discover that Ottawa had dirt roads: "as most of the roads are not
macadamized ... you can ride as quickly as you like upon them," he enthused to
Henry.26 Monck's letters to his son frequently request information about the well-
being of the horses at home, with particular inquiries after his favourites. At a
Toronto cattle show, Monck described himself as "a practical farmer", and the
evidence suggests that this description was not inaccurate. His letters contain
admonitions about control of rats and repair of fences, along with other equally
practical concerns.27
Monck took a low profile socially, seldom entertained, and did not even keep
a carriage and pair. This was probably attributable, not to standoffishness, but to a
dislike of ostentation. He was known to be easy-going and accessible.29 The Globe
observed that "our new Governor possesses the happy knack of placing those who
meet him quite at their ease... His manners are very gracious and tactful.... He does
TO •
not notice mistakes." It is tempting to contrast his low-key approach with the
energetic and extroverted Dufferin, who was loath to miss any social engagement,
and was an enthusiastic dancer at balls. Monck, on the other hand, did not seem to
regard his social duties as in any way pivotal to his position. "There is to be aMilitia
Ball here tonight", he wrote to his son Henry. "Dick & Feo are going but I fought
shy of it".31 Excessive pomp and ceremony embarrassed him. He complained to a
friend about his regal treatment while distributing prizes at a young ladies' school.
I was perched on a sort of throne with about three or four hundred people
about me, and thus tied to the stake, had inflicted upon me by the authoress (a
remarkably pretty girl, by the way) a poetic effusion in my own eulogy, in
which I was apostrophized as 'proud Erin's peer.' I never felt so like a fool
in my life.32
Monck was a down-to-earth individual with a well-developed sense of the ridiculous.
He was amused when his butler had "taken into his head to make the footmen wear
powder" during the social functions that marked the first opening of the Dominion
parliament.33 He admitted that the band of the Rifle Brigade, which played for their
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evening reception, "gratified our ears very much" but ruefully added that the same
could not be said for their noses "as the espirit de corps was rather strong".34 When
things were quiet in Ottawa, Monck apparently did not consider it his duty to enliven
the scene, complaining privately that "the place is very stupid just now as there is
nothing doing here". He tried to shirk speaking duties when possible, again in
contrast to Dufferin, who erred in the other direction, holding forth sometimes for
hours. Monck confessed to Henry that when presenting prizes at a rifle match "I did
not want to make a long speech so, as I had had a sore throat, I made that the
excuse". He was embarrassed when the newspapers reported that '"the state ofmy
•1Z
health' prevented me from speaking, as if I had been seriously ill." He also
grumbled when his administration gave him "a tremendously long speech to read" at
the opening of parliament—in English and French of course: "[D]id I not wish 'notre
langue' at the bottom of the sea" he exclaimed.37
Though inexperienced, Monck's personal qualities made him well suited to
the viceregal position, constitutionally if not socially. Critics have labelled him
"dull", claiming that he "lacked style and imagination", yet it is also acknowledged
that he was respected for his patience, willingness to be helpful and spirit of
impartiality.38 He negotiated his way without any major crisis through a rather
perilous era of Canadian history, overseeing the process of Confederation and
avoiding entanglements with Canada's warring neighbour. Robin Winks noted that
Monck "had no particular qualifications" for the office of governor general "other
than those that were least tangible but most important—energy, tact, and an immense
capacity for patience".39 Monck's secretary, Denis Godley, dubbed "the Almighty"
by Canadians, irritated some by his insistence on controlling access to the governor
general.40 As Godley had decided views on colonial matters, and was known to be a
supporter of Goldwin Smith, Monck was tarred with the same brush, and the
governor's popularity may have been damaged by association with anti-colonial
views.41 John A. Macdonald reputedly found Monck's calm, slow style to be an
irritant42 yet has been quoted as saying that he was surprised by reports that Monck
was unpopular:
I like him amazingly, and shall be very sorry when he leaves, as he has been a
very prudent and efficient administrator of public affairs. Still, he seems not
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to have the power ofmaking friends, and there is a bitterness of feeling
displayed towards him for which I was altogether unprepared.43
Despite the understandable reservations about Monck's ability to do the job, and
criticisms arising from his indifference to the social realm, his appointment must be
counted a success.
In the spring of 1862 Monck was preoccupied with his struggle to induce his
Canadian ministry to pass a satisfactory Militia Bill. The inadequacy of Canada's
defences, brought sharply into focus with the Trent crisis ofNovember 1861, made
legislation for improvements to the militia a matter of some urgency. Years of
indifference toward the militia, combined with a small population base, limited
government revenues, and a long border to defend, meant that Canada's defences
were far from adequate.44 The British parliament was just coming to grips with the
enormity of the expense incurred by the emergency reinforcement of British North
American defences the previous autumn, and opinions were strong that Canada
should bear a greater share of defence costs.45 Canada created a defence portfolio for
the first time late in 1861, and John A. Macdonald had been named Minister of
Militia Affairs. A Commission on the Reorganization of the Militia, on which
Macdonald had served, prepared a report that formed the basis of the 1862 Militia
Bill. The Militia Bill called for a defence budget which would amount to one-tenth
of provincial revenue, and raised the possibility of a direct tax and conscription.
Cautious about political opposition, however, Macdonald described the bill as an
"enabling bill", permitting, but not requiring, the government to put the
commission's recommendations into effect.46 When Monck opened the session of
parliament in March he discovered with alarm that the Liberal-Conservative ministry
headed by George-Etienne Cartier and John A. Macdonald did not have a wide
margin of support. Their candidate for the speakership was carried by only thirteen
votes, Monck noted to the Duke of Newcastle, who was then secretary of state for the
colonies, "but they are very plucky and say they are going to pull through". For his
part, Monck admitted that as long as they managed to pass the Militia Bill, he would
be satisfied, "and as far as I can learn I do not think there will be any serious
opposition to it".47 The government also faced pressure over the representation by
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population question, Monck advised the colonial secretary. This concerned Monck
insofar as anything that endangered the ministry put the Militia Bill at risk. Disunity
among the opposition prevented the defeat of the ministry over the representation by
population issue, he noted, "but it is a subject, the importance of which is becoming
every day more prominent". The representation question would have to be addressed
if "the disparity in numbers between Upper & Lower Canada continues to increase in
48
the ratio shown by the late census". But for the moment, he remained optimistic
that this was in the future, and, as for the Militia Bill, "I have very little doubt that I
shall be able to get a satisfactory measure passed".49 Monck's inexperience in
Canadian politics may have made him overly complacent, but a number of factors
unrelated to the Militia Bill itself thwarted its passage.
Monck unexpectedly was plunged into "the midst of a Ministerial crisis" the
following month. Confessing himself "deeply mortified" at having to report the
setback to Newcastle, Monck admitted that he had been "entirely unprepared" for the
Assembly's rejection of a motion for a second reading of the Militia Bill. He
surmised, however, that the "vote was intended more as one of want of confidence in
the Government than of hostility to the Militia Bill". There had been very damaging
revelations of financial wrongdoing the week before. Further, Macdonald had been
in the grips of a prolonged drinking bout, and had been absent from the House for a
week while the bill was under discussion.50 Monck lamented the non-passage of the
Militia Bill because of the probable impression that it would create in Britain and the
United States,51 but was equally concerned about the domestic political
consequences. The vote in the Assembly had been divided along ethnic lines, Monck
explained to Newcastle, "so that the second reading was lost by the votes of the
French Canadians who made such loud professions of loyalty (and I believe
sincerely) last winter". This would give a great stimulus and excuse, he feared, for
Upper Canadian claims for an increased share of political representation. Despite
his short tenure in the province, Monck very cannily analysed the political scene. At
least one subsequent historical observer agreed with him that the Militia Bill of 1862
was the occasion, rather than the cause, of the defeat of the Cartier-Macdonald
government.53
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Monck's most immediate problem was the appointment of a ministry to
succeed the defeated administration. Joseph Pope, Macdonald's secretary, believed
that it was taken for granted that the governor general would call upon Michael
Foley, nominal head of the opposition. Another contemporary observer, E.W.
Watkin, agreed that "in the ordinary course" Foley would have been sent for.
Instead, to the surprise ofmany, Monck selected John Sandfield Macdonald to form
the new government.54 J.L. Morison called Monck's selection of J. S. Macdonald
"instead of Foley, the more natural alternative for premier", "the most conspicuous
assertion of independence".55 W.P.M. Kennedy echoed this, remarking that Sir
Edmund Head's refusal of a dissolution to George Brown in 1858 and Monck's
decision to call upon John Sandfield Macdonald in 1862 instead of "the more
influential M.H. Foley" were "the nearest approach to independence" of action by a
governor since the advent of responsible government.56 Donald Creighton
challenged this, asserting that "the portly and bibulous Foley did not stand out nearly
so conspicuously as Brown had done from among his unfriendly associates, the other
Reform leaders". It was possible, he argued, for Monck to ignore Foley, and he did
so, probably under the advice of Cartier.57 Bruce W. Hodgins agreed that Foley was
not the inevitable choice. He also suggested that Foley's "ferocious drinking"
reminded Monck of John A. Macdonald, whose drunkenness during the Militia Bill
debates probably cost the government support for the measure. What is more,
Hodgins pointed out, Monck would have been loath to select anyone as minister who
played a role in the non-passage of the all-importantMilitia Bill. This meant that it
was certain Louis Sicotte would not be called upon.58 C.P. Stacey speculated that
Monck probably believed that John Sandfield Macdonald would be more committed
to the militia than Foley was; Foley had been an outspoken critic of the volunteer
force.59 The Liberal Alexander Mackenzie saw Monck's choice of Brown's rival as
evidence of collusion between the governor general and the late Conservative
ministry. He suspected that it was part of a larger scheme to bring the defeated
ministry back as quickly as possible, as in the double shuffle four years earlier.
Mackenzie believed that the two Macdonalds conspired to cover up the criminal
conduct of the previous administration. '"If ye dinna touch me, I'll no touch you' is
manifestly the motto", the staunch Reformer concluded sourly.60 Sandfield
Ill
Macdonald endorsed a "double majority" system for Canada's united Assembly;
measures would have to obtain a majority in both the Canada East and CanadaWest
sections of the legislature. This constitutional compromise was more palatable to
Canadian Conservatives than the more radical representation by population endorsed
by Brown and other reformers. It was also demonstrably unworkable, and the
Conservatives may well have expected to see any ministry built on such a principle
founder in a very short time. "All sides believed", Watkin recalled, "that it would be
a ministry of a month".61
Monck's correspondence with the colonial secretary suggests that he saw no
real alternative to a government led by Sandfield Macdonald. He admitted that his
first instinct had been to refuse to accept the resignation of the Cartier-Macdonald
government and call an election. When he considered further, however, he realised
that an appeal to the country might ratify the vote of the Assembly, meaning the
Militia Bill would be irretrievably lost. As it was, the Bill had not actually been
defeated, only prevented from receiving a second reading.62 "The only alternative",
he concluded, that would mean "not interfering with the ordinary constitutional
action" would be to allow "those who have outvoted the late Ministers to try their
hands at administering public affairs". He did not specify why he chose Sandfield
Macdonald particularly.64 It certainly was not from any love of the principle of
double majority that Sandfield Macdonald embraced. "I entertain for it as great a
dislike as you could wish and entirely agree... that the tendency of adopting such a
principle is retrogressive" Monck assured Newcastle. Neither did he attach any great
significance to calls for "rep by pop" by other reform politicians. "It is true it is a
hustings shibboleth all through U[pper] C[anada]. But so has been the Ballot and
representation Reform for years in England".65 Monck let Newcastle know that he
insisted to his new minister that immediate attention be given to the Grand Trunk
Railway and the Militia. "He assented to both suggestions", Monck reported, "and
his ministry has been formed on the pledge to me that both these questions will be
arranged before I shall be asked to prorogue".66
In any event, Monck's decision to call upon Sandfield Macdonald was not
based on any particular favouritism toward him or respect for his administrative
abilities. "The new Ministers are a wretched lot!" Monck complained to his chief.
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"Not one of them is capable of rising above the level of a parish politician, and they
are led away by all the small jealousies and suspicions to which minds of that class
are prone".67 In October 1862 Monck confided to his friend Edward Ellice that he
was "almost in despair" about the ministry's ineptitude in handling the province's
finances. While the Cartier-Macdonald administration was in some ways "jobbing
and corrupt", Gait—the previous finance minister—was an able man "and at all
events understands what he is about". The present ministers, while "more anxious to
do what is right... have not amongst their administration ability enough to manage
the affairs of a parish!" Monck cautioned Ellice to keep his remarks in strict
confidence "as it would not render my position here... pleasant ifmy Ministers
/TO
became aware ofmy real opinions of them". Shortly after this, Newcastle had met
with Canadian delegates to discuss the Intercolonial Railway, and he proved to be no
more impressed with their calibre than was Monck. "I do not form a very high
opinion ofMr. Sicotte", he admitted. Sicotte seemed determined to thwart the
Intercolonial railway negotiations, he surmised, and he lamented the choice of such a
negotiator "for business so greatly exceeding the grasp of his petty mind". Further,
William Howland, the finance minister, was prevented by his colleagues from saying
a word.69 While he had not met Sandfield Macdonald personally, Newcastle's
impression of him was that he was "a well meaning man without energy resource or
firmness of purpose".70 Despite his own reservations, Newcastle admonished the
governor general not to betray any sign of prejudice against his current ministry. He
reported that "I have reason to know, though not from anything said by the
Delegates, that they already think you less favourable to them than you were to their
predecessors. Whatever they may do," he cautioned, "pray do not allow them the
smallest ground for saying they have not had fair play or that their fall (if they do
fall) was either caused or hastened by any act of yours". Any hint that the governor
general showed favour to any political party, or did not have confidence in his
ministers, would greatly prejudice Monck's position in Canada, Newcastle warned.
"I know how hard it is to appear to trust when no real confidence is felt," he
admitted, "but the Governor of a Constitutional Colony should endeavour to imitate
the conduct in this respect of our good Queen" who never allowed any whisper that
she was Sovereign of a party.71 Monck was quick to defend himself, ingenuously
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protesting that "I am at a loss to discover on what grounds any portion of the present
Ministry should suppose I am less favourable to them than I was to their
predecessors". Only a few days ago, Monck pointed out, Sandfield Macdonald
volunteered that he was grateful for the support the governor general had given him
since he had been in office. While Monck allowed that he had never concealed it
from his administration when his opinions differed from theirs, he had always done
the same with the previous ministry.72
Sandfield Macdonald's fragile ministry quickly suffered a series of setbacks.
The resignation of the influential Antoine-Aime Dorion from cabinet in January 1863
weakened the base of support. But even more threatening was the crisis that erupted
over separate schools. R. W. Scott's Separate Schools Bill flew in the face of the
convictions ofmany Upper Canadian reformers on non-sectarian education. The bill
passed with broad support in Canada East but in the Canada West section of the
legislature the measure was in a minority by nine votes. Faced with a major test of
the defining principle of his administration, Sandfield Macdonald now became
evasive about the applicability of the doctrine of double majority.73
The defeat of the government early in May on a motion of no-confidence by
John A. Macdonald came as a shock to no one. Newcastle's response was that "I
cannot say I am either surprised or sorry". Indeed, he looked forward to the
installation of "a Ministry more suited to the times and to cope with existing
difficulties than that which has for a year been lagging behind the sounder views of
the people and sacrificing its interests to the one miserable object of retaining their
offices". He hoped that Monck would not feel obliged to grant a dissolution to
Sandfield Macdonald. Frequent dissolutions were very mischievous, he warned, and
the effect might be to "encumber you with a weak Gov[ernmen]t for a lengthened
period". On the face of it, the Duke ofNewcastle, an experienced and high-profile
statesman, who occupied the highest echelons of the aristocracy, seemed to be setting
the agenda for the inexperienced Monck.74 Newcastle allowed, however, that "much
must depend upon circumstances at the moment which can only be fully appreciated
on the spot".75
The addendum was fortunate, since Monck had already decided to pursue a
different course. He accepted Sandfield Macdonald's advice to dissolve parliament.
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To his friend Edward Ellice, Monck explained his reasoning. Interestingly, he
looked backward into the term of Sir Edmund Head, and saw in it, not a precedent to
be followed, but a perceived injustice to be countered. The party in power, he
explained, never had the advantage of a dissolution. "There was a strong—though I
am far from saying a just—feeling that they had not been fairly treated when that step
was refused to them in 1858—I think on general principles", he continued,
"Macdonald was entitled to his dissolution, and I am sure if on any technical grounds
I had refused it, I would have found myself in such a position that I had much better
have at once resigned my office".7
Despite Newcastle's earlier assurance that the governor general would be
better able to judge the right course to take, he was quick to condemn his decision.
The colonial secretary wrote privately that he could not agree with Monck's view. "I
think all constitutional procedure is against the demand which Mr. S. Macdonald
made of you in the first instance and the course he attempted to pursue.... That
which I anticipated has come to pass", he noted darkly.77 Monck's response
prompted Newcastle to explain "some ofmy hurried remarks". He insisted that it
was really unnecessary to discuss the case, "as the circumstance of the late
Dissolution in Canada are so very unlikely to recur during your Gov[ernmen]t and as
I have never for a moment implied the least doubt of your wish to act impartially".
While he had doubts about granting a dissolution to Sandfield Macdonald, he did not
mean to dispute its constitutional propriety.78
Newcastle was also critical ofMonck's somewhat cryptic style of reporting
events in his official despatches. The only notice the Colonial Office received of the
dissolution of Canada's parliament was a copy of Monck's speech delivered upon the
closure of the session.79 Colonial Office officials were clearly in the dark about the
significance ofwhat had transpired. "I suppose", minuted Arthur Blackwood, "the
ministry has been defeated on some great question".80 "I think Lord Monck ought to
give the Secretary] of State more information upon the public affairs of Canada than
he has given in this case, and more than he is in the habit of giving", parliamentary
undersecretary Chichester Fortescue ventured.81 Newcastle explained in response to
his colleagues that Monck had written to him privately, "but it is strange that he
should content himself with so bald a despatch as this upon an occasion of so much
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interest & importance". He added that it was "a fitting occasion" to point out to
Monck that his despatches were "much too meagre and that in the present instance
but for the assistance of private letters and newspapers his announcement would have
been quite unintelligible".82 Newcastle followed up with an official despatch in
which he gently scolded Monck in just those terms. "I am well aware of the attitude
of neutrality which it is necessary for your Lordship to maintain amidst the disputes
and vicissitudes of the Parliamentary system established in Canada," he insisted. "I
would on no account urge you to introduce into your public despatches comments
upon the conduct of political parties, which might embarrass you afterwards in
maintaining harmonious relations", but he was confident the governor general should
be able to produce a "plain and impartial narrative" to indicate the general outline of
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events. The spare style ofMonck's official despatches has also misled historians as
to the degree of his involvement in Canadian public life. The despatches, J.L.
Morison remarked "present a striking contrast to those of Sydenham and Elgin, who
proved how active was the part they played in the life of the community by the
vividness of their sketches of Canadian politics and society".84
In the meantime, several of Monck's friends in Britain, who evidently had
received more details, hastened to assure him of their support for his decision to
grant Sandfield Macdonald a dissolution. Robert Lowe wrote to let Monck know
that he had discussed the situation with Edward Ellice and "entirely agreed with him
in thinking that you had acted perfectly right and in a manner in every way worthy of
you". "[I]t would have been an act of gross partiality to have turned ... [the
administration] out in order to give the advantage of the dissolution to their
antagonists", he continued. The former ministry seemed to him "the impersonation
of evil". "I am glad they are out", he pronounced, ".. .and I think you deserve the
highest credit for departing from the precedent of your predecessors and acting with
complete impartiality". He admitted that "these are not the sentiments of the
Colonial Office. The Duke of Newcastle is a man of sympathies and antipathies."
But outside the Colonial Office, everyone acquainted with the facts believed Monck
was right, he assured him.85 Charles Adderley let Monck know that his "wise
[and]... moderate" position had been praised in Britain and expressed his confidence
as Monck undertook "a difficult and important task". He wondered if it was possible
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to maintain a colonial connection with self-governing colonies, and pointed out to
86
Monck that "the dualism of your own post" was the difficulty. In the autumn of
1863 Monck expressed his relief to another correspondent in Britain that "my friends
at home approve ofmy proceedings here. I have had rather a troublesome and
anxious time of it during the summer, but I am repaid by the results". He also
confided that the support of Edward Ellice, who had died recently, had meant a great
deal to him, "for he thoroughly understood Canadian politics, and knew the
difficulties with which I have to contend here".87
The collapse of another ministry apparently convinced Monck that he would
have to take a more active role than that of an aloof constitutional governor. Soon
after the defeat of Sandfield Macdonald's administration in May 1863, Monck
requested an interview with George Brown. The reform politician recalled that he
and the governor general had discussed "all sorts of things". He found Monck to be
"amazingly frank, straightforward and kind". Monck agreed with Brown about the
problems that plagued Canadian politics, "admitted I was seeking the right remedy,
and put the question direct, 'Mr. Brown, could you repeat what you did in 1858—
would Mr. Dorion go with you to the extent he then did?'" Brown allegedly let
Monck know that, while circumstances had changed, he and Dorion might accept
office together. Brown reported that the governor general then sent for Sandfield
Macdonald and urged him to attempt to form a coalition with Dorion and Brown.
Buoyed by the intimation that "the Governor is thoroughly with us", Reform
politicians, including Dorion, Luther Holton, Oliver Mowat, Sandfield Macdonald,
and his long-standing critic, George Brown, met to try to find some grounds for
cooperation. Dorion pointed out that Lower Canadian supporters would never accept
the doctrine of representation by population but, by leaving the question open, a
coalition would be possible.88 Brown himself declined to enter into an
administration,89 but the meeting was significant nevertheless. Brown's conversation
with Monck undoubtedly helped heal the bitterness that remained after his bruising
brush with political office in 1858. By gaining Brown's trust and displaying a
willingness to consider his constitutional remedies, Monck might well have paved
the way for the political rapprochement that was a necessary condition for the
constitutional debates of 1864.
117
In the June 1863 election that followed Monck's dissolution, the previous
government lost some support in Canada East, but gained seats in Canada West.
Sandfield Macdonald once again presided over what Monck described as a "rickety
Ministry".90 The ministry was able at last to pass a slightly modified Militia Bill in a
special session of the legislature in the autumn of 1863. These new measures did not
go as far as Monck would have liked, but they represented a considerable
improvement over previous defence spending commitments.91 Newcastle was
gratified to be able to report on improvements to Canadian defence in the British
Q9
parliament, and the British press approved of Canada's apparent new mindfulness
of defence, and willingness to increase taxes for the purpose.93 While this solved an
immediate problem that had been troubling Monck since his arrival, the fundamental
constitutional impasse had not been resolved. Sandfield Macdonald's support in the
Legislative Assembly quickly melted away. He turned to Sir Etienne Tache and
suggested an alliance with other moderate Conservatives, including John A.
Macdonald and Cartier. Sandfield Macdonald discussed the idea with Monck, who
was fully supportive of such a remedy. Negotiations failed, however, and on 21
March 1864 Sandfield Macdonald's ministry resigned without waiting for a formal
vote of no-confidence.94 "The situation", Joseph Pope speculated, "was one of no
little embarrassment to the Governor General".95 Monck explained to the British
diplomatic representative at Washington, Lord Lyons, that his hands were full with a
ministerial crisis. "I have tried my hand at an endeavour to reconcile personal
differences", he admitted defeatedly, "•—there are really no public questions which
ought to keep men apart—but have failed signally".96 Monck's official despatch to
Newcastle—which was more detailed than his former almost telegraphic style of
communication—echoed this idea. Sandfield Macdonald had told him, he reported,
"that it appeared to him the time was come when a junction of men of opposite
parties might with advantage be formed". "It seemed to me, from my own
observation", he concurred, "that there is really no question involving any principle
which ought to prevent public men from co-operating in Government in dispute
between political parties in Canada".97 Unlike Head, who advocated a federation
scheme, Monck did not see the need for a major upheaval of Canada's political
landscape. It would be enough, he believed, if individual politicians could be
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encouraged to cooperate within the existing system. Sandfield Macdonald advised
Monck that he had come to the conclusion that he himselfmight be a personal barrier
to reconciling men of other parties, and recommended to Monck that he ask
Fergusson Blair to form a government. Blair proved unable to marshal enough
support, however. Monck decided to meet with some of the leading men himself to
"try whether I might not be able to bring them to act together and with him".98
Monck was forced to call upon Alexander Campbell, Cartier, and Dorion in
succession, and found that none of them were any more successful. Only when he
summoned Tache, who in turn garnered the co-operation of John A. Macdonald and
Cartier, was the governor general able to swear in a new ministry. This only delayed
the crisis, however, and within three months the new ministry was defeated by a
99
margin of two votes.
Presented with a new request for dissolution after the adverse vote on 14 June
1864, Monck was understandably concerned. Within three years, four ministries had
been defeated, two general elections had failed to break the deadlock, and there was
no evidence that a new appeal to the people would produce any dramatically
different result. Monck asked Tache to put his request in writing100 while he took
time to consider his answer. He took into account the fact that the adverse vote was
not over a policy of the present government, but concerned Gait's advance of public
money to the city ofMontreal in 1859.101 Since "a good deal of personal feeling had
been excited" over the question, Monck decided, "it seemed to me most desirable
that some interval of time should be allowed to elapse before any definitive answer
should be given by me". These days of delay, were, W.L. Morton argued, "among
the most pregnant and dramatic of Canadian history". They marked a period of "true
crisis, at once a turning-point and a verdict".102
After two days, Monck responded to Tache's written request. Monck
recapped the political events of the past three years and expressed his view that
during this time of political instability, "no question involving any great principle or
calculated to prevent politicians on public grounds from acting in concert had been
raised in Parliament". He recalled his own role in appealing to the patriotism of
politicians on both sides of the House to "throw aside personal differences, and to
unite in the formation of a Government strong enough to advance the general
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interests of the Country". He deeply regretted that this attempt should have failed,
and complained that the continuation of such a state of things was "deeply prejudicial
to the best interest of the Province". A new election would not alter conditions.
"The Governor General", he stated frankly, "still adheres to the opinion that such an
amalgamation of parties is the course calculated to confer the largest amount of
benefit on the Province". He earnestly hoped that "means may be found for effecting
such an arrangement without doing violence to the self respect of any gentleman
connected with Canadian politics". While assuring Tache that he was quite willing
to act on his advice, he trusted that an appeal to the country could be avoided.103 The
arguments Monck used were similar to those cited by Head in 1858—a new election
was unlikely to present a clear verdict—yet Monck's position was strengthened by
the fact that, contrary to Newcastle's instincts, he had permitted an election the
previous year. Further, to borrow a metaphor Monck used himself, he played his
cards shrewdly. He did not refuse a dissolution outright, but rather stalled for time,
hopeful that Canadian politicians could use the interval to undertake the necessary
negotiations.
In the meantime, Monck exerted pressure on opposition politicians, especially
George Brown. There can be little doubt that his careful handling of Brown helped
assuage the Reformer's wounded dignity after his clash with Monck's predecessor.
On 21 June 1864, Monck wrote to Brown to plead with him that "the success or
failure of the negotiations... depends very much on your consenting to come into the
cabinet." Because of the urgent circumstances, the governor general explained, he
felt he must again "take the liberty of pressing upon you by this note, as I have
already often done verbally, my opinion of the grave responsibility which you will
take upon yourself if you should refuse to do so".104 Clearly, in the governor
general's mind a great deal was at stake. Monck recalled later to Macdonald that he
felt "when I formed the present Administration that my last card in that suit had been
played, and that, if it did not win, the time would have come when I ought to give up
the attempt to manage the affairs of Canada".105 W.L. Morton has speculated that
Monck's own political experience in a political coalition under Lord Aberdeen may
have contributed to his commitment to the idea of a coalition as the solution to
Canada's constitutional problems.106 Morton referred to Monck as the "advocate as
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well as inspirer of the idea of coalition", pointing out that Monck had become
convinced during Sandfield Macdonald's term of office that only a coalition could
break the deadlock.107 It had been a great disappointment to Monck that the idea had
failed earlier. Morton did not believe it followed from this, however, that Monck had
any grand plan about the necessity of Confederation. Monck would later become a
firm advocate of Confederation, and an active agent in the process of securing its
passage.108 But Ged Martin has agreed that "neither Newcastle nor Monck linked the
political need for coalition with the opportunity for a new departure in constitutional
engineering". It had not been evident to Newcastle, or Cardwell, his successor, that
Confederation was part of the immediate plans of the Great Coalition. Monck, for
his part, had only expressed to the Colonial Office his hope that a compromise would
be found for the representation by population issue.109
Monck was pleased to report to Cardwell that his delay in answering Tache's
request for a dissolution was "attended with beneficial results". There had been
several days negotiation to "bring about a Union of parties in the sense of my
memorandum", Monck explained. "I had constant interviews with gentlemen
representing the different parties in Canadian politics, and the result was that on
Wednesday the 22nd an arrangement was made satisfactory to both parties". Monck
was not backward in claiming his share of the credit for this resolution, and "I have
no hesitation in expressing my satisfaction at this result". He pointed out that the
only question about which there had been any serious difference was the equality of
representation for Upper and Lower Canada, given the difference in population.
Now, however, that those holding opposing views had "met each other in a spirit of
conciliation", Monck had no doubt that a satisfactory compromise could be
devised.110
The cabinet of the so-called "Great Coalition" included John A. Macdonald,
Alexander Gait, George-Etienne Carrier, William McDougall, Thomas D'Arcy
McGee, Oliver Mowat, Etienne-Pascal Tache, Hector Langevin, Alexander
Campbell, James Cockbum, J. C. Chapais, and George Brown.111 Brown might be
seen as either the sine qua non of the coalition, or, according to Joseph Pope, the root
of all the trouble in the first place.112 It was understood that the coalition would work
toward the goal of federation, either of Canada, or all of the British North American
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provinces, according to the programme outlined in a constitutional committee report
1 n
made by George Brown on 14 June. A printed pamphlet, Ministerial
Explanations, issued by parliament on 23 June 1864 described this objective, and
also explained the process of negotiation that led to the construction of the coalition.
Perhaps not surprisingly, little mention was made of any role Monck may have
played.114 Alexander Mackenzie's biography of Brown plays up this role to a greater
degree. "Lord Monck", he reports, "had several interviews with Mr Brown with a
view to induce him to set aside his scruples and act as a minister in securing the
acceptance of the new system".115 There is little doubt that Brown's biographer felt
it reflected well on Brown that he was deemed to be an essential element of the new
cabinet, and that no less a personage than the governor general was called into
service to win him over. Mackenzie praised Monck as "a thoroughly honest man, an
upright Governor-General, and an enthusiastic lover of Canada. He was also in
British politics a well-known liberal. The opinions of such a man very naturally had
much weight with public men generally". Mackenzie declined to discuss the full
share Monck had in negotiations involving the coalition and the adoption of
Confederation, but asserted that "it may be accepted as inconvertible that the means
used and the influence exerted were such only as he was justified in using in a great
crisis". This explanation also served the purpose of providing a suitable rationale for
Brown's decision to join with his former political enemies.116
The informal mediation Monck undertook was fraught with risk, and unlikely
to have earned him the gratitude of Canadian politicians. The fact that Monck was
successful in his thankless task is testimony to his suitability for the sensitive role of
impartial constitutional ruler and behind-the-scenes peacemaker who cajoled and
flattered intransigent political rivals. Political conditions in the immediate pre-
Confederation period were such that a governor could not practically adhere to the
ideal of aloofness that strict constitutional principles might demand. This had been
Sir Edmund Head's experience as well. But unlike Head, Monck's temperament
enabled him to push the limits of his role without causing undue offence or
controversy. Once Confederation was in place, and a remedy found for the ongoing
political instability, the stage was set for the governor general's eventual retreat to a
position that was more dignified than active.
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Lord Lisgar and the Treaty of Washington, 1871
Much of this study has been concerned with the constitutional role of the governor
general—the part he played in ensuring the smooth workings of government during
changes in administration, or periods of political instability. It follows from this that
during periods of stable government the role of the governor general was less
conspicuous. Sir John Young, Lord Lisgar, had the apparent good fortune to preside
over an unchanging Conservative administration dominated by Sir John A.
Macdonald during his entire term of office (1869-1872)1. The absence of any
constitutional crises has given him a lower historical profile and has led one historian
to characterise him as "an indolent individual" who took little part in political
affairs. The lack of any private manuscript collection for Lisgar is also undoubtedly
a factor in his obscure reputation. No collected correspondence remains to celebrate
and elucidate any part Lisgar may have taken in Canadian affairs.
Unfortunately for his reputation, virtually the only allusion to Lisgar that
survives in Canadian historiography concerns his role in the conclusion of the 1871
Treaty ofWashington, a treaty that, to many Canadians, symbolised a sacrifice of
colonial interests on the altar of imperialism.3 This episode, however, warrants
closer examination for its potential to shed light on an important but unofficial aspect
of the viceregal role. The governor general during this period functioned as a quasi-
diplomat with respect to the United States. There was, of course, a British minister
posted at Washington, but—as any British-American issues almost certainly would
have a bearing on Canada—the perspective of an imperial functionary based in
Canada was invaluable. Donald Creighton argued that Lisgar used his privileged
position as go-between to propose a settlement of the fisheries question—one of the
points at issue during the Treaty ofWashington negotiations—that was contrary to
the wishes of his Canadian ministers.4 J.B. Brebner went even further, maintaining
that Macdonald's work as one of the Joint Commissioners was "almost fatally
handicapped by the underhand behaviour of Lord Lisgar... who repeatedly
hamstrung him by betraying to the British Commissioners Macdonald's confidential
correspondence with the Canadian Cabinet."5
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It is possible to get a fuller picture of Lisgar's role by examining his official
correspondence with the Colonial Office, along with the private correspondence of
such figures as Lord Granville, Lord Kimberley and Canadian Prime Minister John
A. Macdonald. Lord Granville was secretary of state for the colonies, and later
foreign secretary, during Lisgar's term, and Lord Kimberley succeeded him as
colonial secretary. All of this material shows that Lisgar did indeed have an active
role in the settlement of the issues. It is undeniable that Canada came away from the
negotiations without the hoped-for renewal of reciprocal free trade. It is less clear,
however, that Lisgar dealt away Canada's trump card—access to the inshore
fisheries—out of carelessness or duplicity. Mindful of Britain's imperial agenda,
Lisgar nevertheless tried to secure the best deal he could for Canada. A return to
reciprocity was not in the cards. A series of British and Canadian overtures in that
direction had run squarely into a solid wall of protectionist sentiment. Further,
Americans insisted upon continuing to enjoy the historic privilege of access to
Canada's fisheries and seemed disposed to flout attempts to collect licence fees or
bar them altogether. Alarmed by recent developments in Europe and the rise of a
powerful unified Germany, Britain was determined to secure good relations with the
United States. These realities—Canada's colonial status, and, more especially, the
presence of a powerful neighbour able to dictate terms—shaped the nature of the
agreement reached at Washington.
Sir John Young, the second baronet, was bom in Bombay on 31 August 1807,
eldest son of Sir William Young and his wife Lucy, daughter of Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles Frederick. He attended Eton and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and
obtained a Bachelor's degree in 1829. He entered Lincoln's Inn in January 1829,
and was called to the Bar in 1834. He was elected Tory MP for County Cavan in
May 1831, a seat which he held until 1855. A supporter of Peel, Young held
moderate political views. Peel appointed Young a lord of the treasury in September
1841. Three years later, he was made one of the secretaries of the treasury, a post he
held until the defeat of Peel's ministry in July 1846. Young was among a group of
close-knit political allies who rallied around the defeated Peel, and attempted to
resuscitate a party under his leadership, a party which would be essentially
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conservative, yet committed to reform in tariff policy and administration. Young's
close political friends in this group included a number of influential figures: Lord
Lincoln (later the Duke of Newcastle), William Gladstone, Sidney Herbert, Lord
Dalhousie, Lord Canning, and Edward Cardwell. Young served as the Peelite chief
whip from 1846 to 1852. He succeeded to the baronetcy in 1848, was made chief
secretary for Ireland in Lord Aberdeen's government in December 1852, and was
appointed to the Privy Council. In 1855, he was appointed Lord High Commissioner
of the Ionian Islands and was awarded a GCMG. A clash with his representative
assembly in the Ionian Islands, sparked by a leaked dispatch, led to Young's recall
on the advice of Gladstone, but with the recommendation that he be appointed
elsewhere. In 1859 he was awarded a KCB. In March 1861, Young was appointed
governor general and commander in chief of New South Wales, a post he held until
December 1867. Young again encountered trouble with this new colonial
appointment. Immediately after his arrival, he accepted the advice of the premier of
New South Wales, Sir Charles Cowper, and appointed fifteen new members to the
upper house in order to secure the passage of a measure for the allotment of Crown
lands. Young's predecessor, SirWilliam Denison, had refused to be party to this, and
Newcastle let Young know that he was displeased. In November 1868, after his
return to Britain, Young was created GCB. He wished to re-establish himself in
politics, but found that he was in disagreement with Gladstone over the ballot. It was
a Conservative administration that offered him the governor-generalship of Canada
in that year.6 Young's selection by Disraeli's government has been labelled a "non-
political appointment".7 Sir John Young was raised to the peerage as Baron Lisgar
of Lisgar and Baillieborough, County Cavan, in October 1870, and was named lord
lieutenant of County Cavan in 1871.
The absence of any surviving collection ofmanuscripts means that less is
known about Lisgar than others who held the viceregal role. No in-depth biography
has yet been attempted. His character is therefore more elusive. He emerges as a
retiring individual who went through the motions of his required social duties, but
preferred the solitude of his study, where he would immerse himself in quadratic
equations.8 Lisgar also enjoyed the pastoral life and recalled with fondness how he
"used to love farming and having animals—black faced sheep to eat, and cows to
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give milk". His short horn bulls always took the prize at the local cattle show, he
noted with pride.9 When his Canadian term was over he confided to Macdonald that
he was eager to return "to peace and quiet in Ireland.... You will perhaps hear ofmy
distinguishing myself at an agricultural exhibition".10
Lisgar has been described as "an experienced and practical civil servant"11
but his low-key approach to his gubernatorial duties has also earned him a reputation
as "an indolent individual" who took little part in affairs of government.12 In
parliament almost twenty-five years, Lisgar had considerably more political
experience than other governors general. Lisgar had a reputation as a "working"
member of parliament,13 so it may well be that his comparative lack of energy while
in Canada is indeed attributable to ill health. Nonetheless, Lisgar's lack of industry
may be more apparent than real. He fulfilled his role discreetly, but there is ample
evidence that he was busy behind the scenes. Lisgar's unpublished correspondence
with the colonial secretary shows considerable activity. Most observers seem to have
agreed that Lisgar was not in any way ostentatious in the performance of his duties.
Goldwin Smith looked back on Lisgar's term of office after he had been succeeded
by the more flamboyant Lord Dufferin and found much to admire in Lisgar's steady,
quiet approach. Lisgar is described as "a veteran public servant" who had no desire
"to fill the papers on his own account".
He was content to perform his allotted part without exaggerating it, and to
appear as a faithful and dignified representative of the Crown. He did not go
on the stump, meddle with the press, or use his high station to propagate his
own opinions. His influence was exercised only in teaching colonial
politicians to observe English rules, and in tempering the violence of their
conflicts. He was courteous, but did not hunt popularity. His hospitality was
simply that of an English nobleman: it had no ulterior object, and as an
example could do nothing but good. When he spoke, his words were those of
sobriety and truth; nor did he ever court applause by indulging in the
unmeasured flattery which is at once most seductive and most poisonous to a
young nation. If, among English noblemen and public men his counterpart
could be found, supposing that the office is to be retained, Canada might go
further and fare worse.14
Lisgar was a favourite with Fanny Meredith, wife of a prominent Ottawa civil
servant, who remembered that "it was sort of an understood thing that after receiving
guests at an afternoon reception, he would come over to me and say 'now let us go
and have a cup of tea'".15 John Charles Dent found Lisgar's manner "pleasant and
130
ingratiating" but acknowledged that he never made himself universally popular, or
aroused much enthusiasm among the populace.16 There is also evidence that Lisgar
and his wife established a cordial relationship with John A. Macdonald. Lady
Macdonald remembered Lisgar as "the dear old Governor".17 The relationship
between the two men became strained during the struggle over the Treaty of
Washington, when Lisgar grew weary of Macdonald's apparent craftiness and
entertained doubts about the prime minister's good faith. Nevertheless, their
correspondence suggests a spirit of candour and affection.18 Lisgar exhibited the
easy hospitality and geniality that characterized the best aspect of aristocracy, while
Macdonald's facility for friendship enabled him to mix easily with people from all
backgrounds. Some Canadian politicians were awkward and standoffish with British
peers, hampered by a mingled sense of inferiority and resentment, but Macdonald
inevitably hit the right note and was friendly without being fawning. When Lisgar's
term of office was over, the two continued to correspond, Macdonald sharing his
impression of Lord Dufferin, Lisgar's successor, and finding him wanting by
comparison. Macdonald insisted that he did not mind flattery, "but he lays it on
rather too thick. Lady Dufferin is very charming, with nice, unaffected manners, and
much more natural than the caro sposo. I think I shall like her much, but in military
phrase, I would gladly exchange her for Lady Lisgar, and pay the difference."19
Lisgar's portraits show an archetypal Victorian statesman ofmature years,
with a firm jaw, long straight nose and receding grey hair swept over a broad
forehead and framing his long face in sideburns. His deep, close-set eyes betray
some hint of fatigue. The Canadian appointment proved to be Lisgar's final one.
When he left Canada he returned to his home in Baillieborough, where he died in
October 1876.
In the years leading up to the 1871 Treaty of Washington the number of
outstanding grievances and points of potential conflict between the United States and
Britain and Canada grew. These included reparations for damages by the British-
built Alabama during the Civil War, tariffs and trade, possession of the San Juan
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Islands, the Fenian raids, and navigation and fishing rights.
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The fisheries issue was a long-standing one. The 1783 Treaty of Paris, which
recognised the independence of the United States after the Revolutionary War, had
granted certain fishing privileges in British waters to the new nation. Britain
maintained that these privileges had been extinguished during the War of 1812,
although the Treaty of Ghent ending the war made no specific reference to the
subject. A number of American vessels had been seized after the war's end, pointing
up the need for a clear agreement. The Convention of 1818 excluded Americans
from fishing within three miles of the shores of British North American territory,
except in certain defined waters, but granted admission to harbours for obtaining
shelter and water, making repairs and purchasing wood.21 The convention did not
put an end to disagreements, however, and the British North American provinces
complained of continual invasions of their inshore fisheries by Americans. Only
with the conclusion of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was the matter resolved. In
addition to the free exchange of natural products, access to the inshore fisheries was
to be shared. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty by the United States in 1866
meant that the fisheries arrangement was cancelled and conditions returned to those
set by the convention of 1818—conditions ripe for renewed conflict.
The question of reciprocal trade with the Americans was a very important one
to Canada. Lord Elgin's triumphant conclusion of a Reciprocity Treaty in 1854 may
indeed have been a product of his skilful diplomacy—critics sneered that he had
floated the treaty through on champagne. " But annexationist rumblings in Canada
were undoubtedly a factor as well. Northern US Senators believed that closer trade
ties could be the precursor to continental union. Southern Senators, unwilling to see
anything upset the precarious balance of slave and free states, hoped that reciprocal
IT
trade would be an effective means of staving off annexation. Strained Anglo-
American relations during the Civil War and suspicions of Confederate sympathies
in British North America militated against continued reciprocal trade arrangements.24
Efforts by Lord Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, to stem the tide of trade
restrictions were unavailing.25
With the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty by the United States in 1866,
Canada exerted immediate pressure to try for a renewal of the trade agreement.
Initially, Canadian efforts took the paradoxical form of allowing liberal access to the
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fisheries in the hope that the Americans would respond with a similarly generous
spirit in their tariff policy. The colonial secretary, Cardwell, acknowledged to
Monck, who was governor general at the time, that it was "understood that reciprocal
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trading privileges and freedom of the fisheries were inextricably interwoven".
Frederick Bruce, Lord Lyons' successor, proved unable to repeat his brother's
successful diplomatic coup in winning a reciprocity deal;27 too much had changed
since Lord Elgin's mission.
The expectation among leading American statesmen that all of North
America might one day be united had a distinct bearing on their diplomatic approach.
Perhaps the most outspoken advocate of this view was Senator Charles Sumner, who
chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sumner was heavily influenced by
British advocates of "little Englandism" and was convinced that the loss of
reciprocity, and anti-imperial sentiment in Britain and the colonies, was leading
inexorably to a break between Canada and the empire.28 In April 1869 Sumner
denounced in the Senate the idea of a convention to settle the Alabama claims. The
damages, which he estimated at two to eight billion dollars, could be paid by handing
over the North American colonies. Senator Zachariah Chandler agreed, arguing that
Britain was liable for half the cost of the Civil War.29 The American Secretary of
State, Hamilton Fish, found in November 1869 that President Ulysses S. Grant
favoured delay in settling claims relating to the Alabama. The matter would be
in
better left until Britain was willing to give up Canada, Grant urged. Lisgar rejected
the idea that Canadians were eager to sever the imperial connection; "all I have been
•2 1
able to observe points to the contrary conclusion."
Confident American expectations that the British provinces would ultimately
come into their orbit, even ifmisinformed, made Canadian overtures toward a new
reciprocal trade deal especially difficult. Informal preliminary talks in 1869 between
• ^9
Fish and John Rose, Canada's finance minister, proved abortive. The Canadians
had not been optimistic; the President's Address provided advance evidence of a
strong protectionist climate. But Fish's activities in the meantime had added insult to
injury. He had Edward Thornton, Bruce's successor, inquire of the Foreign Office
whether Her Majesty's government would impose any obstacles should the North
American colonies wish to separate. Fish admitted to Thornton that high tariffs were
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a "legitimate means of coercion" to induce Canadians to join the United States.33
John A. Macdonald was indignant at Fish's "impudence" in proposing that a free
vote be taken in Canada on annexation.34 Overtures toward reciprocity having been
rebuffed, the Canadian government imposed new retaliatory duties that Spring on
certain articles, including coal, salt, wheat and meal. These measures drew
objections from the British Board of Trade, which expressed concerns that Canada's
precedent might be followed by other colonies, and that new Canadian tariffs would
provoke retaliation against Britain.35
With the collapse of the system of free American access to the inshore
fisheries which had existed under the Reciprocity Treaty, Canada levied fees of fifty
cents per ton of the vessel. Royal Navy officers were instructed to give three
warnings before seizing any vessels in violation of the law, a provision that
effectively nullified the system. At the start of the 1868 season Canada raised the
licence fee to two dollars, and determined to reduce the warnings. Further, the
Dominion government implemented a marine police force to protect Canada's
inshore fisheries from encroachment. Faced with rampant American disregard for
the system, and wishing to apply greater pressure for reciprocity, Canada's
government decided in January 1870 to abolish licences and exclude foreign fishing
vessels outright.37 The prospect of Canada taking a stance calculated to provoke the
Americans caused some alarm in the British government. Lisgar was required to
communicate stern instructions from the British Admiralty which, he advised the
colonial secretary, were regarded in Canada as "the virtual abandonment of all power
to enforce Canadian Fishery rights". There was even a possibility the cabinet might
resign, he warned Granville. After several meetings with the Canadian minister of
marine and fisheries, Peter Mitchell, Lisgar reported that the minister would probably
38recommend compliance under protest and for a limited time. Despite the Canadian
government's determination to enforce a strict policy, Lisgar believed they were
being very moderate and reasonable. The seizures of American vessels that had
taken place were "strictly within right and beyond challenge".39 The Canadian police
vessels, he insisted, were acting "so cautiously within their due limits, that I hope no
American complaint will be sustained, though Congress seems to address and
endorse every idle statement that is made to it". Lisgar explained that the cabinet
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wanted a clear statement of advice they were receiving from Britain, so that they
would "have it on record, when the opposition attack them in Parl[iamen]t that they
have not lightly abandoned the rights of Canada".40
Canadian forbearance was made all the more difficult by the continued
menace of Fenian raiders from south of the border. Despite growing resentment
about the failure of the United States to check Fenian activities, Canada was urged to
be lenient in treating raiders captured on Canadian soil. The avoidance of "bad
blood" was "entirely for the interest of Canada", Frederick Bruce had urged earlier.41
Kimberley invited the Dominion government to draw up a statement about the
Fenian threat, but cautioned Lisgar that the tone of previous communications on the
subject should be tempered. "A lecture of that kind", he admonished, "addressed to a
foreign nation would not increase the chances of a satisfactory settlement of
grievances."42 A few days later Kimberley again explained to Lisgar that, while
natural, Canadian irritation toward the United States "does no good". "When you
have to deal with a powerful and most unreasonable nation such as that...the first
requisite is to keep one's temper. We shall do the best we can for Canada," he
assured him, "but the Canadian Gov[ernmen]t must make some allowance for the
inherent difficulties of the case".43
During the course of the same summer, Kimberley, who was now secretary of
state for the colonies, met with Alexander Campbell, Canada's postmaster general, to
discuss the proposed withdrawal of troops, Fenian invasions, and the fisheries.44
Kimberley expressed dismay at the tone of a document prepared by the Canadian
cabinet minister on the fisheries question, but reflected later that "in one sense if
produced it might be useful as showing the US Government that we have our violent
men to deal with as well as they."45 Campbell's mission to England was significant
in that it allowed Canada's cabinet to express their views directly to the secretary of
state. Campbell agreed with Kimberley that it was unwise to mix the fisheries and
reciprocity questions, since a renewal of the treaty was unlikely.46 Revealingly,
Campbell admitted that it was unrealistic to use the fisheries to try to force a renewal
of reciprocity. Any hopes that Britain would support a hard line policy of excluding
the United States from the fisheries were sure to be disappointed, however.
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Early in September Thornton visited Ottawa and Lisgar was pleased to give
him the opportunity of conferring directly with the Canadian cabinet. Regrettably,
Macdonald was ill, but Sir George-Etienne Cartier and Charles Tupper were present.
Since Tupper was "intimately acquainted with all the bearings of the Fishery
question and the wishes of the people in respect to it", he was able to "put Sir
Edward fully in possession of the views of the Canadian Ministry". Lisgar ventured
that all questions could be put to rest if the United States would agree to a
commission, but had little hope that they would do so.47 He feared that "nothing will
satisfy the U[nited] States... but... being placed on an equal footing with the
Canadians [in the fisheries], without payment,... and continuing at the same time to
exclude Canadian fishermen from the U[nited] States markets". The American
newspapers were even counselling fishermen to arm themselves and resist the
Canadian schooners, Lisgar reported.48
Although Lisgar characterised Canada's policy of exclusion as justifiable,
and believed enforcement was being delicately handled, it is probable that Canadian
policy would have been more conciliatory if Macdonald had been fulfilling his usual
leadership role during the summer of 1870. Joseph Pope, Macdonald's secretary,
attributed Canada's more hard-nosed policy to the prime minister's illness. When
Macdonald's "restraining hand was no longer felt," he explained, "Canada's
despatches took a loftier tone, and a vigorous policy of exclusion was decided on.
On Sir John Macdonald's resuming command in October, more moderate counsels
again prevailed."49 At that time Macdonald assured Lisgar that, while council had
discussed the idea of excluding American fishermen, "we will not for the present
enforce any such exclusion". He admitted that "Council had been going too fast"
and promised that "there was a way out of the difficulty."50 Lisgar assured
Kimberley that Macdonald's desire for a good understanding with the United States
was "his own view and conviction of what is best in the interests of Canada, and not
merely taken up at my instance or in deferring to instructions from home".
Nevertheless, he warned, if Canadians were not allowed to exclude foreign
fishermen, they would "consider themselves badly used by the British Government
and relapse into the ill temper from which they are gradually recovering".51 Lisgar
also explained Canadian views on the latest developments concerning the Fenian
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threat. The American authorities, seeking to win favour with Irish-American voters,
were preparing to release a number of Fenian convicts, an action that Canada
regarded as distinctly unfriendly.52
Late in October 1870 Lisgar sent a private letter to Kimberley in which he
summed up the fisheries situation as he saw it. The Canadians, he explained, sought
not "the mere protection of their own fishery rights... but a reconquest of the
advantages they enjoyed under the reciprocity treaty". They hoped by annoying the
Americans over the fisheries, they would compel a renewal of the treaty, or at least
gain more advantageous commercial arrangements. The United States, he believed,
had ended the treaty with Canada in the hopes of "starving her into annexation". The
American object "has signally failed of attainment, and that which the Canadian
Gov[ernmen]t is now pursuing is also certain to fail". Lisgar found, however, that as
much as he attempted to convince his cabinet that they would not be able to use the
fisheries as a lever to dictate American commercial policy, "it is useless to argue
with them on the subject—they reply—'the fisheries are our trump card'... 'they got
us reciprocity before, and if we manage them properly now, they will get it for us
again'". Lisgar recalled that "the only time that Sir J. A. Macdonald spoke warmly
and abruptly to me on any subject" was during a discussion of the fisheries. The
governor general had argued that sentiment in the United States in favour of
protectionism was too entrenched, and that the British government would not support
them in any plan to provoke the United States into a settlement.53
Convinced that excluding the Americans was not a practical option, despite
Canada's right to do so, Lisgar approached Thornton early in November about
negotiating an agreement. "Nothing less will produce peace", he explained to
Kimberley. He pointed to some encouraging signs in the United States, and also
expressed his view that the Canadians would accept less than they would have
insisted upon before, since they have found "they cannot count on the full support
they expected to receive" from Britain.54 Lisgar provided Thornton with details of
current tariff levels in both countries on various natural products and asked him to
make quiet inquiries.55
While Thornton found the Americans intransigent on the tariff question, he
was encouraged by Lisgar's letter. Lisgar's belief that a resolution could be reached
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was "concurred in at least by Sir John A. Macdonald", Thornton reported to
Granville. Thornton himself agreed that Canada "would do well to get rid, on the
best terms they can obtain, of a right which cannot but involve them in quarrels and
... expense".56
Lisgar then took a major step on his own initiative to help resolve the issue, a
step which led to future historical criticism. He wrote to Thornton again,
emphasising that his private letter was unofficial, and not intended to bind the
Canadian government. He inquired, however, "in plain words, what...[the United
States] will give for the privileges and facilities which they require in regard to the
inshore fisheries". Lisgar confessed that he personally despaired of any agreement to
lowering the tariff; there were "so many interested parties averse to that course".
Besides that, "reciprocity treaties are vicious in principle and liable to many
objections—each side thinks the other has the advantage". He could not help
thinking that "it would simplify the transaction if we could lay aside all reference to
the Tariff and if the U.S. would say what annual sum it would consent to pay in order
that its citizens might have free access as under the reciprocity treaty to the Canadian
inshore fisheries for say the next ten years—or better still, twenty. Will they give
two hundred thousand dollars a year?" Lisgar acknowledged probable objections to
the sum named, but included calculations to show that the privilege was "well worth
that". Lisgar reminded Thornton that he had already indicated his view that the tariff
concessions the United States had proposed on lumber, fish, coal and salt as a basis
for negotiation were not deemed to be very valuable to Canada. If, however, "the
U[nited] States authorities can see their way to making relaxations" on animals,
grain, flour, ore and wool, this "would greatly smooth difficulties". He assumed
further that the Americans would confirm the right of Canadians to carry goods in
bond on the railways to Portland Maine. Lisgar ridiculed Congressman Benjamin
Butler's argument that, even if Canada had the right to exclude the Americans, it was
not kind or neighbourly to do so. A man with a well-stocked cupboard was not
expected to leave the key in the door so that his neighbours could help themselves,
he countered. "He is reputed kind and neighbourly if he .. .lets them have all they
want at a moderate price". The Canadians, he cautioned, might not be willing to
treat the fisheries separately from the reciprocity question, but if the Americans made
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a reasonable offer, the imperial government would be fully justified in pressing for
its acceptance.57
Thornton, having found Fish unyielding on the question of tariffs, broached
the topic of a money payment for freedom of the fisheries. "I threw the idea to Fish
as from myself', he explained to Granville. "He pondered over it a minute or two,
and then said he was afraid Congress would not sanction any such payment just now,
because the people of the United States were so much irritated by the conduct of the
Canadians towards the United States' fishermen during the season just ended".
Thornton noted, however, that Fish did not seem "entirely averse" to the idea of
pecuniary compensation, but believed that the present state of feelings was against it.
At the end of the conversation, Fish remarked that the United States might keep the
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compensation money as a part payment toward the Alabama claims.
By this time, the British cabinet had learned of the shifting winds in the
Canadian cabinet; Macdonald's return would "help to smooth matters", Kimberley
ventured. Supporting Canada in a retaliatory policy against the United States was
never an option, and now that "we have a black diplomatic storm from the Russian
quarter", "I need hardly say that this does not render it less necessary to avoid
complications in America".59 Even with Macdonald back at the helm, Kimberley
advised Gladstone that any move to withdraw the imperial garrison at Quebec had
better be left until a more expedient time. Removal would cause excitement and
irritation in Canada, he explained, and would produce an unfavourable impression in
the United States, "who will construe it into an abandonment of Canada, just when
she is menaced by the Americans".60
Lisgar himself was becoming increasingly optimistic that an agreement could
be reached, given his reassurances from Macdonald. He had had, he told Kimberley
"a good deal of conversation" with his ministers of late on the topic of the fisheries.
There were some, he admitted who were "inclined to stand out"—the French were
among the least tractable—"but what the Council as a body want is to make the best
case they can for themselves and their constituents—and save themselves harmless
with the Canadian Parliament".61 An experienced parliamentarian himself, Lisgar
knew that the issue was more complex than simply securing the best deal for Canada.
Any arrangement reached on Atlantic fisheries, and tariffs and trade, could expose
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the essential disparity in economic interests that Confederation had papered over. As
any agreement was certain to be unpopular with at least some sectors of the country,
and an election was due before September 1872, the Conservative party was loath
to be held accountable for any policy. British pressure to settle with the Americans
might be resented, but at least it provided a target for resentment that would not be
vented at the polls.
Lisgar's optimism was not, however, based on finding any more evidence of
a reasonable spirit among the Americans. If there had been any abatement in the
tension that the Civil War provoked, the firm measures Canada took to enforce the
1818 Convention during the 1870 fishing season almost certainly renewed them.
Lisgar clipped American newspapers that told of the inflammatory speeches given by
Congressman Butler to his New England constituents and his advice to fishermen to
sink British cruisers. Thornton, too, reported that anti-British feeling was still
strong and that the influence of the fiery Charles Sumner would likely be an obstacle
to any settlement. Hamilton Fish told Thornton that he had received a number of
indignant and insulting letters from Sumner, and had begun to wonder if Sumner was
going mad; suicide was a frequent theme in his conversations.64 Fish himself seemed
to betray some bitterness toward Canada and the imperial government, the British
minister noted. This was especially apparent after the governor general declined to
release a Fenian prisoner in accordance with American wishes. Fish seemed, in fact,
to associate the alleged anti-American sentiment in Canada with Lisgar personally,
and complained that Lisgar's elevation to the peerage demonstrated that Her
Majesty's government approved of this unfriendly spirit.65 Fish rejected Thornton's
argument that Canadians sought only to protect their fisheries; the real object, he
insisted, was to be unfriendly to the United States and force them into a new
reciprocity treaty.66 President Grant's position was also "curious", Lisgar reported to
Kimberley. Grant acknowledged that there had been no violations of the 1818
convention, but still asked Congress for powers to be used if retaliatory measures
became necessary. The President's tone, and the multiplication of recent conflicts
over the fisheries, "convince me we shall never find rest except in a total surrender—
i.e. in letting every one fish where he pleases upon or without conditions".67 This
"total surrender", it must be stressed, was meant to avoid the ineffective, expensive,
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and potentially provocative need to police the fisheries against American intruders.
Lisgar was firm in his conviction that this must be avoided. Since the Americans
were determined to have the use of the fisheries, and Canada was unwilling or unable
to keep them out, he sought to negotiate the best compensation he could for Canada's
surrender of the privilege.
In his bid to find ways in which the stalemate could be resolved, Lisgar
suggested to the colonial secretary that the surrender of the fisheries could be used as
a "make weight" in adjusting the Alabama claims. He reported that Americans had
estimated losses from the Alabama at thirteen million dollars, "greenbacks I
presume", but also that they claimed "something more—moral or material—to salve
their wounded feelings". In making this suggestion, however, Lisgar was not
proposing that Canada should pay the price for settling British diplomatic scores. He
made it clear that Britain would then have to settle with Canada for the fisheries, and
the Americans would have to guarantee Canada's liberty to convey goods in bond as
before. He marvelled that the President of the United States could assert a right to
use of the Welland Canal, which was constructed at Canadian cost on Canadian
ground. If, however, Canada made the canal improvements already contemplated, at
an estimated cost of £260,000, the Americans might be granted liberty to pass in
exchange for a free or low duties on Canadian grain, animals, wool and ore. Lisgar's
experience had convinced him that these were the natural products on which Canada
most desired American tariff concessions. Alternatively, if the Americans were
unwilling to assent to free admission of those natural products, Canada might accept
an arrangement whereby the coasting trade on the Great Lakes were opened. Britain
could also offer to spend the £ 260,000 necessary for canal improvement in exchange
for using the fisheries to help settle the Alabama claims. Thus two matters could be
settled, he explained: the fisheries and the St. Lawrence canals, and Britain would
only have to pay three quarters of a million pounds spread over several years. As a
means of settling all outstanding differences with the United States, he urged, "it
would be money well laid out". It was his opinion that Canada would accept a
reasonable payment, especially if "she was assured she was listening to the Counsels
and carrying out the policy of the Mother Country."68 Kimberley eagerly shared
Lisgar's letter with Granville at the Foreign Office and pronounced the scheme
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"ingenious". He wondered, however, if it was wise to let the Americans know that
they were prepared to surrender the fisheries to settle the Alabama claims. There
was some question, he reminded the foreign minister, as to whether Britain was
liable at all, and this should probably be settled before any compensation was
proposed.69
As the year drew to a close, Lisgar continued to busy himself with the
intricacies of the fisheries question and kept Thornton abreast of his behind-the-
scenes work. Thornton approved wholly of Lisgar's ideas and, despite the governor
general's admonition that his proposals were unofficial, doubted if Lisgar would
have made such suggestions even privately unless it was likely that they would be
acceptable to the Canadians.70 Lisgar provided Thornton with calculations of the
value ofmackerel caught by Americans in Canadian waters, showing how he had
arrived at the proposed compensation figure of $200,000 per year. Lisgar was
interrupted while writing to Thornton by a visit from Charles Tupper, and reported
that Tupper said "Canada ought not to accept less.. .than a rent or tribute of
$200,000 a year—and the admitting free of duty into the U.S. of fish of all kinds" as
well as other products of the sea. Tupper's position might be considered "the outside
Canadian view", Lisgar explained, but numerous prominent commercial men had
also spoken in favour of a money settlement to end the dispute. Further, Lisgar had
discussed the matter over with "several of the best men ofmy Council separately"
and explained his views fully. Nevertheless, the council was unwilling to initiate any
offer and protested that it was useless to do so, since "the U.S. people will haggle and
chaffer and try to beat them down". Lisgar cautioned Thornton not to mention either
his name or Tupper's in any proposal. He expressed considerable confidence in
Tupper, however, as "one of the most eloquent and earnest politicians in the
Dominion" who "knows as much about the Fisheries as anyone". Lisgar maintained
that "in the best ofmy judgment the terms he proposes71 as stated above are fair and
right". The United States would gain many advantages, and unless "they deliberately
mean to bully and cheat the Canadians out of their just rights, they will at once
accept the terms mentioned". Lisgar concluded by hoping that the suggestions he
conveyed could be used as the basis for an American proposal, and hinted that such a
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proposal would likely find acceptance in Canada, especially if imperial pressure were
brought to bear.72
*7 "2
The idea of a commission to settle outstanding issues, including access to
the fisheries, gained momentum early in 1871. Sir John Rose was sent by the British
Foreign Office to the United States to make unofficial inquiries as to American
willingness to enter into negotiations.74 While Rose had been a member of
Macdonald's cabinet, his allegiances were apparently suspect in the eyes of some in
Canada, since he now lived in London, and had personal business interests that
coloured his views. Rose reported to Thornton that upon visiting Canada after his
trip to Washington "he was very ill received". "There seems to have been an idea",
Thornton explained to Granville, "that he had been secretly and without consulting
the Canadian Government, negotiating with Fish relative to the fishery and all other
questions... and sacrificing Canadian interests for the sake of settling all disputes
between the Imperial Gov[ernmen]t and the United States". Rose requested that
Thornton telegraph Lisgar to clarify that he had not been in any discussion about the
fisheries. This did not have the desired effect, Thornton admitted, "and Rose told me
that Lord Lisgar was colder than ever he had been before; nor has he taken any
notice to me of the Telegram. I hope however that as the exact truth has become
known, this feeling has been effaced".75 Rose also remarked on the fact that Fish had
recalled that the choice of Lord Elgin as emissary in 1854 had given great
satisfaction to the Americans. Rose wondered to Granville if the gesture should be
repeated by sending Lisgar to treat with the Americans, something he believed would
be "an expedient and gratifying move".76 One historian attributed the decision not to
pursue this idea to Canada's new sense of nationhood. Representation solely by
imperial authorities, while appropriate in 1854, would not have been considered
fitting for the new dominion.77 This may indeed have been a consideration, but Rose
may not have been aware—as Granville was—that there was another ground for
objection to Lisgar as commissioner: Fish's conviction that the governor general was
hostile to the United States.
In January 1871 Kimberley advised Lisgar that the British government had
broached the topic of a joint commission with the United States. Canadian
representation would be indispensable, he insisted, proposing that both Macdonald
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and Rose serve. Among matters to be settled was "the general question whether the
U.S. will purchase from Canada the right of fishing in Canadian waters by a money
payment or any other equivalent". "You may assure Sir J. Macdonald", Kimberley
stressed, "that we have every intention to uphold the just rights of Canada" and
added that, for his own part, he believed Canada's position was excellent "as far as
78
right is concerned".
Unfortunately, just as the idea of a money payment for access to the fisheries
was being openly discussed in the British cabinet as a basis for negotiations, Lisgar
found that support for it in Canada was crumbling. On 11 January 1871 he had
confidently asserted that "the Can[adia]n Ministers, though at first averse to it, have
well nigh all come round to it". There seemed, after all, "little prospect of obtaining
anything like a reciprocity treaty on fair terms". Lisgar visualised the money
payment as a substitute for the licensing system, which had proved unenforceable.
"Instead of each fishing vessel taking out a separate licence", he explained, "let the
U[nited] States authorities pay a lump sum for a general licence". There was still,
he acknowledged, some discussion in the Canadian cabinet about what was in fact a
fair price.79 By 26 January, however, conditions had changed and Lisgar reported
that his ministers were now retreating from the idea of a money payment: "they are
in excessively bad humour about the fisheries just now". "Three weeks ago several
of the leading men told me a settlement might fairly be made by accepting a money
payment or annual tribute from the U[nited] States for the admission of their fishing
vessels to the inshore fisheries", he explained, "but now they have entirely receded
from that point, and nothing less is talked of than all the advantages and facilities
contained in the former reciprocity treaty". He still hoped that "this storm will blow
over", but advised Kimberley that the ministry had been upset by the Colonial
Office's recent support for Prince Edward Island's unilateral policy of allowing
Americans to trade in port contrary to Canadian interpretations of the 1818
80
convention.
Plans for a joint commission moved ahead very quickly, and within weeks
possible participants were mooted. John Rose, whom Granville had described to
Gladstone as part of his "beau ideal" of a commission,81 was vetoed by Canada. His
American business interests posed a potential conflict of interest and objections were
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raised that he was no longer resident in Canada.82 Fish was reportedly deeply
disappointed that Rose was not to be a member of the commission. John A.
Macdonald wrestled with the offer of a seat on the commission, confessing to Lisgar
that he was "a good deal embarrassed by ... not being able to communicate with my
colleagues on the subject". He considered the alternative of having no direct
representation for Canada, and allowing Canadian interests to be settled by others.
"The government here would be very much censured if the result were a sacrifice of
the rights of the Dominion", he speculated, and Britain would be able to say that the
offer of representation was declined. At last he advised the governor general that if
R4
his colleagues consented, he would act. Lisgar confided to the colonial secretary
that he had feared his cabinet would refuse permission to take part in the
commission. "This course would have been more in accordance with the previous
declarations of a majority of the members of the Council", he acknowledged, but
oc
"fortunately more acceptable counsels have prevailed" and Macdonald agreed.
Lisgar admitted that he had "exerted myself to persuade Sir J.A. Macdonald and win
oz:
over the Council" about participation in the joint commission. Macdonald was
reassured by the former governor general, Lord Monck, that he would find the
British head of the commission, Lord de Grey—"a very old & valued friend of
07
mine"—"very agreeable". Lisgar was more stinting in his praise, warning
Macdonald that de Grey "is, I fancy, a man of whom greater expectations than he has
realized, were formed in early life".88
Privately, Kimberley expressed his relief to Lisgar that Macdonald had
agreed to act. His appointment would show, he hoped, "that we are desirous of
giving Canada every opportunity of making out her case and exercising her due
influence". He was sorry to hear that Canada was "out of humour with the Home
gov[ernmen]t" and protested that "as far as I know we have given them no cause for
it. We are perfectly ready to support the just rights and claims of Canada, but ... we
cannot give her our countenance and aid in a retaliatory policy" simply because of
the termination of the reciprocity treaty. The Canadian minister of marine, Peter
Mitchell, "seems to be a sort of Canadian 'Butler'", Kimberley noted. "It is a pity
his colleagues cannot restrain him".89 Thornton was also pleased that Macdonald
was to represent Canada's interests, but hoped that de Grey would "impress upon the
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Canadian government the necessity of not making demands which will profit them
but little, and cause irritation in the United States".90 The Canadian government had
meanwhile been reassured by telegram that, while Britain declined to make any
pledge before undertaking negotiations, "we think the right of Canada to exclusive
fishing within [the] three mile limit beyond dispute, and only to be ceded for
adequate compensation".91 With the joint high commission pending, Kimberley put
the position of Her Majesty's government on record in a despatch in which he
reiterated the principle expressed in the telegram. He offered his opinion that
"should this consideration take the form of a money payment, it appears to Her
Majesty's Government that such an arrangement would be more likely to work well
than if any conditions were annexed to the exercise of the privilege of fishing within
the Canadian waters". He cited the expense inherent in keeping a number of cruisers
to enforce any exclusion, and the inevitability of disputes.92
The joint high commission commenced on 27 February 1871. The two most
important issues were deemed to be the settlement of the Alabama claims and the
inshore fisheries. The other questions—the San Juan boundary, navigation of the St.
Lawrence, and compensation for the Fenian raids—were deemed to be subordinate.
QO
The fisheries issue was to be tackled first.
John A. Macdonald wrote detailed accounts of the commissioners' activities
to Tupper in Ottawa. He reported that de Grey came to see him at his hotel on
Sunday 5 March to discuss a conversation he had had with a "leading statesman" in
Washington. This statesman—almost certainly Fish—insisted that the United States
did not question Canada's right to the fisheries, but were prepared to pay for them.
De Grey indicated at this time that, while he had no instructions on the matter, he
would submit any proposal to his government. At the same time, he asked if the
United States were willing to renew the Reciprocity treaty. He was told that it was
unlikely Congress would sanction such a move, and that the basis for negotiation
would likely have to be a money payment. When de Grey reported this to
Macdonald, the Canadian prime minister demurred, explaining that "we had not even
taken into consideration any other equivalent" except "enlarged commercial
intercourse in the direction of reciprocity". He did not know how such a proposal
would be received, he cautioned, but a surrender of fishing rights "for all time to
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come" was out of the question. "Any surrender must be for a term of years renewable
by either party, or, what would be preferable, for an unspecified period, but liable to
be terminated by either party". Macdonald indicated to de Grey that he would sound
his council on the matter, and he wrote to Tupper to get his views on what
compensation would be acceptable, supposing reciprocity was refused.94
This episode seems to have been the basis ofDonald Creighton's intimation
that Lisgar had worked behind Macdonald's back to try to force a settlement that was
unsatisfactory to Canada. Creighton recounted the informal conversation Fish had
with de Grey in which the offer was made, and concluded that "it was this
astounding piece of information which had sent de Grey hurrying down to the
Arlington Hotel that Sunday morning". Macdonald, according to Creighton, "heard
the news with surprise and disquiet. Where, he wondered, had this embarrassing
notion of the sale of the fisheries come from? Who had suggested it?" Macdonald
was ignorant of the fact that it was the governor general who had made the proposal,
Creighton claimed.95 Yet far from being "astounding", the notion that Americans be
granted access to the fisheries for a monetary equivalent had been a long-standing
alternative. Lisgar's proposal, in which he believed he had the concurrence of his
ministers, was not an eleventh-hour attempt to circumvent Canada's agenda, but a
discreet inquiry made to the British minister at Washington months beforehand.
Canadians hoped for reciprocity, but were aware that protectionist sentiment in the
United States was deeply entrenched. Even the previous September, Alexander
Campbell, representing Canada's privy council, had acknowledged to Kimberley that
they had come to that conclusion. Further, Macdonald's letters to his colleagues in
Ottawa immediately after this incident do not betray any sign that he was in any way
discomfited by what had transpired. In a brief letter to Alexander Campbell the very
next day he reported that we "have made some progress". A few days later, he
offered his opinion to Cartier that "Lord de Grey is doing his work very well, and I
do not think that there is the slightest desire to sacrifice Canada or her interest in any
way in the minds of any one of the Commissioners."96 Macdonald did characterise
Lisgar's earlier proposal to Thornton of a money payment for the fisheries as
"somewhat indiscreet" but urged cabinet minister Francis Hincks not to mention it to
any of their colleagues, since "some of them are not very friendly with the
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G[overnor] G[eneral]". Macdonald did not suggest that this proposal would have
compromised the negotiations in any way, and only concluded that "the
disappointment will... be great when we refuse to deal with the subject in that light
Q7
and Mr. Fish will naturally, I fear, feel [?] hurt". Macdonald's show of surprise in
front of de Grey at the idea that Canada should have to settle for anything less than
reciprocity must be treated with a degree of scepticism. He was, after all, in the
midst of difficult three-way negotiations, trying to win his case with both the
Americans and the British. Macdonald, whom no one could accuse of naivety, knew
that the British were eager to conclude an agreement and that there would be
opportunity to extract concessions from them if Canada gave way.
Compensation to Canada was already being discussed with respect to the
Fenian raids, an issue the Americans adamantly refused to place on the agenda at
Washington.98 Even if it was decided not to pursue a claim with the Americans,
Kimberley reminded Granville, the option still existed for Britain to satisfy Canada
and then "prefer the claim ourselves" as principals, and not merely as "seconds" to
Canada. "A little grease to the wheels in the shape of compensation for the Fenian
raid might enable us, if applied at the crisis of the negotiation, to drive in the right
direction." Kimberley cited Canada's "bad temper" over the fisheries and expressed
his fear that at the present moment "the Canadians think they can have everything
their own way."99 The Canadian cabinet had already been thinking in terms of
compensation from Britain as part of the bargain to be struck. In February 1871,
Francis Hincks confided to Macdonald that "you may be in a position to get England
to aid you by agreeing to guarantee a large 3 1/2 % loan". This could "help to
reconcile the west to the loss of reciprocity in bread stuffs & livestock which I
apprehend for the present to be unattainable". If, on the other hand, reciprocity or
something close to it was achieved, "then you could put your demand for guarantee
on the ground of the necessity of conciliating the Maritime provinces for any fishing
rights surrendered".100 Macdonald considered the exclusion of the Fenian claims at
the conference to be the result of "diplomatic blundering" on the part of Thornton,
Rose and Granville. He reflected later to Lisgar, however, that "it is rather fortunate
for Canada that this mistake has happened as I fancy we would have got but a small
award if any [from the United States]."101
148
Before the commission had begun, Lisgar, at the request of the Canadian
cabinet, sent a cypher telegram to the Colonial Office confirming that "Canada
considers [the] inshore fisheries her property and that they cannot be sold without her
consent".102 Kimberley was quick to offer his reassurance that "We never had any
intention whatever of selling the inshore fisheries of Canada without her consent."103
Now, facing pressure from the British members of the commission to accept a sale,
and preferably a sale in perpetuity, Macdonald reflected to Tupper that obtaining the
telegram had been "a most fortunate thought". Macdonald responded to pressure
from de Grey by producing the telegram, "which was a floorer", he wrote
triumphantly.104 A few days later, he was able to report that he had succeeded in
getting the British commissioners to agree that a clause should be inserted into the
treaty that provisions concerning the fisheries would have to be ratified by the
Canadian parliament. On the face of it, this was a personal coup for Macdonald, and
a step forward in Canadian autonomy, but it did bring with it additional
complications. Macdonald acknowledged to Tupper that it placed him in "an
exceedingly embarrassing position". If the other British commissioners accepted
terms of which he disapproved, he would have to consider whether to protest and
withdraw, or trust to the Canadian parliament to reject the terms. Any apparent
discord among the British members of the commission could be exploited by the
Americans, yet Macdonald did not relish the idea of being charged in Canada with
sacrificing the Dominion's interests.105
Lisgar, meanwhile, was dismayed by the growing intransigence exhibited by
his Canadian ministers. He confessed to Kimberley that he had been "rather
surprized" at the "violent spirit" that had "completely possessed the Council". The
change of tone and purpose on their part was complete, he insisted. "It may be, as
the opposition is pressing them about the Fisheries, that they are only seeking to
make political capital and establish a case for themselves with the constituents next
year at the general election", he explained. He sent copies of the Commons debates
to the colonial secretary so that he could see the strong terms that had been used,
especially by the opposition. Lisgar also stressed that Canadians viewed American
speeches in a different spirit than did the British, seeing them not "as earnest
utterances to be followed up by action", but as "big words, tall talk... used for the
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purposed of extorting concessions from neighbours". Lisgar lamented that he had
found it vain to argue against such convictions. "No Canadian believes in the
sincerity or earnestness of the U.S.' threats and blustering". But what was more, "the
inclination is to resort to the same weapons, as I cannot help thinking is the case in
the present instance of the tel[egra]m about the Fisheries".106
Lisgar, aware of the pressure Macdonald was facing from his Canadian
cabinet, used what influence he could to convince him not to adhere to a stubborn,
and ultimately futile, course of action. He reminded Macdonald of the many
"powerful cliques" in Congress opposed to a renewal of reciprocity, and of the
necessity of keeping on good terms with the Americans. "If any angry complications
arose", he cautioned, England "must pay the piper; even a preparation for war
without war would cost more than the fisheries could fetch in any market". If an
arrangement were made for a limited period, "time may be given for the subsiding of
the dregs and muddiness, the protectionist theories, which the Civil War sea threw up
to confuse and blind men's eyes". In a few years, he predicted, the American public
"will see their interests clearly and get rid of the incubus of their unwise tariff'.107
Lisgar's counsel did not prevent the Canadian cabinet from flatly refusing to
accept an American offer to remove tariffs on coal, salt, mackerel, herring, and cod,
with lumber also free of duty after July 1876. Macdonald was informed that council
considered the terms offered "so inadequate" that "no Government could carry a
proposal so obnoxious to the people through our Parliament".108 Macdonald
acknowledged to de Grey that "as it appears that the United States Government will
not return to the free-trade arrangements of the Treaty of 1854, some other
equivalent must be sought. The only one that suggests itself to me is a substantial
payment in money in addition to the admission of the four articles referred to [coal,
salt, fish and lumber], free of duty."109 The British commissioners accordingly
submitted a counter proposal that lumber should also be admitted free immediately
and a cash payment made to Canada if tariff concessions on other products were
refused. The United States not only refused this proposition, but withdrew the
former offer.110
While the impression has sometimes been perpetuated that the British
commissioners treated Canadian concerns as an annoying addendum to the real work
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of settling outstanding Anglo-American differences, it should be noted that more
time was devoted to the fisheries than any other issue the commission addressed.
Seventeen sessions were concerned with the fisheries, as opposed to the ten devoted
to the Alabama claims and four to the San Juan boundary.111 Further, whatever
differences existed between Macdonald and the other British commissioners, the
delegation maintained a united frontin the presence of the Americans. Privately, de
Grey warned Macdonald that Britain would not be disposed to help Canada insist
upon terms that were thought excessive or unreasonable, but it seems that no hint of
this discord was betrayed to the United States commissioners.112
Thornton shared Lisgar's impression about the Canadian position in
negotiations. "In this triangular duel", he wrote to the foreign secretary, "it is
somewhat difficult to give satisfaction to both Canada and the United States, when
each side has such exaggerated pretensions". Like Lisgar, Thornton also expressed
his surprise and disappointment that the Canadian council should have instructed
their extreme objection to a money payment. His correspondence with Lisgar had
led him to expect they would accept such a proposal, even though Lisgar did say the
idea was his own. "I cannot but suspect that the Canadian Government are now
opposing it under the impression that the Imperial Government will bring pressure to
bear upon them, thus saving them from a [part?] of the responsibility of accepting the
proposal", he speculated.113
Lisgar's private letters to Kimberley expressed similar views and explained
the climate of ill temper in parliament over the fisheries that helped account for
Macdonald's apparent intransigence. Most of the council was reasonable, "but they
are overborne and outtalked by colleagues of narrow views, and all have the same
interest ofmaking as strong a case for themselves as possible in the eyes of the
public and parl[iamen]t". Lisgar maintained that the best course was for Britain to
advise Canada "authoritatively" that "we consider such and such terms fair, you must
accept them as a settlement". If it were put that way, Canada "will do so", he
believed -"not perhaps without a protest for parliamentary reasons, but with a
tolerable good grace, and no lasting displeasure". 114
Macdonald wrote freely to Lisgar about the difficulties of his role, knowing
that Lisgar would communicate these impressions to the other British
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commissioners. While he was not an experienced diplomat, per se, Macdonald knew
that he had nothing to lose by playing up the likelihood that Canada would balk at
the treaty if the terms were not sufficiently generous. "I am not in a very enviable
position as I stand alone", he wrote to the governor general. "The Americans are
constantly depreciating the value of our property, and making absurdly low offers",
he complained. His British colleagues, "in their anxiety for a settlement, are
constantly pressing me to yield.... Were it not for the answer that I have at hand [a
telegram from the Canadian privy council] that there is no use in my assenting to an
arrangement which will not subsequently be ratified, I should have no protection."115
For his own part, Lisgar was not fooled by the ruse of the telegram. "Sir J. A
.M[acdonal]d telegraphs daily to his colleagues for instructions—that is—he tells
them the instructions he wishes to receive and they send them in accordance", he
confided to the colonial secretary. Lisgar regarded Macdonald as "a very able man,
full of resource and knowledge", but found him "strangely susceptible not to say
timid as to the effect of his doings on the parliamentary support he may receive". He
wondered at Macdonald, "clever as he is", allowing himself to be led by inferior
colleagues.116
Despite Lisgar's conviction that Macdonald was self-consciously using his
correspondence with cabinet as a tool to manipulate British opinion, he continued to
send the copies Macdonald supplied to him to Kimberley and Northcote. In mid
April, Macdonald wrote to Cartier to discuss the latest American offer: admission of
fish free of duty and a sum ofmoney to be settled by arbitration.117 He repeated de
Grey's warnings that relations between Britain, the United States and Canada were at
risk. Macdonald assured de Grey that he was alive to the gravity of the situation, but
that Canada was not responsible for the commingling of issues—the decision to treat
the Alabama claims, the San Juan boundary and the fisheries together—"and she was
in my opinion prejudiced by it". He implied to de Grey that he might not have
accepted the commission had he realised that all the issues were to be treated
together. Canada did not wish to sell or lease the fisheries but wanted a fair
commercial equivalent. The American attitude, he insisted, was "simply an attempt
to bully us into a surrender of our rights by speaking of probable collisions involving
the shedding of blood and consequent irritation...". Macdonald insisted he was
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unconcerned about personal popularity, but predicted that the treaty would arouse
indignation, and would be summarily rejected in parliament. De Grey asked
Macdonald to convey his concerns to his colleagues and confided that, if all other
matters were settled, Britain might consider compensation to Canada for the Fenian
claims, if no precedent was inferred.118 Before sending his "private and confidential"
letter to Cartier, Macdonald showed it to de Grey and Northcote both to confirm that
he had correctly conveyed de Grey's arguments, and so that they might understand
his own position.119
In sending a copy ofMacdonald's letter, Lisgar remarked to Kimberley that
"the inference drawn from this and insisted upon with more warmth than courtesy is
that the interests of Canada in the fisheries are to be or have been sacrificed to those
ofG[rea]t Britain". Lisgar cannily surmised that "no doubt the fume and fury of the
Canadians are liable to some allowance on the score that they are making a case for
their own defence in the Can[adia]n Legis[latu]res" but he warned Kimberley also
that "in so much sound there is also I fear some meaning". Macdonald and his
colleagues may find their position as ministers "which is already weakened by
various causes" jeopardised by the fisheries questions, even if they themselves have
been responsible for raising unrealistic expectations about the settlement. "The
Council completely altered their views as I stated in my letter to you of the 26th
Jan[ua]ry and the self will of two or three has carried the day completely over the
rest and in opposition to the various statements made to me on previous occasions",
he explained. "The situation has not been a pleasant one for some time and I have
done all I could to inculcate more moderate view—with little effect". Even as he
found his ministers largely to blame for the prospect of the treaty's rejection in
parliament, Lisgar proposed a number of concessions by which "the fracas might be
smoothed over for the present". He pointed to the need to enlarge the Welland and
St Lawrence canals, a project estimated to cost about three million dollars over four
or five years.
If Great Britain would, not guarantee, but lend this three millions to the
Dominion on the same terms as they are lending money to Irish landlords to
buy up the tithes—3 Vi percent, with a sinking fund, 1 Vi p. cent = 5 in all you
might settle both the canal, and the Fishery question on the latest basis
proposed, until the money were all repaid—say 25 or 28 years hence—the
security is unquestionable.120
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Lisgar also urged, in response to a later query from the colonial secretary, that the
proposed withdrawal of the imperial garrison from Quebec be delayed until
September: "By that time the first outcry,—if an outcry there be, about the Fisheries
will have died away.... It will be well not to have a simultaneous grumble about the
Fisheries and the removal of the Regiment". Lisgar also advised that he had been
given copies of further letters from Macdonald to his cabinet colleagues, similar in
tone to what he had already sent and "very unsatisfactory". "They are written for a
purpose of some kind no doubt perhaps shewn to me for a purpose—To get
something out of England it may be for the Fisheries beyond what can be got from
the U[nited] States"121 To another correspondent, Lisgar speculated that "It looks as
122if half their anger were assumed. I cannot help thinking so at times."
If there is any question that Macdonald attempted to manipulate British
opinion, there can be none that he tried to do so in Canada. To Tupper he confided
that "I do not like to look at the consequences, but we are so clearly in the right, that
we must throw the responsibility on England". He was "rather glad" that he was
being criticised in New York papers: "it will do me no harm in Canada".123 Another
colleague was instructed to manipulate news coverage of the treaty. If the "friendly
newspapers" held back and created the impression that Macdonald approved the
treaty, George Brown of the Liberal Globe "will then pitch into the treaty and into
me for sacrificing the interests of Canada. He will afterwards find out, when it is too
late, that he is on the same side as myself, and will not be able to retract". If Brown
finds that I am opposed to the treaty, Macdonald explained, "he may take up the
loyalty cry.... This course would give him a strong influential position with the
Home Government, which might react prejudicially on our party".124 Macdonald
cannily assessed how his apparent reaction to the final terms would influence
opinions. He toyed with the idea of refusing to sign the treaty, but was dissuaded.
Alternatively, he considered inserting a statement of his non-concurrence in the
agreement. He proposed the idea to de Grey, arguing that "it can also be suggested
to ... [Fish] that the fact ofmy objecting to the arrangement as a bad bargain for
Canada, will be an additional proof to the Senate that it is a good one for the United
States".125 In the end, Macdonald contented himself with a somewhat theatrical
show of reluctance at the official signing. When the treaty was formally concluded
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on 8 May 1871, Macdonald held the pen in his hand, turned to Fish and half-
whispered, "Well, here go the fisheries". To Fish's reply, "You get a good
equivalent for them," Macdonald retorted, '"No, we give them away—here goes the
signature'; and thereupon signed his name, and rising from the table, said, 'They are
gone.'"126
The impression ofMacdonald's fellow commissioners was somewhat
different. When an agreement was at last reached, de Grey wrote of Macdonald's
reaction that "his delight was almost ludicrous".127 He had earlier surmised that "it is
evidently the wish of Macdonald to be able to represent to his people that any
unpopular arrangement.. .was forced upon him by the British Government for their
interests rather than those of the Dominion".128 Thornton characterised the treaty as
"a very fair and equitable adjustment of pending questions" but noted that
Macdonald "pretends to believe that his Government will never consent to the
arrangement...". For his part, Macdonald confided to Hincks that he had "worked
out a plan in my head". "Our true policy is to hold out to England that we will not
ratify the treaty, and I have strong hopes that in her desire to close every possible
cause of dispute with the Ufnited] States we can induce her to make us a liberal offer.
We should lose all this advantage if we showed any symptoms of yielding."130
Unfortunately, Macdonald's strategy of sharing the "private and confidential"
letters he wrote to his cabinet colleagues with the governor general may have
backfired in this instance. Lisgar was handed a copy of this letter, which he
forwarded to Kimberley as he had the others. He added a postscript that "I cannot
however think it was written with the intention that it should be placed in my
hands".131 Macdonald's letter provoked indignation in the British cabinet.
Kimberley described the letter as "very curious. If I understand it rightly, he means
to play a game, for which knavery is hardly too strong a term." Gladstone minuted
that "I hope the 'liberal offer' which Sir J.M. intends to [cajole?] from us will be
1 ^9
nil". Kimberley informed Lisgar that he "should be sorry to write what I think of
the game he proposes so coolly to play.... He will find out that 'in vain is the net
spread in sight of any bird.'"133
Although Lisgar saw clearly that Macdonald was using the possibility of non-
ratification of the treaty as a ploy to extract concessions, he did urge that Britain
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consider compensation for Canada. Lisgar let the British cabinet know that
opposition to the treaty was indeed real and could jeopardise its passage in
parliament, even though he believed much of it was Macdonald's own fault.
Macdonald had been losing ground in Ontario, Lisgar reported, "and dreads the
effect of the general election."134 The Globe had convinced farmers that tariff
concessions ought to have been won. Even so, Lisgar maintained that the idea of a
railway subsidy of some sort, which Cartier urged, "would only injure Canada", and
was speculative and impractical. Lisgar told Macdonald frankly that "you and your
colleagues had better abandon the idea of a guarantee for the Railway". It was, he
said, "hopeless from the first and if you will accept advice from me—not often
tendered—you will shew your hand to Lord Kimberley—you will not get less from
England by doing so". Lisgar did support other aid for Canada, however. "If
anything can be done," he urged Kimberley, "the enlargement of the canals would be
the proper and safe investment in aid—for it cannot be denied that the Can[adia]n
Gov[ernmen]t are in a difficult position".135
Even as Lisgar supported the Canadian government's bid to win concessions
from Britain, he could not help but betray his frustration at the tactics Macdonald
adopted. Lisgar expressed satisfaction that Granville had cautioned the Canadian
prime minister in a letter: "I am not at all sorry he should be made aware as he now
is, that he is not to play fast and loose as he pleases; and deal in matters of weighty
concern with the Imperial Gov[ernmen]t as he deals with intriguers in local politics".
"I think the letter was admirably suited to the circumstances and the man
1 "lb
addressed". He was troubled by Macdonald's lack of candour and explained that
he was "almost sure we have not Sir J.A.M[acdonald]'s real opinion.... [H]e is so
Protean one cannot say what he may be at from day to day". While Macdonald
assured Lisgar he would work toward the treaty's ratification, he evidently feared the
opposition, and even his own colleagues "amongst whom there are some statesmen
1 "37
of no very enlightened order."
Over the course ofmany months, Lisgar continued to act as a mediator
between Britain and Canada in their respective objectives of seeing the treaty ratified
and securing compensation. He supplied the colonial secretary with excerpts from
colonial newspapers to show the state of Canadian opinion. The Globe, for example,
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expressed "grave doubts whether the much-trumpeted 'protests' were not simulated
rather than real". Macdonald was accused of "chaffering or intriguing to gain some
advantage from Great Britain as a set off to the distasteful morsel he has to present to
the Canadian Parliament, or ... letting time pass in the hope that something or other
may turn up to help him out of his quandary".138 Lisgar observed that the ministry's
"former braggadocio and imprudent declarations in Parl[iamen]t [are] being
constantly paraded before their eyes" but nevertheless hoped that a planned
proposition for compensation "will be liberally met". The plan under discussion was
for Canada to give up a British loan guarantee for fortifications, and ask instead for
"an equivalent guarantee for railways [and] canals...[for] some peaceful purpose."
Such a change, Lisgar noted, "shews reliance on the continuance of peace and a good
understanding with the U[nited] States". The proposal being met in a liberal spirit by
Britain, he explained, will "prove the best and most satisfactory mode of closing up
all questions on the Fenian score". He was sorry, he said, that the British cabinet
seemed determined that compensation must take the form of a sum ofmoney. "That
may seem clear and simple, but it will be of difficult adjustment as to the amount,
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and will scarcely in any case be admitted as satisfactory by the Canadians".
Even as the uncertain fate of the Washington treaty hung in the balance,
Britain's decision to withdraw the imperial garrison complicated matters.140
Kimberley "very earnestly" conveyed a Canadian request regarding the transfer of
military stores to Cardwell, the secretary of state for war, explaining that, while
Canadian demands were "more or less unreasonable judged on their own merits",
"in the present very ticklish state of Canadian affairs, it is a matter of the greatest
importance to seize any [occasion?] for smoothing down the irritation which exists
there". It was therefore "well worth our while (if it can be done with any decency) to
give them more than their due in such a matter at this particular juncture."141 This is
not to say that Kimberley was not completely supportive of the larger decision to
withdraw the garrison. Canadians, he complained, "want to act in everything quite
independently of us, and at the same time to have a claim for our support whenever
they want it. This 'heads you lose, tails I win' principle is not one on wh[ich] our
relations can be conducted, & this they must learn."142
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Lisgar's early confidence that the treaty would be passed suffered somewhat
over the course of the winter, largely because of his growing doubts about
Macdonald's good faith. "Instead of Sir J.A.M[acdonald] trying to convert his
colleagues", Lisgar suspected, "the ablest of his colleagues are trying to convert him
and fix him to a decision in favour of acceptance". Should the treaty ultimately pass,
Lisgar told Kimberley, "we shall, I fancy owe little either to his frankness or his
disinterestedness". The strain was telling on Lisgar, who reminded the colonial
secretary that he was approaching the middle of his sixty-fifth year.143 He
complained in late January of "well nigh twelve months of anxiety and
disagreeableness all owing to the torturous course which... Sir J.A.M[acdonald]
chose to sketch". Macdonald, whose statements may have had "a colour of fact and
accuracy", had consistently withheld information from him. The past week, Lisgar
reported, had been marred by a "semi-revolt" of Macdonald's ministry. Hincks had
been "so urgent with ... [Macdonald] for acceptance that they had almost
quarrelled". Tupper had openly threatened to resign. Cartier—"a man whose word
may be relied upon"—had told the governor general months before that he was in
favour of ratification. "These three intimated pretty plainly to me where the
weakness lay" Lisgar reported grimly.144 More than a month later, Lisgar was still
frustrated by Macdonald's "jealous reticence and inveterate habit of waiting upon
Providence". Lisgar had done all he could, but all in vain, he complained, to induce
Macdonald to make a clear ministerial statement of his position on the treaty. Lisgar
admitted that the fact that Macdonald "always plays the waiting game" had always
"stood him in good stead", but found that "it renders him neither very agreeable nor
very safe for those who have to deal with him in confidence and who are entitled to
full confidence".145 Macdonald and Lisgar remained on good terms—indeed
Macdonald later described Lisgar as the ablest governor general under whom he had
served146—but it is clear that the question of the treaty and its ratification placed a
serious strain on their relationship.
The settlement that was ultimately reached—an imperial loan guarantee of
£2,500,000 for the purpose of railway construction and canal improvements to be
implemented as soon as Canada passed the act ratifying the treaty147—was not
precisely what Lisgar believed was best for Canada, but he dutifully supported the
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proposal. The treaty was ratified in Canada's parliament in May 1872 and Lisgar
officially notified Kimberley of this welcome news before returning to Britain the
following month. "I hope to give the Royal Assent to the Bill before I leave Canada,
and I will add that I am well-pleased to think that this should be my last public act in
Her Majesty's Colonial Service."148 He reflected privately to Kimberley that
"truly... all is well that ends well".149
In Canadian historiography, the Treaty ofWashington has been viewed as
another in a series of unsatisfactory concessions made by the British to placate the
Americans at Canada's expense. The Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, the Oregon
treaty of 1846, and the 1903 Alaska boundary award are generally seen as part of this
tradition. It is undeniably true that in each of these instances, the final settlement
was disappointing. Colonial status, and an aggressive and uncompromising
American foreign policy, ensured that the playing field was not level. Lacking a
significant military capability, Canada could not hope to pursue a tough line against
the Americans. Nor would it be reasonable to expect British diplomatic weight and
military force to be brought to bear in support of a policy that could only escalate
tensions, and which offered no benefits to Britain. It is revealing that when Canada
achieved nominal independence in foreign policy in the twentieth century, the other
part of the equation remained unchanged. The agenda of the United States would
continue to be the dominant influence in Canada's external affairs.
Given this non-negotiable set of conditions in 1871, guardians of Canada's
interests set out to do the best job they could under the circumstances. Lord Lisgar,
far from being indolent, devoted considerable time and energy to a search for
solutions. These solutions were aimed at dealing with events as they were, not as
Canadian politicians might have wished them to be. Recent events had proved that
the licence system for American fishing vessels was a failure. The Americans
seemed determined to have access to the fisheries, and any attempt to stop them
brought with it heightened international tensions. Further, numerous overtures by
Canadian and British envoys to re-establish reciprocal trade ties had ended in failure
and the political climate in the United States remained solidly protectionist. Lisgar
was adamant that if Canadian fisheries were going to be open to Americans, some
compensation ought to be claimed. He was perfectly frank with his ministers about
his convictions and believed that he had won them over to a similar view. Lisgar
may have allowed his own wishful thinking to exaggerate the support his cabinet
gave to the idea of financial compensation for the fisheries. He was sincerely
convinced that the plan was best, not only because the imperial government sought
accord, but because Canada's interests dictated a peaceful settlement. It appears
that, having at first resisted the idea, his ministers grudgingly acquiesced in it when it
became apparent that the goal of reciprocity could not be realised, only to disavow it
later for diplomatic and internal political reasons. John A. Macdonald was no less
sincere in his desire to achieve a good settlement for Canada. His agenda was
complicated, however, by the need to secure terms that would ensure success at the
upcoming election. The decision to allow Canada a veto over the treaty was a
double-edged sword. Canadian politicians could not shift responsibility to Britain by
claiming that unpopular terms were forced upon them. Macdonald recognised that
by skilfully manipulating his own reactions to the treaty, and those of the country at
large, he might win compensation for Canada from the British government. There
had to be enough resistance to loosen the purse strings, but not enough to cause the
measure—and the government—to be defeated. His almost machiavellian cunning in
working to achieve this balance put considerable strain on his relationship with the
governor general. Lisgar had enjoyed a good rapport with his charming and genial
prime minister, but ultimately was forced to question Macdonald's good faith and
integrity. Ironically, it is Lisgar's good faith and integrity, and not Macdonald's, that
have been questioned.150 The absence of any collected correspondence detailing
Lisgar's role, and the reticence about their function demanded of the Crown's
representatives, have made it possible for the governor general to remain a
convenient historical scapegoat.
1 Sir John Young was actually sworn in as governor general on 29 December 1868. See J.C. Dent,
Canadian Portrait Gallery, IV, 41. While Sir John Young was not raised to the peerage until 1870,
for convenience the title Lisgar will be used here.
2 D.M.L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 55.
3 A very useful survey article on Lisgar's Canadian career has been published in Australia. See Dan
O'Donnell, "Lord Lisgar", 254-73.
4 Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: II: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), 84-5.
5 J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay ofCanada, the United States and Great Britain
(New Haven: Yale University, 1945), 197.
6
DNB, XXI, 1296-7. See also, Charles A. Thompson, "Young, Sir John, Baron Lisgar" in DCB, X,
728-29; John Cowan, Canada's Governors General, 11-17; Joseph Pope, Memoirs ofMacdonald, I,
160
370-1; Dan O'Donnell, "Lord Lisgar", 254-73; J.B. Conacher, "Peel and the Peelites, 1846-1850"
English Historical Review (July 1958), 431-52, and F. Darrell Munsell, The Unfortunate Duke, 82-7.
7 Robert Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 495.
8 Sandra Gwyn, The Private Capital, 159-60.
9
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Sir Frederic Rogers, private, 16 March 1871.
10
Joseph Pope, ed„ Correspondence ofSir John A .Macdonald (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1921), Lisgar to Macdonald, 16 July 1872, 172.
11 R.H. Hubbard, Rideau Hall, 16.
12 D.M.L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 55.
13 J.C. Dent, Canadian Portrait Gallery, IV, 40.
14 Goldwin Smith, as quoted in J. C. Dent, The Last Forty Years, II, 518.
15 As quoted in Sandra Gwyn, The Private Capital, 153.
16 J. C. Dent, Canadian Portrait Gallery IV, 41.
17 As quoted in Louise Reynolds, Agnes, 62.
18 Some of these letters can be seen in Joseph Pope, Correspondence ofMacdonald.
19 Macdonald to Lisgar, 2 September 1872, Ibid., 111.
20
Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 238-61, provides an overview of the political,
commercial and ideological differences that complicated relations. See also Goldwin Smith, The
Treaty ofWashington, 1871: A Study in Imperial History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1941);
G.P. de T. Glazebrook, History ofCanadian External Relations. (Ottawa: Carleton Library, 1965), I;
Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration 2 vols. (New York:
Frederick Ungar, 1957 ed.); J. B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, Adrian Cook, The Alabama
Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1975); Lester Burrell Shippee, Canadian- American Relations 1849-1874 (New Haven: Yale
University, 1939). Robin W. Winks, Canada and the United States, provides useful background on
the strained relations arising from the Civil War years. J.C. Bancroft Davis, Mr. Fish and the
Alabama Claims: A Chapter in Diplomatic History (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press,
1969 reprint of 1893 ed.) and Caleb Cushing, The Treaty ofWashington (New York: Harper & Bros.,
1873) provide contemporary American perspectives on the issues. Joseph Pope, Memoirs of
Macdonald provides a useful Canadian perspective.
21 G.P. de T. Glazebrook, History ofCanadian External Relations, vol. 1, 101. Caleb Cushing, The
Treaty ofWashington, 226-40, rejected the idea that the War of 1812 should have cancelled the
existing fishing arrangements. Caleb Cushing, of course, was not an impartial observer. Cushing,
who had been attorney general in the Pierce administration, was an acknowledged Anglophobe and a
key advisor to President Grant on the Alabama claims. He later served as senior counsel for the
United States in the tribunal for arbitration of the Alabama claims. Dictionary ofAmerican
Biography, II, Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone, eds. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929),
623-30.
22 Laurence Oliphant, Episodes in a Life ofAdventure, 46.
23 J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas, 138.
24
See, for example, incidents related in W.T.R. Preston, My Generation ofPolitics and Politicians,
25.
25 Lester Burrell Shippee, Canadian -American Relations, 160-6, 179.
26 Cardwell to Monck, confidential, 3 March 1866 in Ibid., 262-3.
27 NAC, Monck Papers, A 755, Frederick Bruce to Monck, private, 6 July 1866.
28 See, for example, NAC, CO 42/695, B 508, Hon. Charles Sumner to H.B. Willson, 6 July 1869:
"Sooner or later - and I believe very soon, it will be so positively for the interests of England, to
withdraw from this hemisphere, that I do not doubt the considerations you present so clearly will be
weighed by her statesmen.... The Colonies must be left free to determine their future, each for
itself...".
29 J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 175; Not surprisingly, Sumner's speech aroused hostile
feelings on both sides of the Atlantic. The British diplomat Lord Tenterden snidely speculated that
Sumner's fury was fed by his disappointment in his marriage to a much younger widow who left him
when she found that he did not possess "full powers". Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims: American
Politics andAnglo-American Relations, 73-89.
161
30 Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the GrantAdministration, I, 296-7. Caleb
Cushing also looked forward to the "glorious consummation" of the relationship between Canada and
the United States. "[I]f it be possible to conceive of two countries, which would appear to be mutually
destined to constitute one Government, they are the United States and the British Provinces, to the
special advantage of the latter rather than the former." The Treaty ofWashington, 255, 253.
31
NAC, Colonial Office Correspondence, Supplementary, CO 537/101, B 815, Sir John Young to
Granville, confidential, despatch, 22 January 1870.
32 NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Thornton to Young, 10 February 1870; J.C. Bancroft Davis, Mr. Fish
and the Alabama Claims, 44-6. Bancroft Davis was a member of the American delegation.
33
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Memorandum of...Privy Council, 22 February 1870.
34 John A. Macdonald to John Rose, private, 26 January 1870, in G.P.deT Glazebrook, History of
Canadian External Relations, I, 97-8. The question of Canada's separation from Britain continued to
be a part of the American diplomatic agenda. In September 1870 the President insisted to Zachariah
Chandler that settlement of the Alabama claims should also include provision for a referendum on
Canadian independence. Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims, 141.
35 D.M.L Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 176-8.
36 Lester Burrell Shippee, Canadian-American Relations, 266-70.
37 354 licences had been issued in 1866, as compared to only 25 in 1869. NAC, CO 537/101, B 815,
Review ofPresident Grant's Message...relative to the Canadian Fisheries... (Ottawa, 12 December
1870).
38
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Young to Granville, Secret, 23 June 1870.
39
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Young to Kimberley, private, 25 July 1870.
40
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Young to Kimberley, private, 9August 1870.
41
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Frederick Bruce to Monck, 6 August 1866. Carnarvon's advice was the
same. See Monck Papers, A 756, Carnarvon to Monck, private, 7 July 1866.
42
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Young, private, 28 July 1870.
43 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Young, private, 10 August 1870.
44
PP, Young to Granville, despatch 131, 9 June 1870, 617.
45 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Young, private, 28 July and 24 August 1870.
46 NAC, CO 42/696, B 509, Report by A. Campbell to His Excellency... Sir John Young, Ottawa, 10
September 1870.
47
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Young to Kimberley, Secret, despatch 66, 9 September 1870.
48 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Young to Kimberley, private, 2 September 1870.
49
Joseph Pope, Memoirs ofMacdonald, I, 440.
50 Ibid., Macdonald to Young, 31 October 1870, 440.
51
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Young to Kimberley, Secret, despatch 70, 23 September 1870.
52
NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Young to Kimberley, Secret, despatch 72, 13 October 1870.
53 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Young to Kimberley, private, 27 October 1870.
54 NAC, Granville Papers, B 894, Young to Kimberley, private, 4 November 1870.
55 NAC, Granville Papers, B 894, Young to Thornton, 4 [?] November 1870, excerpt, enclosure in
Ibid.
56 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 15 and 18 November 1870.
57 NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Young to Thornton, private, 14 November 70, marked closed 17
November 1870.
58 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, 22 November 1870.
59 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Lisgar, private, 20 November 1870. In October
1870, Alexander of Russia, taking advantage of France's preoccupation with the lately fought war
against Prussia, repudiated the "Black Sea" clauses of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The treaty, which
brought an end to the Crimean War, had denied Russia the right to build military or naval
establishments on the shores of the Black Sea. The issue was more far-reaching, as Russian
expansionism threatened the European balance of power. The involvement of France and Britain in
the Crimea had been meant to uphold Turkish integrity and thus contain Russian ambitions in the
Balkans. David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), 242-49; 321.
In the United States, Bancroft Davis proposed that the instability in Europe offered an opportunity for
the Americans. "What a time this would be", he wrote to Fish, "to strike in London for the
162
independence of Canada and the settlement of the Alabama Claims." Adrian Cook, The Alabama
Claims, 135.
60
NAC, Cardwell Papers, B 532, Kimberley to Gladstone, private, copy, 9 December 1870.
61 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 8 December 1870.
62 W.L. Morton, The Critical Years, 253.
63 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 8 December 1870. The previous
year, Butler had publicly proposed that the United States should issue a proclamation of
nonintercourse, denying Britain access to the American market, in order to increase pressure to settle
the Alabama claims. Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims, 81, 135-9, 147-9.
64
NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 27 September 1870.
65 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 4 October 1870.
66
Seemingly, Fish was at least half right. NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville,
private, 18 October 1870. Thornton later conceded to Granville that although "I combat this idea by
all the arguments I can think of, the Canadians themselves take very little trouble to conceal that Mr.
Fish is not far wrong". NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 25 October
1870.
67 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 8 December 1870.
68 Ibid.
69 NAC, Granville Papers, B 894, Kimberley to Granville, private, 23 December 1870.
70 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 13 December 1870.
71 "He proposes" was probably stretching the point. It appears that Tupper was aware of Lisgar's
suggestion and it is probable that he concurred in it, but the suggestion does not seem to have
originated with him, and indeed Lisgar claims it elsewhere as his own.
72 NAC, CO 537/101, B 815, Lisgar to Thornton, private, 28 December 1870.
73 The Canadian privy council had indicated its willingness the previous year that such a commission
should take place. See Kimberley's memorandum of his meeting with Alexander Campbell, 11 July
1870, NAC, Kimberley papers, A 313.
74 Rose also had to combat the American impression that Canada's separation from Britain was
imminent. "Haul down the flag and all will be right", Sumner advised him. Adrian Cook, The
Alabama Claims, 159-60.
75 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, 14 February 1871; J.C. Bancroft Davis, Mr.
Fish and the Alabama Claims, 59-66.
76 Rose to Granville, 10 January 1871, as quoted in Goldwin Smith, The Treaty of Washington, 33.
77 Goldwin Smith, The Treaty ofWashington, 33.
78 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Lisgar, private and confidential, 26 January 1871.
79 NAC, CO 537/102, B 816, Lisgar to Kimberley, secret, 11 January 1871.
80 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 26 January 1871. A Committee of
the Privy Council complained in a separate report that, while the government of Prince Edward
Island—which was not yet a part of Confederation —admitted the correctness of Canada's
interpretation of the 1818 Convention, they wished to foster trade with the Americans "which is
advantageous to individuals who have no interest in the fisheries. Her Majesty's Government", the
committee explained, "may not be aware that the inhabitants of Prince Edward Island have engaged in
the fisheries to a very limited extent, and that Charlottetown has been the headquarters of the
American trespassers." The report implied that this seriously undercut the efforts of Canada to
enforce the convention. See Report ofa Committee of... the Privy Council of Canada... 17 February
1871 NAC, B 509, CO 42/696.
81 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Granville to W.E. Gladstone, 22 November 1870.
82 NAC, Granville Papers, B 894, Lisgar to Kimberley, telegram, secret and confidential, 19 February
1871.
83 Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, II, 471, Adrian Cook, The Alabama Claims, 170-1..
84 NAC, CO 537/102, B 816, Macdonald to Lisgar, confidential, 4 February 1871. This letter is also
printed in Joseph Pope, Memoirs ofMacdonald, I, 443-44. Macdonald feared the effect his absence
would have on domestic politics. The upcoming parliamentary session would be an important one, he
knew, and the prospect of leaving his French-Canadian lieutenant, George-Etienne Cartier, to deal
with Ontario members outraged over the late Red River Rebellion was disquieting. Macdonald's
secretary, Joseph Pope, recalled that Macdonald ascribed his defeat in 1873 to his absence in 1871.
Memoirs ofMacdonald, I, 445. Further, British Columbia's entry into Confederation, including
163
controversial terms for the construction of a transcontinental railway, secured passage during
Macdonald's absence. See J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe, II, 284.
85 NAC, CO 537/102, B 816, Lisgar to Kimberley, secret, despatch 105, 9 February 1871, and Lisgar
to Kimberley, telegram, secret, 9 February 1871.
86 NAC, CO 537/102, B 816, Lisgar to Kimberley, secret, despatch 108, 23 February 1871. The other
commissioners were (for Britain) Oxford Professor Mountague Bernard, Earl de Grey and Ripon, Sir
Stafford Northcote, Lord Tenterden, and Sir Edward Thornton. The American appointees were
Senator Rockwood Hoar; General Robert C. Schenck, the newly appointed Minister to England;
Senator George H. Williams; Justice Samuel Nelson; J.C. Bancroft Davis, Assistant Secretary of
State, and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish. See Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, II, 450, 474. See also
Lester B. Shippee, Canadian American Relations, 333-5.
87 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 1580, Monck to Macdonald, 10 February 1871.
88 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 1580, Lisgar to Macdonald, confidential, 6 February 1871.
89 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Lisgar, private, 26 February 1871.
90 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, 14 February 1871.
91 NAC, CO 537/102, B 816, Kimberley to Lisgar, telegram, secret, 4 February 1871.
92 NAC, CO 42/697, B 509, Kimberley to Lisgar, despatch, confidential, 16 February 1871. This is
also printed in PP, vol. 27, 619-20.
93 Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, 475. See also Appendix II, "Canadian Fisheries and Reciprocity" in
which Nevins describes the tension between Canada's and Britain's agenda in the Treaty of
Washington negotiations, 917-20.
94 Joseph Pope, Memoirs ofMacdonald, Macdonald to Tupper, 5 March 1871,1, 447-9.
95 Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald, vol. n, 84-5.
96 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 29, Macdonald to Campbell, 6 March 1871 and Macdonald to Carder,
11 March 1871.
97 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 29, Macdonald to Hincks, ? March 1871. On 6 April 1871 Macdonald
cabled Tupper in cypher that the British ambassador told him that Lisgar had said Tupper considered
$200,000 to be sufficient compensation. Tupper replied the following day that the ambassador "must
have misunderstood [the] Governor General who told Carrier I was angry at his having suggested such
a thing". NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 1581 See also O.D. Skelton, The Life and Times ofSir
Alexander Tilloch Gait (1920), 496-504. Skelton described the attempt by George Brown and Edward
Thornton in 1874 to negotiate a renewal of reciprocity, a measure that ultimately failed to win the
support of the U.S. Senate. Around this time, Gait wrote to Macdonald seeking his recollections about
how the figure of $200,000 had been arrived at. Thornton told Gait that Macdonald "did not say so in
so many words, but... qualified] the proposal as very indiscreet" and implied that Lisgar made the
suggestion without the full knowledge and consent of his ministers. [9 June 1875] Macdonald's letter
to Gait, however, confirmed that there was no formal offer and "we are in no way held to any definite
proposition" [31 May 1875].
8 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, de Grey to Gladstone, telegram, 30 April 1871. See also D.M.L.
Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 86 and G.P. de T. Glazebrook, History ofCanadian External
Relations, vol. I, 112.
99 NAC, Granville Papers, B 894, Kimberley to Granville, private, 21 February 1871.
100 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 1580, Francis Hincks to Macdonald, confidential, 15 February 1871.
101 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 29, Macdonald to Lisgar, private, 7 May 1871.
102 NAC, CO 42/697, B 509, Lisgar to Kimberley, decipher of secret telegram, 10 March 1871.
103 Ibid., Kimberley reply to Lisgar, decipher of secret telegram, 11 March 1871.
104 Memoirs ofMacdonald, Macdonald to Tupper, private, 17 March 1871,1, 449.
105 Ibid., Macdonald to Tupper, private, 21 March 1871, 449-451.
106 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 9 March 1871. Lack of American
good faith had been a frequent theme in Lisgar's letters for some time. See also Lisgar to Kimberley,
private, 9 January 1871.
107 Lisgar to Macdonald, 12 March 1871, Goldwin Smith, The Treaty ofWashington, 59-60.
108 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 1581, Macdonald to Tupper, telegraph, 22 March 1871 and Tupper to
Macdonald, telegraph, 24 March 1871. These are printed in Memoirs ofMacdonald, I, 451-2.
109 Memoirs ofMacdonald, Macdonald to de Grey, 25 March 1871, Appendix XXI, 756.
110 PP, vol. 27, Report of a Committee of... the Privy Council...20 January 1872, 629. See also
Fish's diary entry for 12 April 1871 in Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, in which Fish records that he
164
told de Grey that he was "rather glad that they [the Canadians] are not willing to accept our proposals
for the settlement of the fisheries, as I find the universal impression that we have proposed to give too
much, and that the concessions offered would probably jeopardize the ratification of the treaty", 477.
111 Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, 476-7.
112 Goldwin Smith, The Treaty ofWashington, 65.
113
NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, private, 21 March 1871.
114
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 6 April 1871.
115
Correspondence ofMacdonald, Macdonald to Lisgar, private and confidential, 7 April 1871, 144.
116
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 6 April 1871.
117 These proved to be the terms of the final treaty. The other key issues, the Alabama claims and the
San Juan boundary, were to be settled by arbitration.
118
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Macdonald to Cartier, private and confidential, 16 April 1871.
119
Correspondence ofMacdonald, Macdonald to Tupper, 21 April 1871, 484.
120
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 24 April 1871.
121 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 4 May 1871. The letter from
Kimberley to which this is an answer is found in the same collection and is dated 20 April 1871.
122
NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Lisgar to Herbert, 4 May 1871.
123 NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 29, Macdonald to Tupper, private, 1 April 1871.
124
Correspondence ofMacdonald, Macdonald to Alexander Morris, private and confidential, 21 April
1871, 145.
125
NAC, Macdonald Papers, C 29, Macdonald to de Grey, private and confidential, 26 April 187.
126 Fish diary, 8 May 1871, Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish, 490.
127 De Grey to Granville, 21 April 1871, W.L. Morton, The Critical Years, 256.
128 De Grey to Granville, 19 March 1871, Goldwin Smith, The Treaty ofWashington, 63.
129 NAC, Granville Papers, B 895, Thornton to Granville, 9 May 1871.
130 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley 11 May 1871, enclosure, Macdonald to
Francis Hincks, n.d.
131
Lisgar's postscript on Ibid.
132 Minutes on Ibid., Kimberley, 23 May 1871; Gladstone 25 May 1871. Creighton has read this word
as "conjure". Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald, vol. II, 109.
133
Paraphrasing Proverbs, chapter 1, verse 17. NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Kimberley to Lisgar,
private, 25 May 1871.
134
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 20 July 1871. A short while later,
Macdonald lost control of the provincial administration of Ontario. A Liberal administration under
the premiership of Edward Blake was formed, and it is probable that the failure to secure reciprocity
was a key factor. W. L. Morton, The Critical Years, 254, 259-60.
135
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 20 July 1871. A copy of the letter
to Macdonald to which Lisgar refers [dated 7 July 1871] may be found in NAC, CO 537/102, B 816.
A lengthy private letter from Macdonald to Lisgar, dated 21 July 1871, explained his fears that the
treaty and his government might be defeated and warned that he would " at once abandon any attempt
to reconcile my colleagues or the people of Canada to the adoption of the Treaty" if the British
government made compensation for the Fenian claims contingent upon acceptance. NAC, Macdonald
Papers, C 30, Macdonald to Lisgar, private, 21 July 1871. Macdonald did not leave it exclusively to
Lisgar to communicate his concerns; he himself let the British cabinet know that there was
considerable resistance to the treaty and resentment of the imperial government. A series of letters
Macdonald wrote to de Grey over the summer of 1871 can be found in the Macdonald Papers,
letterbook, vol. 15, C 29.
136 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 17 August 1871.
137 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 30 August 1871.
138
NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 16 November 1871, Enclosure, The
Globe, 13 November 1871.
139 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 23 November 1871. Kimberley
suggested that Canada send their counter proposal to the British government but added a note of
caution that "the Canadians must not open their mouths too wide, as guarantees are not popular here,
and we shall have to justify our action to the House of Commons". Ibid, Kimberley to Lisgar, private,
20 December 1871.
165
140 The decision to withdraw the imperial garrisons was in keeping with that philosophy of empire,
growing since the late 1840s, that the colonial possessions should bear greater responsibility for their
own defence. The large-scale reinforcement of British North American defences during the American
civil war was not a reversal of this general policy, but a response to an immediate threat. The
restoration of peace meant that the trend toward withdrawal would be continued. Useful background
may be found in C.P. Stacey, "Britain's Withdrawal from North America 1864-1871" The Canadian
Historical Review 36 (September 1955), 185-198; C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 204-63;
and R. L. Schuyler, "The Recall of the Legions: a phase in the decentralization of the British Empire"
American Historical Review 26 (October 1920), 18-36.
141 NAC, Cardwell Papers, B 532, Kimberley to Cardwell, private, 6 September 1871.
142
NAC, Cardwell Papers, B 532, Kimberley to Cardwell, private, 26 September 1871. Lisgar, too,
was in general supportive of the overall aim to reduce colonial dependency upon British defence. He
felt, however, that the seriousness of the Fenian threat was underestimated in Britain. C.P. Stacey,
Canada and the British Army, 211.
143 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, most private, 11 January 1872.
144 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 22 January 1872.
145 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, private, 29 February 1872.
146 Carman Miller, "Lisgar, Sir John Young, Baron", The Canadian Encyclopedia, second edition, II
(Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1988), 1217.
147 PP, vol. 27, Kimberley to Lisgar, despatch 58, 18 March 1872, 630.
148 Ibid., Lisgar to Kimberley, despatch [no. ?], 30 May 1872, 690.
149 NAC, Kimberley Papers, A 314, Lisgar to Kimberley, 17 May 1872.
150 J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 197: Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald, II, 84-5.
166
6
"A Choice of Difficulties": Lord Dufferin, the Pacific Scandal,
and the Prorogation of 1873
Less than one year into his viceregal term, Dufferin was forced to confront a
challenging political crisis. Like his predecessors - Elgin in 1854, Head in 1858, and
Monck in 1863—Dufferin faced the dilemma of whether or not to accept the advice
of his ministers. The "Pacific Scandal" seemed to implicate John A. Macdonald and
key Conservative ministers in corrupt financial bargains and vote buying, and
Macdonald's advice to Dufferin to prorogue parliament at the height of the crisis
appeared to be a cynical ploy to escape censure.1 Dufferin was temperamentally
inclined toward activism and his decision to follow the advice of his ministers in this
instance might at first glance appear to be inspired by partiality for Macdonald.
Dufferin did indeed consider Macdonald to be far superior to opposition leader
Alexander Mackenzie, but this was not the decisive factor in the governor general's
decision. Throughout the summer of 1873 Dufferin wrestled with the constitutional
dilemma posed by the scandal and his ministers' advice, only to arrive at last at the
position that seemed to come so readily to Elgin in 1854. Even after the prorogation,
Dufferin agonised over his course of action, fearing that he might be compelled to
force Macdonald's resignation. With the advantage of hindsight, and access to
private correspondence, it is possible to see how close Dufferin skirted to
constitutional impropriety, yet fairness dictates that he be assessed by his ultimate
actions alone. While Elgin evidently kept his own counsel, Dufferin struggled more
visibly, canvassing the opinions of others, writing a torrent of letters to the colonial
secretary weighing the pros and cons, and considering various schemes to get wind
of Parliament's mood. Nevertheless, his final decision was constitutionally correct.
Elgin, having lived through the difficult days of the Rebellion Losses Bill, could
approach the dissolution controversy with calm confidence. Dufferin had not been
seasoned by such an experience, but even had he been, his natural proclivity toward
action and evident need for personal popularity made it hard for him to maintain the
requisite detachment. A review of Dufferin's painful process of decision offers
instructive insight into the challenging nature of the role of constitutional governor.
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Born 21 June 1826 in Florence, Frederick Temple Hamilton-Temple-
Blackwood, was the only child of Price Blackwood, fourth Baron Dufferin and
Clandeboye in the Irish peerage, and Helen Selina Sheridan, one of three famous
beautiful daughters of Thomas Sheridan, and granddaughter of the noted statesman
and dramatist, Richard Brinsley Butler Sheridan. Frederick attended Eton and Christ
Church, Oxford, although he stayed at Oxford for less than two years and left
without earning a degree.2 As his father was a captain in the Royal Navy, and
frequently absent, much of Frederick's youth was spent in the exclusive company of
his mother.3 He succeeded to the title of fifth Baron Dufferin and Clandeboye when
his father died of an accidental overdose ofmorphia in 1841.4 Dufferin's mother,
who had been only seventeen at the time of her marriage, and eighteen when her
child was born, did not remarry for many years, but devoted her time primarily to her
son. "I do not suppose," Dufferin recalled, "that there was ever a human being who
had such a power of loving."5 Theirs has been described as an "intense, hothouse
relationship".6 In 1862, Dufferin married nineteen-year-old Hariot Georgina Rowan
Hamilton, of a neighbouring aristocratic family that was related to, but a long¬
standing rival of, the Blackwoods.7 Dufferin's mother chose to remarry almost
immediately following her son's wedding. Her new husband, Lord Gifford, was only
a year older than her son. Critically ill at the time of their marriage, Gifford lived a
mere eight weeks after the wedding. When he died, Helen moved to Clandeboye to
be with her son and his new wife.8
Assessments ofDufferin's appearance and character tended to be filtered
through assumptions about his descent from Sheridan. Nicolson wrote that "the
Sheridan blood seethed and tingled like champagne" in Dufferin's veins.9
Apparently of slight build, in portraits Dufferin generally adopted a somewhat
theatrical pose. He is usually described as handsome, although such assessments
may have been partially influenced by his charming and courtly manner. He had
wide-set and heavily lidded eyes, which gave him a dreamy appearance. His hair was
dark and ample, though combed close against his head, and the pointed chin beard
and moustache he wore did nothing to discourage persistent—but false—rumours
that he was actually the son of Disraeli.10 Certainly his flamboyant charm at court
contained echoes of Disraeli's heavy-handed flattery. Dufferin corresponded
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frequently with the elderly Duchess of Argyll, whom he referred to as "the
archangel" and closed a letter to the Marquis of Lome with the instructions "pray lay
me at the feet of your dear Princess [Louise]".11 Dufferin was a romantic, who wrote
poetry and painted watercolours. He once cited his mother and Sir Walter Scott as
19 •
the greatest influences on his character. An observer who met Dufferin in his later
years noted that "his lisp and eye-glass, and his extremely courteous, perhaps slightly
punctilious manner... gave me at first an impression of affectation, but this soon
11
wore off'. Dufferin has been described as the most popular of all modem
Canadian governors, because of his "Irish blarney and his gracefulness and charm".14
Not all were equally impressed. Goldwin Smith sneered at Dufferin's practice of
giving advance copies of his speeches to the press with "applause" inserted at
appropriate places.15
Dufferin's intellect has been described as "brilliant and versatile rather than
deep".16 He was not suited to academia and did not shine at school.17 Spelling was
always a challenge. His mother responded to one of his letters by warning him
against carelessness. "My grandfather Sheridan always affirmed that no Irish peer
could spell. Pray don't let his first great-grandson be a proof of his knowledge of
Irish ignorance."18 Nevertheless, Dufferin impressed Canadian audiences by his
ability to make speeches in English, French, Latin or Greek,19 even if it was
acknowledged by a more sophisticated contemporary that he never attained real
facility in any foreign tongue.20 No matter. "Even the French Canadians are not in a
position to criticise my accent as their own is excerable [sic]", Dufferin explained to
91
the Marquis of Lome.
Dufferin's Irish antecedents have frequently been cited as a key to his
character,22 and when in Canada he himself often played them up in speeches, as a
means ofmaking a bridge to Irish-Canadian audiences. At the age of twenty he
visited Skibbereen to see first hand the effects of the Irish famine and conveyed a
grim picture of the suffering in a pamphlet, "Narrative of a Journey from Oxford to
Skibbereen". He followed this up with an anonymous contribution of a thousand
pounds to a relief fund. Dufferin, as an Irish landlord, took a keen interest in the
contentious debate over land reforms in Ireland that followed the appointment of a
select committee in 1865. Dufferin appeared before this committee to argue for
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reforms that would take proper account of improvements made by outgoing tenants,
yet not saddle incoming tenants with onerous obligations. He was adamant,
however, that the landlords' proprietary rights must be upheld. Sensing that
legislation would ultimately undercut his position as a landholder, he began to
dispose ofmost of his holdings in Ireland in the years following 1870, excepting the
environs of his estate at Clandeboye.23
Even as a very young man, Dufferin enjoyed the unquestioning self-
confidence that came with his privileged birth. Access to prominent public figures
was taken for granted. At age twenty, he was presented to King Louis Phillipe while
vacationing in France. Five years later, he was granted a long interview with the
Pope. "I told him the truth about Ireland", the young man breezily asserted.24 In
1850, with his elevation to the UK peerage as Baron Clandeboye, he took his seat in
the House of Lords and began to establish a reputation as a speaker.25 As a young
man of twenty-three, Dufferin was appointed lord-in-waiting to Queen Victoria,
under Lord John Russell's ministry, although the Queen reportedly thought him
"much too good-looking and captivating" for the job. He was also much in demand
in London society, and had occasional difficulties juggling his parliamentary duties
and his social ones. Lady John Russell took pains to warn him that his absence
during important divisions had not passed unnoticed.27 He served as attache to Lord
John Russell's abortive mission to Vienna in 1855 which sought to bring the
Crimean War to an end. This was only the beginning in a string of appointments, of
steadily increasing consequence, which Dufferin would enjoy. He appears to have
made himself agreeable in court circles and established friendships with many
prominent figures in the world of politics and the arts. Dufferin established a minor
literary reputation with the publication of his Letters from High Latitudes, an account
of a voyage to Iceland, Jan Mayen, and Spitzbergen in 1856. As well as enjoying the
patronage of Lord John Russell and Sir James Graham, Dufferin was a personal
friend of the Duke of Argyll, the Marquis of Lome, and the Earl of Carnarvon,
colonial secretary between 1874 and 1878. Among his literary friends were
Tennyson, Dickens, Thackeray, Carlyle, Charles Buller, Macaulay, and Kingsley.
Tennyson wrote a poem to honour Dufferin's service as viceroy of India, enthusing
that his "rule has made the people love/Their ruler".28
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In 1860 and 1861 Dufferin acted as British representative on an international
commission dealing with Syria after the massacre of Christians at Damascus.
Shortly thereafter, he declined the lucrative post of governor of Bombay on the
grounds that the climate would not agree with his mother "from whom I could not
separate".29 Helen Lady Dufferin died in 1867. In 1864 Palmerston appointed
Dufferin lord lieutenant for County Down, as well as under-secretary for India. Two
years later, he shifted to the same position in the war office. Under Gladstone's
administration, Dufferin was in 1868 named chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
and twice chaired Royal Commissions on military and naval affairs. In November
1871 he was advanced in the peerage, and was then known as the Earl of Dufferin.
Dufferin had long wrestled with the question of how he would be best able to make
his mark in life. At age thirty-seven, he lamented to the Duke ofArgyll that "life is
slipping by very fast, and... I have very little to show for the years that are
gone....[U]nless soon I have some opportunity of taking part in affairs, it will be too
late altogether, as after forty, the necessary initiation is almost impossible."30
Although Dufferin dismissed a life devoted to literature as a "lower form of
existence",31 by 1871 he advised Gladstone that he had decided to pour his energies
32into producing "a really good, impartial history of Ireland". Little seems to have
come of this resolution, however, and Dufferin soon afterward expressed his
33
willingness to be considered for the viceroyalty of India. He failed to win the
appointment, however, and was offered the consolation of the governor generalship
of Canada, a post he held from 1872 to 1878. In 1876 Dufferin was made GCMG.
Unlike some predecessors, the governor generalship of Canada was not the crown of
Dufferin's career. He went on to serve as ambassador to Russia in 1879, a post he
was awarded by Beaconsfield, although he had not broken his ties with the Liberal
party.34 This was not, however, the prize he sought. On the renewal of his
appointment by the Liberals in 1880, he grumbled that his years of service in Canada
"might have deserved a better reward than a further term of exile in an Arctic
climate."35 Dufferin was appointed ambassador to Turkey in 1881. In December
1884 Dufferin won the long-sought appointment of viceroy of India, a post he held
until 1888. When Queen Victoria honoured him with promotion to the title of
Marquis, he considered the title Dufferin and Quebec, but was dissuaded and instead
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took the appellation Dufferin and Ava, after the ancient capital of Burma. Dufferin's
career culminated with ambassadorships at Rome (1889-91) and Paris (1891-96) and
the post of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports between 1891 and 1895. Sadly, his
retirement years were marred by the death of his eldest son Lord Ava in the Boer
War and heavy financial losses through imprudent investments. Dufferin's
reputation suffered as well, as he had encouraged others to make similar
investments.36 His health broken by this series of shocks, Dufferin retired to
Clandeboye where he died in February 1902.
On his arrival in Canada, Dufferin quickly established an excellent rapport with
the personable Sir John A. Macdonald, whom he believed was the only one who
07
could lead the House of Commons. He admitted to the colonial secretary that on
one occasion Macdonald had "fetched [a parliamentary] ...adversary a blow in the
face" but dismissed rumours about the Canadian prime minister's drunkenness with
the assurance that he "has now left off anything stronger than tea".38 Dufferin's
correspondence with Macdonald suggests genuine affection. As the 1873 session of
parliament opened, he wrote Macdonald that "my only regret is that I cannot have the
pleasure of watching you handle the ribbons. Everyone seems to agree that your
management of the House is as neat a specimen of good coaching as anyone need
wish to witness."39 Even as the Pacific Scandal broke, relations between the two
men remained cordial; Dufferin clearly expected little to come of the Liberals'
accusations. Macdonald wrote to the governor general to congratulate him on the
safe arrival of "the Young Canadian"—a child for whom he stood godparent—and
joked that the Canadian branch of Dufferin's family, "the Backwoods Blackwoods"
would soon outstrip the older branch.40 Dufferin, for his part, reported to Kimberley
that the "stormy scenes in the House" had resulted in nothing. "I confess I am very
glad that for the present, at all events, there is to be no change in my advisers. Sir
John is by far the ablest public man in Canada, experienced, and as far as I can see
really anxious for the good of the country. He is very agreeable in his manner, and to
me personally most friendly and considerate."41 To Macdonald, Dufferin wrote that
"the unfolding of the drama is quite sensational and in spite of all the annoyance to
which you have been put by this business must have afforded you a good deal of
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amusement." After the initial allegations seemed to have fallen flat, he remarked
that, "now that the rocket has exploded at the wrong end I suppose we shall not hear
much more of the business".42
The Pacific Scandal came to light in a quiet way which belied the political
upheaval it would wreak.43 Early in April 1873, Lucius Seth Huntington, a Liberal
member of parliament, rose in the House to allege that Sir Hugh Allan and a group of
his American colleagues, in anticipation of being awarded the contract to construct
the Canadian Pacific Railway, had advanced large sums ofmoney to support the
election campaigns of key Conservative ministers. Huntington's motion for a
committee of inquiry was defeated, no evidence was produced, and neither
Macdonald, nor any of his colleagues, made any immediate comment on the
allegations. The next day, however, Macdonald announced plans for a committee of
inquiry. Two members of the committee were to be Liberals: Edward Blake and A.A
Dorion. Mackenzie, along with other opposition members, argued that evidence
taken by the committee should be under oath, and also insisted that the committee
should continue to sit after the House was prorogued, since such would not normally
be the case. An Oaths Bill was consequently introduced, and Dufferin gave the
measure Royal Assent early in May. Dufferin confided to Kimberley that
Macdonald had expressed doubts about the legality of the Oaths Bill with a view,
Dufferin suspected, to delaying any investigation, but "he did not like the odium of
appearing to throw any impediment in the way of this inquiry and prefers to shelter
himself behind my throne".44 The governor general consulted privately with
constitutional expert Alpheus Todd and decided to consent to the bill at once on his
own authority. "Delay would have been very prejudicial", he told Kimberley. "Had
I referred the Bill home it would immediately been promulgated all over the country
that I had done so at... [Macdonald's] instigation, even though such would not have
been the fact".45 After meeting on 5 May, the committee decided to adjourn until 2
July, if parliament was still sitting at that date, since neither Sir George-Etienne
Cartier nor J.J.C. Abbott were in Canada to testify. Dufferin recalled that "early in
May" Macdonald suggested to him that, since it was generally understood that a
prorogation would dissolve any sitting committees, the House be simply adjourned
until a date which would allow enough time for the committee to complete its
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investigation. Dufferin agreed that 13 August was a suitable date for prorogation.46
He understood that this was in accordance with the wishes of the House, and
received no addresses to the contrary. On 15 May, Huntington made his allegations
more specific: he had letters to prove that the Conservative ministers had accepted
$360,000 from Sir Hugh Allan. Macdonald protested against any disclosures in the
House of Commons, and the Speaker prevented Huntington from reading the letters
aloud.47 On the very same day, Dufferin learned that the Law Officers of the Crown
48 i •
had declared Canada's Oaths Bill to be ultra vires. While the decision was based
on technical grounds, it would provide fodder for Liberal suspicions that Dufferin
and the imperial government wished to protect the apparently corrupt Conservatives.
More bad news arrived days later, in the form of a cable announcing the sudden
death in London of Macdonald's French Canadian lieutenant, George-Etienne
Cartier. Cartier had been at the centre ofHuntington's allegations, yet Macdonald
proposed in the House that he be honoured with an elaborate public funeral and
monument. The motion was carried over Alexander Mackenzie's objections 49
Following the disallowance of the Oaths Bill, Macdonald, with Dufferin's
approval, offered to convert the committee of inquiry into a royal commission, which
would have the power to examine witnesses under oath. Blake and Dorion rejected
this proposal, complaining that a royal commission would be appointed by, and
answerable only to, the executive—as Blake put it, "subject to the direction and
control of the accused."50 Blake and Dorion proposed continuing the committee in
its existing form, relying upon unsworn testimony. The other three members of the
committee rejected this idea, and voted to adjourn until 13 August.51
On the following day—4 July—the Montreal Herald and the Toronto Globe
began to print correspondence which brought more details of the scandal into the
open.52 While the published letters and telegrams showed that Cartier and Macdonald
had actively solicited funds from Sir Hugh Allan, the correspondence also seemed to
show that Macdonald had contradicted Cartier's intimation to Allan that the
government would award his company the railway contract. "Instead of damaging
the Government", Dufferin explained to Kimberley, "this move turned out very much
for their advantage, for although the letters proved Sir Hugh Allan to be both an ass
and a rogue, they contained nothing which criminated Macdonald." Dufferin
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admitted nonetheless that "all this business fills me with great anxiety". He would,
he explained, consider it "a great misfortune both for myself and for the country if
Sir John were to be turned out". In any case, Dufferin had little faith in the
opposition. "I scarcely see", he wrote, "who are the people to replace him".53
Relations between the governor general and prime minister continued to be
warm. Macdonald had proved to be co-operative when Dufferin complained of the
inadequacy of his salary and allowances, and added $ 5,000 to the budget to defray
Dufferin's expenses for heating and lighting Rideau Hall.54 By the end of July,
Dufferin wrote to Macdonald from Halifax to reassure him that the printed
correspondence had not shaken his confidence, but did put the government in a more
difficult position. Perhaps, he suggested, both the committee and parliament should
be kept alive, in order that the committee might make its report. Another
adjournment of six weeks, or possibly two months, would accomplish this. Under
the circumstances, he added, he did not think a prorogation until February 1873
would be desirable. "In saying this I again wish to assure you that I do not for a
moment doubt the result—in fact it is my confidence in that result that induces me to
urge upon you the advisability both of forwarding the inquiry, and of taking the
verdict of Parliament upon it at the earliest opportunity." He reminded Macdonald
that "I address you as one of your warmest friends and sincerest admirers".55
Dufferin was more frank with the colonial secretary. "We are in a devil of a
mess here", he admitted, "and my position is not to be envied". The latest
correspondence published seemed "most ominous and suspicious".56 Macdonald's
telegram asking for ten thousand dollars, Cartier's letter promising his best efforts to
secure Allan the charter, and Sir Hugh Allan's own affidavit all combined to paint a
very black picture. Macdonald was absent in Riviere du Loup and Dufferin did not
hear from him for some time, although he did hear rumours that the prime minister
was "constantly drinking" and even one "dastardly report" that he had committed
suicide.57
Macdonald at last recovered himself sufficiently to write Dufferin a long
letter. He had been, he said, "enjoying the sea breezes" when he was notified about
the new letters that appeared in the Montreal Herald. After meeting with colleagues,
he decided to ask his excellency to appoint a commission. Judges Day and Gowan
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would be good choices, he urged, and he had already written private notes to them to
see if they would be willing to serve. Macdonald admitted that the published Cartier
letter "took us all by surprise" but maintained that when all of the other documents
were produced, a satisfactory explanation would result. The absence of any
centralised electoral fund made it impossible to say what Allan might have
subscribed in Quebec, but his assistance in Ontario was confined to legitimate loans
which were entirely unconnected to the railway charter, the prime minister insisted.
Macdonald further denounced Blake and Dorion's conduct in refusing a commission
as "unworthy". Reluctant to participate in an enquiry which would bring the facts
into the open, they instead seized upon a "flimsy excuse" to continue to "excite
general prejudice by feeding the public mind from time to time with garbled
extracts". Now, he understood, they were attempting to rally together members of
the opposition for the sitting of the House on 13 August. The Liberals' strength was
almost entirely confined to Quebec and Ontario, he explained, whereas many of his
supporters would have already dispersed to more distant parts of the country.
Macdonald had understood that the meeting on 13 August was to be "merely
formal", without the necessity of distant members attending. Even Dufferin himself
had not planned to return from his tour of the Maritimes, intending to use a deputy to
perform the prorogation in his stead. It would be impossible for distant
Conservatives to return to Ottawa in time to frustrate this Liberal tactic, Macdonald
warned; the opposition would be certain of a majority. Even now, the Liberals were
preparing petitions to influence Dufferin, Macdonald had heard. "I have no doubt
however as to the course Your Excellency will take as a matter of justice to the
Government and in fulfillment of the pledge to Parliament when the adjournment
was agreed to".58
Dufferin agreed to Macdonald's request for a commission.59 Deciding that it
was not fair to the prime minister that he be absent "at this critical conjuncture of
affairs", Dufferin advised Macdonald that he was returning to Ottawa. He reassured
him "that it is my desire to give you in these anxious circumstances a loyal and
generous support to assist you with my best advice and to observe the principles of
the Constitution up to the furthest limit consistent with my own personal honour and
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conscientious convictions". Further discussion should be withheld until they could
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meet.
To Kimberley, Dufferin explained his personal dilemma. He well understood
Macdonald's reasons for adhering to the original plan to have parliament prorogued
on 13 August, even though new revelations made "the aspect of affairs at
present...very different" from when Dufferin agreed to the plan. He expected that
Macdonald would tell him that if he attempted a motion for adjournment he would
face an adverse vote, but wondered if he would not be able to negotiate an
arrangement himself with the opposition "under the threat of prorogation as the
alternative". In that event, however, the interval before parliament reassembled
should only be such to allow the commission to do its work. The case against the
government was strong, he confessed, and he did not think they should try to escape
facing parliament. But he was concerned that a refusal of prorogation would
guarantee their defeat, since it was physically impossible for distant Conservative
members to attend. I know, Dufferin, explained, "that I am not sent here in order
that the Colonial Office may have the trouble and responsibility of governing Canada
from Downing Street". Even so, if his "imperfect exposition" reached Kimberley
before the 13th, he would be most grateful to receive private and confidential advice
by telegram.61
Meanwhile, Dufferin was receiving plenty of unsolicited advice from other
quarters. Lady Dufferin wrote home that "the papers are advising the Governor-
General, and abusing him in advance, if he does not follow each of their different
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counsels". The Grip seemed to sympathise with Dufferin's plight, characterising
him in a political cartoon as a hapless traveller besieged by cabmen, each urging him
to go to a different hotel.63 The Liberal Globe was among Dufferin's most vocal
critics, denouncing prorogation as a "gross... insult to the representatives of the
people" and a "deliberate contempt of the requirements of public justice and public
morality". The idea that prorogation was the governor general's "wish" was
ridiculed, cited as "an excuse for Ministerial wrong-doing". Nothing, it asserted,
"could be more calculated to lessen the respect and veneration the office of the
Viceroy of the Sovereign everywhere inspires".64 In the following weeks, the Globe,
and other opposition newspapers, continued to tender advice to the governor general.
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While allowing that "he is bound by the principals [sic] of constitutional Government
to act on the advice of his responsible advisers... there are admittedly exceptional
cases, and common sense says this must be one of them". Under the present
circumstances, with evidence so weighty, "the position of the Governor-General is
painful, but it should not be embarrassing to a man of clear discernment, sound
judgment, high honour, and a due sense of duty". "Until the prorogation has actually
taken place," the Globe insisted, " we cannot believe that Lord Dufferin will allow
the prerogative entrusted to his keeping ... to be so grievously abused".65 The
following day, under the heading, "The Governor General and Prorogation", the
Globe addressed the subject even more directly. Dufferin was not bound to be
"merely the recording clerk of his Ministers", forced to "lead himself to every
iniquity that they may plan". The governor general had "a large amount of autonomy
and a corresponding degree of responsibility".66 A short time later, the Globe
rejected accusations of disloyalty from those who "would seek to distract attention
and draw it off from the real point at issue". At the same time, it maintained that
"there is no one too high for criticism". The newspaper's record with respect to
representatives of the Queen was defended. "The Globe has never come into
collision with any of the Canadian Governors-General except Lord Metcalfe and Sir
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Edmund Head" it asserted. Criticism ofMetcalfe, who "dreamed of playing rather
the Turkish Satrap than the British Governor" was perfectly defensible, the
newspaper insisted, as was the Globe's characterization of Head as an "unscrupulous
partisan" who was continually meddling. Lisgar was never the subject of censure
"except so far as we expressed our regret at the ambiguity of one speech in which he
seemed to hint that England would be pleased if Canada would go". The Tories, on
the other hand, criticised Monck because he gave them "too few and too poor
dinners", and went so far as to stone Lord Elgin when they disagreed with his policy,
the Globe pointed out.68 During the early days of August 1873 George Brown of the
Globe was in England and availed himself of the opportunity to try to exert some
influence on the colonial secretary. Kimberley agreed to meet with Brown as a
private citizen, rather than opposition member, and assured him that the disallowance
of the Oaths Bill was purely technical and reflected no preference for the
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Conservatives. He refused to speculate about how Dufferin might use his
discretionary powers.69
Dufferin found an opportunity while speaking in Halifax to address the
speculation over his probable actions. He alluded to the fact that he had been in
Canada for only a year, and consequently his character and sentiments would not be
well known. He was adamant that no one claim to be in a position to make any
conjecture about his views. He reminded his audience of his impartiality, and his
insisted that "my only guiding star in the conduct and maintenance ofmy official
relations with your public men is the Parliament of Canada. In fact," he continued,
I suppose I am the only person in the dominion whose faith in the wisdom
and the infallibility of Parliament is never shaken. Each of you, gentlemen,
only believe in Parliament so long as Parliament acts according to your
wishes—and convictions. I, gentlemen, believe in Parliament no matter
which way it votes.
He would give his confidence to those parliament assigned as his responsible
advisers, and "whether they are the heads of this party or of that party must be a
matter of indifference to the Governor General". He acknowledged that he would
have the right to retain personal friendships, and as a "reasonable being" could not
help having views about the merits of various policies, but insisted that these would
be only abstract and would have no effect on his official relations. He would have
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neither political friends nor enemies, and would be indifferent to praise or blame.
Dufferin returned to Ottawa with little time to spare, arriving on the very
day—13 August—that parliament was due to reassemble. He met with Macdonald,
and discussed the one compromise still available. He might be, he said, "the channel
of communication by which an understanding between [Macdonald]... and his
opponents might be arrived at".71 Part of the governor general's role, he said later,
was to "moderate the animosities of party warfare, to hold the balance even between
the contending parties".72 The prime minister rejected this solution: the Liberals
were adamant and were "evincing by unmistakeable signs that they would show no
quarter".73 Dufferin relented, explaining that he did not feel justified in withdrawing
his confidence from his ministers, but insisted that the House should be reconvened
at as early a date as possible. This would make it clear that he was not using
prorogation as a means to help the ministry avoid facing the serious charges made
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against them. The governor general suggested an interval of six or eight weeks, but
at last agreed that ten weeks was permissible.
Dufferin found "unexpectedly" that a deputation ofmembers of parliament
was waiting to confer with him, led by Richard Cartwright.74 The deputation
presented a petition signed by ninety-two members, mostly Liberals but including
twelve ministerialists, praying that His Excellency not prorogue parliament until the
House of Commons had time to take "such steps as it may deem necessary and
expedient".75 The Globe, under the heading "Lord Dufferin's Excuse", reported that
the governor general returned "a very long and argumentative reply".76 He expressed
his regret at the unfortunate delays which had postponed a full enquiry into the
Pacific Scandal, "the more so as they seem to have given rise to the impression that
they have been unnecessarily interposed by the action of the Executive". He
reiterated that the disallowance of the Oaths Bill had been beyond his control. For
him now to refuse to prorogue parliament, he explained, was in essence to dismiss
his ministers from his counsels. He had no guarantee that that was the actual wish of
parliament, especially as those who had signed the memorial did not actually form a
majority. While the documents published in connection to the scandal were very
significant, they did not actually provide proof of guilt. Those assembled today did
not represent a full parliament, and the governor general, as guardian of the federal
rights of the individual provinces, had an obligation to prevent important measures
being decided when distance prevented many of the representatives from more
distant provinces from attending.77
The prorogation was carried out in the stifling heat that August afternoon.78
The moment the speaker took his chair to begin the session, Mackenzie rose to
speak, with Black Rod already visible through the glass doors of the chamber and the
Sergeant-at-Arms already bowing at the speaker's table waiting to announce him.
Black Rod's knocks were unheard over the cries of "privilege, privilege", and loud
cheering and commotion. When the doors opened, members of the public rushed in,
adding to the chaos. It is doubtful if any heard Black Rod's summons to attend the
Senate chamber. Only about thirty-five Conservatives followed the speaker to the
chamber for the prorogation. The other members made their way to a large
committee room for an "indignation meeting" led by Mackenzie.79 Lady Dufferin
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avidly shared the events with her family in Ireland. "The political excitement is
fearful, and we hear that the Opposition is going to ask for the Governor-General's
recall!! So expect us home in disgrace."80
"Lord Dufferin", the Globe reported resignedly,
has, in short, done what the Premier asked him. He has missed a great
opportunity of showing that he had a mind of his own, that he could rise to
the dignity of a great crisis, that he could aid in putting down corruption with
a firm hand. It will be a disappointment to some, but others more familiar
with the past career of Lord Dufferin have not looked for much at his hands.
While calling Dufferin's actions "very indiscreet, very unwise, and morally wrong",
the Globe admitted that they were not unconstitutional, and warned against
transferring the indignation that should be directed toward the ministry toward the
governor general.81
Dufferin's hasty private letter to Kimberley expressed his "hopes I have
pulled through this abominable business better than I had expected". The
government's bitterest enemies admitted that he could not have acted otherwise, he
explained, and "the promise of the re-assembly of Parliament within a short period
89
has had a wonderfully good effect." His public despatch provided exhaustive detail
about every aspect of the case, complete with copies of relevant correspondence. He
took pains, however, to point out that he was referring only to events leading up to
the prorogation, and treated the issue of the commission as a separate matter. He felt
that the effect of prorogation upon the committee in progress was a secondary matter,
"an ill effect with which I had no concern". "However much I might have desired to
do so," he explained, "I could not have treated Parliament as a pregnant woman, and
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prolonged its existence for the sake of the lesser life attached to it." A second
despatch a few days later observed that "my anxieties have been very great, and my
position most embarrassing". He asserted that, as he was "trained in the liberal
school of politics under the auspices of a great champion of Parliamentary rights",
his "political instincts would revolt against any undue exercise of the Crown's
Prerogative". It was better that the governor general be "too tardy in relinquishing
this palladium of colonial liberty, than too rash in resorting to acts of personal
interference".84
With few precedents to guide him, Dufferin was eager to convince himself
and others that he had taken the right course of action. He worried that "people in
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England may get hold of the wrong end of the stick, and look upon my proceedings
as an endeavour to shield a guilty Ministry".85 The Times was quick to condemn the
governor general's actions, although it later reversed its position when more
information was known. There were two matters at issue, Dufferin wrote to
Kimberley in a long and detailed private letter:
the one, —were my Ministers right in advising prorogation? And the other—
If they were wrong—was I right in being guided by their counsels? For of
course it may often happen that Ministers may give questionable advice,
which it may nevertheless be my duty to follow.87
He reminded Kimberley of the reasons for his decision: the distance that prevented
many members of parliament from attending, and the fact that both Cartier's letter
and Macdonald's telegram "are perfectly susceptible of explanation". Even if
Macdonald were ultimately found guilty, Dufferin speculated, his own reasons would
still hold good. On the other hand, "if after any dismissal of him, he were brought
back to power whitewashed and triumphant on a wave of reaction, my position
would become a very false one". Dufferin apologised for writing such a long letter,
but explained that "I have been very much bored and worried; and it is vexatious
being dragged into such a dirty quarrel". "When the time arrives for doing so", he
ventured, "if it should be decided that I was right in assenting to prorogue I shall be
anxious for a Despatch to that effect".88 The colonial secretary explained that he had
not offered any guidance because Dufferin's letter had not reached Downing Street
until 20 August, "too late to telegraph you". He abstained now from expressing any
opinion, but assured Dufferin that this did not imply he disapproved, only that he was
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not in a position to form an opinion. A week later, he was prepared to venture that,
while he could not yet answer Dufferin's despatch on the prorogation issue, "I will
say at once... that my impression is that having a choice of difficulties you acted
rightly".90 Some time later, Dufferin suggested to Kimberley that an official
despatch might be sent "deprecating the introduction of the Governor General into
the political contentions of the day unless he has been really guilty of some
unconstitutional act or shows some symptoms of partisanship from both of which
accusations I have been exonerated".91 A cable received from the Colonial Office
supporting the expedient of a Commission "relieves my mind of great anxiety,"
Dufferin explained, "as the business in which I have been engaged has been very
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disagreeable. There is scarcely any precedent for such a situation. I had nobody to
consult, and the very men who were bound to advise me were those most interested
in cajoling me into some false move."92
Dufferin also unburdened himself by discussing the situation with other
correspondents. Perhaps the most significant of these was Canadian constitutional
expert Alpheus Todd. Immediately after the prorogation had been carried out,
Dufferin sought Todd's approval for his actions. He further solicited Todd's view on
the reply he had given to the members of parliament who had addressed him that
day.93 The governor general expressed his gratitude for Todd's "very able and
cogent" memorandum on these questions, and sought further discussion of the matter
of his issue of a commission of inquiry. Dufferin explained his actions, pointing out
that he felt some sense of responsibility as an imperial officer, since Britain had
financial liability with respect to the railway funds. He was concerned that the
opposition, once they achieved their political goal of ousting the Conservatives from
office, would let the matter drop and not actively pursue an inquiry. He asserted his
prerogative right as the representative of the crown to initiate an inquiry, but
indicated that if Todd had any remarks to make "I should be very glad to be
instructed". Recognising that his consultation with Todd was at least unusual, and at
most improper, Dufferin was adamant that Todd should "not allow anyone to know
that we are in correspondence", and took the precaution of requesting that his letter
be returned.94 During the autumn of 1873 Dufferin enjoyed a visit from George
Brodrick, an English acquaintance, who appears to have acted as a kind of sounding
board. Dufferin shared all the details of the scandal with his guest, and seemed to be
especially glad to have someone to whom he could complain of all the abuse he had
suffered in the press. Dufferin vented his frustration over Goldwin Smith, in
particular, who "seems to have a notion that by rising in my wrath, and striking down
Macdonald, I could have purified the political atmosphere once and forever".
Smith's view, Dufferin conceded, was "one very natural to a man of his vehement
temper".95 Just as he had with Todd, Dufferin took pains to ensure that his written
communications with Brodrick should remain secret. He instructed him to "burn this
rigamarole [sic]" when he finished reading it.96 Dufferin entertained a number of
English visitors that autumn, and it is clear that he discussed matters with them, and
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relied upon their impressions about the parliamentary debates once the session
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opened. In one of his frequent letters to Judge Day about the ongoing commission,
Dufferin cited "a very intelligent English gentleman a lawyer and publicist of great
eminence who is staying with me" to support his ideas about the nature of the
commission.98
Despite his insistence on impartiality and his need to dissociate himself from
the actions of his ministers, Dufferin evidently struggled with his own ambivalent
feelings toward Macdonald. While the commission was in progress, the governor
general sought more details about recent events from Macdonald, in order that he
could provide Kimberley with as much background as possible. He was especially
anxious to receive the prime minister's explanation for his telegrams and Carder's
letter "for the satisfaction of the Imperial Government". He assured Macdonald that
he looked forward with eager expectation "to your vindicating yourself from the
aspersions by which you have been assailed. When you shall have come out of this
ordeal with your character cleared from these damnable accusations there will set in
a glorious reaction in your favour, or I much mistake the generosity of our
Canadians."99 Dufferin let Kimberley know that he had asked Macdonald for "a
written explanation of these damnable documents to which he has been ass enough to
put his signature". He confessed to the colonial secretary that he had seen signs of
the return of the "old weakness" in Macdonald, but allowed that "it is marvelous how
he can pull himself together when occasion requires it, and with what pluck, good
temper, and confidence he meets all these emergencies".100 It is evident, however,
that Dufferin was beginning to experience doubts. He still was not satisfied with the
information that he had available to send to the Colonial Office. "If you are in a
position to state that you were unaware of Allan having contributed such large sums
to Carrier's own election", he urged Macdonald, "it would be well to add that effect
in your letter to me". Even while he pressed for a "frank explanation", he explained
that he would not be able to act as Macdonald's advocate with Kimberley, since that
"would of course destroy my trustworthiness in his eyes".101
By early October, the colonial secretary was able to provide Dufferin with the
reassurance he sought with respect to his own actions. His carefully worded
despatch thanked the governor general for his "clear and able statements" about
184
Huntington's charges and the prorogation of parliament. The despatch scrupulously
avoided offering any opinion on the conduct of Dufferin's ministers, but declared
that Her Majesty's government "fully approve your having acted in these matters in
accordance with constitutional usage".102 Privately, Kimberley confirmed this view.
He allowed that he had some doubts about the necessity of Dufferin issuing a royal
commission: "I do not see why a bill should not have been brought in appointing a
Commission and naming the Commissioners". Nevertheless, Dufferin's conduct was
"perfectly constitutional", and he fully approved of the governor general's careful
dissociation of himself from his ministers in his official despatches. He observed
that while it was tempting to act on one's own opinion, "once the Gov[erno]r General
comes forward beyond the limits of his constitutional prerogatives, the whole
machine would get out of gear". This was even more true of the Imperial
government, he noted, recalling that he had explained to George Brown that any
interference on the part of the colonial secretary in Canadian politics would "have a
prejudicial effect".103
Reflecting back on his decision two months after the prorogation, Dufferin
acknowledged that under some circumstances a different course of action might have
been appropriate. "Had there really been", he mused to Kimberley, "on the side of
the Opposition an honest set of men capable of forming a strong Government I might
perhaps have been tempted to have forced the situation a little more". The
Conservative ministry undoubtedly deserved punishment "but it did not seem to me
desirable to run any risk for the sake of making Mackenzie Prime Minister. Though
I like him personally he is a poor creature". Lest Kimberley harbour any
reservations, Dufferin reminded him that "with you the clear light of day is shining
upon the intricacies of a channel which I had to traverse in a very dim twilight, with
the assistance of lights which were often intentionally misleading".104 He was still
stung by the fact that he was being widely criticised in the British press, and worried
about the consequent impression that was being formed of his actions at home. "The
information obtained by the English newspapers is so polluted with misstatements
that I have not a fair chance", he complained.105
The prorogation, of course, did not put an end to Dufferin's dilemma. The
commission was due to make its report in mid-October, and parliament was to
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reassemble on the twenty-third. As the middle of October drew near, Dufferin
appears to have been in a very restless state, knowing that some action might be
required, but unwilling to act prematurely. He composed lengthy private letters to
Kimberley almost daily. He knew that there would be no time to receive
instructions, "but it is rather a relief to me talking to you on paper".106 He drafted a
lengthy confidential memorandum outlining the facts of the case, but decided
immediately after sending it that it had "too much the air of pleading the case of the
Government which is very far from my desire". He asked Kimberley to destroy it
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and substitute it with the new version he was sending. Dufferin decided that even
if he were to adopt most extreme course he would "not feel justified in stirring" until
he had carefully gone over the evidence and conferred with the commissioners. But
the best course, he thought, would be to avoid taking any action until parliament met,
unless Macdonald resigned in the meantime, which seemed unlikely. "The idea of
my immediate intervention does not seem to have occurred to anyone", he reported
with obvious relief, and it would be "better that Ministers should fall by a vote in
Parliament than by an act ofmy authority. The question is will they fall?" The
Conservatives seemed very confident of their majority, and some of the Liberal
conduct of late—the stolen correspondence, the rumours of Macdonald's suicide—
would surely have cost the opposition some support.108 Despite his personal
fondness for Macdonald, it is undeniable that Dufferin's position would be made
more difficult if the Conservatives were not immediately defeated in the House.
"[I]f the Government creep through with a small majority what am I to do?" Dufferin
asked Kimberley. While he closed his letter with the caveat that "you must take it
more as a soliloquy than anything else", the question was not entirely rhetorical.109
Almost immediately after this, Dufferin found "the conviction was forcing
itself strongly and more strongly upon my mind" that the Conservatives' position had
become indefensible. He met with the Commissioners on 14 October and, when
sitting face to face with the evidence, came to the conclusion that he must speak with
Macdonald and "put him upon his guard".110 Professing that "it is with greater pain
than ever I did anything in my life", Dufferin warned the prime minister that he
might not be able to count on his continued support. He addressed him not as the
governor general, but as a "warm and sincere friend" and expressed his fear that he
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may ultimately have to sacrifice his personal inclinations to his duty to the sovereign.
Irrespective of his personal attachment, Dufferin insisted, he still maintained that
there was "no one in the Country capable of administering its affairs to greater
advantage than yourself'. He praised Macdonald's ability, patriotism, integrity and
statesmanship. Dufferin's letter did not ask for the prime minister's resignation but
ominously concluded that Macdonald's personal connection with the events of the
scandal "cannot but fatally affect your position as Minister".111 During the "most
painful" interview that followed, Macdonald conducted himself with "great dignity,
courtesy and self-control". He told the governor general that his first impulse upon
receiving the letter had been to offer his resignation, but Dufferin insisted that he had
not met with Macdonald in order to dismiss him and that he had a right and a duty to
meet parliament. Dufferin let him know that if he were sustained by a large majority
in the House, he would accept the verdict of parliament; his written warning applied
only to a contingency of "his pulling through with the skin of his teeth".112
Dufferin's confidence in his decision was shaken, however, with the receipt
of Kimberley's private letter of 6 October the following night. The colonial
secretary had asserted that "even had they (the 'accusations') been proved, it would
be the province of the Dominion Parliament to decide whether its confidence must be
withdrawn from them (the Ministers)". Dufferin now became convinced that he had
overstepped the limits of his role in writing to Macdonald, and he requested another
interview. Without explaining the precise terms of Kimberley's communication,
Dufferin told him that the colonial secretary had given him to understand "that I was
more straitened by the voice of Parliament than I had imagined myself to be", and
that he should consider his letter of warning "as in some degree cancelled".113
The opening of parliament on 23 October did not bring any immediate relief
for Dufferin's anxiety. As the constitutional ruler, he was barred from attending the
Commons to hear the debates, and could only rely on information provided by his
prime minister and newspaper reports which he found "quite untrustworthy".114 His
discomfort with this state of enforced ignorance led Dufferin to make the astonishing
suggestion to Macdonald that he find a place to hide so that he could listen to the
debates in secret. "Some little closet for me in the House of Commons from whence I
could hear what was going on" would solve the problem, he suggested.115 He
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acknowledged Macdonald's objections to his presence where anyone could notice
him, but argued that the utmost he wanted was a closet, "no matter how dark or
inconvenient within the House".116 Macdonald, with his usual tact, was able to
dissuade Dufferin from pursuing this idea. He invited Dufferin to imagine what sort
of objections the opposition might manufacture, and what insults to the crown they
would be capable of. Some "truculent blackguards in the House" would "like
nothing better than the chance of snubbing the Sovereign", he warned, feigning just
the right tone of outrage.117 Instead, from the time parliament opened, Lady
Dufferin, the staff of Government House, and various visitors gathered each night in
the Speaker's gallery to watch the proceedings. A contemporary observer reported
that "rumours were current that His Excellency was sitting in the public gallery
disguised. It was generally believed that Lord Dufferin was capable of taking such a
risk."118
Dufferin was concerned that the debates in the House would focus on the
question of prorogation and the commission, rather than the main question of the
Conservative ministers taking money from Allan. This might bring the Commons
into conflict with the governor general and the Imperial government, he feared. If
full information was available about the process behind Dufferin's decision, the
opposition "would be forced to abandon this mode of assault", he reasoned, and the
"numberless fables" being propagated by the Liberals could be contradicted. For this
reason, Dufferin decided to present to parliament his despatches to and from the
Colonial Office on the subjects of prorogation and the commission. He happily
reported to Kimberley that this tactic seemed to have worked and " Mr. Mackenzie
moved yesterday a direct vote of censure upon the Government for the taking of
money from Allan".119
The debate raged for several days. Sir Charles Tupper provides a vivid, if
unbalanced, account in his memoirs of events surrounding what he called the
"Pacific Slander".120 According to Tupper, when debates over Mackenzie's
resolution were under way, Dufferin sent for Macdonald and asked for his
resignation. Tupper reported that he himself advised the governor general that he
had "made a fatal mistake in demanding Sir John's resignation". He would make
himself "the head of the Liberal party.... If Her Majesty would tomorrow undertake
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what you have done she might lose her throne". Dufferin allegedly asked Tupper
what he would recommend, and was told that the Colonial Office should be cabled.
"The result of that interview", Tupper boasted, "was that Sir John was aroused from
his bed at two o'clock in the morning and notified that Lord Dufferin had recalled his
decision."121
Dufferin's correspondence contains no direct reference to such an interview,
although Kimberley's personal letter to Dufferin on 29 October adds some credence
to the story. Kimberley alluded to Dufferin's "telegram asking me to instruct you
whether you should dismiss your Ministers" if they were saved by only a small
majority. Kimberley, while tempted to "rule the destinies of four millions of people
without having to leave one's comfortable armchair at home", admitted that it would
be a "grievous mistake... [to] take upon myself one of the most important, indeed I
may say the most important of the functions of the Governor General". It would
become known that Dufferin had been instructed by the Imperial government, and he
would appear to be "a mere tool of Downing Street". The decision was Dufferin's
alone. "We shall be sure to give you all possible support", Kimberley wrote
reassuringly, "unless... you made some egregious blunder".122
Dufferin could only wait to see what the fate of his ministers would be, and if
the course of events would demand further action from him. Lady Dufferin provided
the day by day accounts of proceedings in parliament.123 The speeches were
"enormously long"—three to four hours on average—"but none were either talented
or brilliant"; the effect was more that of "blundering rustics trying to beat out each
others brains with bludgeons".124 Macdonald appeared weak and demoralised,
despite his "resort to stimulants", and, to the chagrin of his colleagues, refused to
speak. Day by day Conservative support melted away. Macdonald at last explained
to Dufferin that he had remained silent because he feared Blake was waiting to
deliver a final coup de grace, perhaps some hitherto undisclosed document by
Cartier. On 4 November "all my ladies went as usual to hear the debate, leaving me
at home", Dufferin reported to Kimberley, when at last Macdonald spoke in the
House. A minor speech early in the day had filled the prime minister's supporters
with apprehension. He was obviously tipsy, made several blunders, and "said
exactly the wrong thing". Yet when he rose again three hours later, "pale, haggard,
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[and] looking as though a feather would knock him down", he electrified the House
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with his oration.
While Dufferin half hoped for a quick defeat of his Conservative ministers
that would obviate the need for any controversial action on his part, he found much
to admire in Macdonald's eleventh hour redemption. "Round the breakfast table at
Rideau this morning there was a continuous chorus of admiration from all my
English friends", Dufferin told Macdonald. Lady Dufferin came home from the
debates at three in the morning "brimful of your speech". She "was pleased to keep
me awake from 3 to 5, repeating it with appropriate action". Dufferin sent an
account of the climatic events to the colonial secretary, who confessed that it "takes
one's breath almost away". Macdonald, Kimberley commented wryly, "should have
lived in the good old times of two bottle men, when one of the duties of the Secretary
to the Treasury is said to have been to hold his hat on occasion for the convenience
127of the First Lord when 'clearing himself for his speech".
Despite Macdonald's valiant last stand, his political downfall was hardly in
question. The day after his impassioned defence in the House, his anticipated
majority having evaporated, he called upon Dufferin to tender his resignation.
Dufferin's relief was evident. He felt sorry about how things ended, he confessed to
Kimberley, but "was very glad... that Sir John should not have dragged his party
through the dirt and committed them... to an approval of his own indefensible
proceedings".128 Kimberley agreed that "it must be a great relief to you that the
immediate crisis is over" and congratulated Dufferin on "having steered so
successfully through the troubled waters". He admitted that he would have
considered it a "great misfortune" if the Conservatives had clung to office, and had
entertained some doubts after receiving Dufferin's despatch of 3 November. It
seemed to him that the governor general might have been exposing himself to
19Q
criticism by making too good a defence for his ministers. Fortunately for Dufferin
the point was now moot.
Dufferin sent for Mackenzie, telling him that his accession to office under
such circumstances was "both legitimate and honourable, and far more satisfactory"
than if it had taken place as a result of any refusal by Dufferin to prorogue parliament
on 13 August. He could now be assured that he had become prime minister "not
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through any unfair advantage nor by the vote of a packed House, nor through the
premature condemnation of men who have been given no opportunity of making
their defence", nor by any intervention by the governor general.130 After many
weeks of anxiety, and occasional temptations to precipitate action, Dufferin was now
vindicated. His new prime minister still regarded him with caution, however.
Dufferin reported to Kimberley that Mackenzie, having formed his cabinet, asked
him to prorogue parliament at once. Dufferin protested that this was usually done by
the governor general in state, and that there was hardly time for him to send for his
uniform. He suggested an adjournment until Monday when the prorogation
ceremony could be properly performed. Mackenzie replied that he feared that if a
motion for adjournment was made, Macdonald might propose some disastrous
amendment and bring down the new government before it was properly in place.
Dufferin was amused by the "exact reproduction or rather parody" of the
conversation he had had with Macdonald on the thirteenth, and could not help saying
to Mackenzie "why you seem... as little inclined to trust those people now as they
were to trust you then". Mackenzie's response, he noted, was "a grim laugh",
although he did agree to an adjournment.131
With the first major crisis of his viceregal term over, Dufferin felt the need to
reflect on events. In retrospect he was glad that he had had no specific direction
from Downing Street.
Government seems to me very much a matter of instinct,—like steering a
ship, or handling a horse, and it is only the person whose hand is in
immediate contact with the rein or the rudder, that can exactly accommodate
his action to the shifting requirements of the situation.132
Dufferin's evident satisfaction with his own success did not prevent him from
seeking reassurance from the only people who could truly understand his late
dilemma: previous governors general. Dufferin had sought advice on the viceregal
role from Lisgar in the past.133 Now, Lisgar reassured Dufferin that "I do not think
any amount of experience could have added to the firmness and discretion with
which you met every emergency. No quality was wanting".134 Lord Monck was also
quick to voice his support, maintaining that he "never... entertained the least doubt
as to the propriety" of Dufferin's course, but only hesitated to write earlier as he was
uncertain of all the facts. The strong vote of support the Conservatives received on
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the question during the first session "determined my judgment that you could not
refuse their advice to prorogue in August", he assured Dufferin. "If you had done so
it would be a virtual dismissal of the administration, and my experience of Canadian
politicians leads me to the conclusion that such an exercise of power on your part
w[oul]d probably have had the effect of consolidating Macdonald's majority and of
forcing him back on you as your Minister."135 Dufferin's position, Monck continued,
was "very much the same" as his own in 1862 "when Macdonald & Cartier resigned,
and Sandfield Macdonald came in with a very slender majority". In addition to
communicating with past governors general, Dufferin shared all the details of the
Pacific Scandal with his eventual successor, the Marquis of Lome, a lifelong friend
and correspondent.137 Months after the event, Dufferin wrote triumphantly to Lome
that "both Mackenzie and his colleagues have made me a very handsome admission
that the Pacific Scandal crisis has been conducted to a far more satisfactory close
than would have been the case, had their own violent counsels of last summer been
followed".138
While interested contemporary observers such as Goldwin Smith and George
Brown condemned Dufferin's action, overall both contemporary and historical
assessments have been positive. By 6 November, The Times pronounced that "the
vindication of Lord Dufferin is complete".139 While Liberal Richard Cartwright
allowed that Dufferin "acted with strict impartiality all through", he found it "evident
that the sympathies of everybody else at Government House were decidedly with Sir
John".140 Alpheus Todd's wholehearted approval ofDufferin's conduct is hardly
surprising;141 nor is that of biographers William Leggo142and Sir Alfred Lyall.143
Arthur Berriedale Keith gave gmdging approval to Dufferin's non-intervention.
Dufferin, he wrote, "claims credit for having decided to allow the pressure of events
in the normal way to determine the outcome. He recognized", he continued,
that he had the power to dismiss, he would have used it had it been essential
as a means to elucidating the facts, but its use would have told against the
opposition, as showing the Government a means of confusing the issue by
raising the cry that the people of Canada were being interfered with by an
. . 144
outsider.
Harold Nicolson asserted that Canadians approved of Dufferin's capacity for taking
decisions on his own, without recourse to Imperial instructions.145 De Kiewiet and
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Underhill noted that Dufferin ably defended his actions in his public despatch, and
maintained that the Liberal opposition eventually came to accept that any criticism
should fall upon the responsible ministers and not the governor general.146 Ben
Forster praised Dufferin's discretion and concluded that he was right in not acting
hastily, although later events showed action might have been warranted.147
In the final analysis, Dufferin acted wisely. Or, more accurately, he was wise
in not acting. He need be judged on his actions alone, and the many doubts he
wrestled with, and sudden impulses he held in check, were fortunately known by
very few. His frantic correspondence with his confidants reveals his insecurity and
discomfort with his role as the crown's silent and aloof constitutional representative.
Dufferin's hand-wringing indecisiveness toward Macdonald, and his ridiculous
suggestion that he hide himself in a closet to hear parliamentary debates suggest that
he came very close indeed to abandoning his proper constitutional position. While
the governor general was, and is, the guardian of constitutional government in a
domestic political crisis like the Pacific Scandal, the fact that Dufferin was a British
appointee complicated matters. Just as Mackenzie King raised the cry in 1926 that
the governor general's refusal of advice was tantamount to imperial interference,
such would have been the perception in this instance. Fortunately for Dufferin, his
inaction was rewarded and parliament pronounced its verdict, sparing him from a
disagreeable duty. The controversy was quickly resolved, the Conservatives, as
Dufferin reported, went "cheerfully into opposition",148 and the conflict over the
propriety of having Canada's constitution safeguarded by an imperial outsider was
postponed for another half century.
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7
"The line over which he must not pass": Dufferin, Edward Blake and the
Establishment of Permanent Letters Patent, 1878
Constitutional history generally focuses on circumstances rather than individuals—
the establishment of precedents, enactment of statutes, and legal interpretations.
Only rarely, it would seem, are personalities a key factor. Yet changes in the office
of Canada's governor general have at times been a direct product of the man who
filled it. One of the best examples of this is the establishment of permanent Letters
Patent for the office in 1878.1 Lord Dufferin, governor general from 1872 to 1878,
had an activist conception of his role. Given the prickly and defensive character of
Edward Blake, the Liberal minister of justice (1875-77), it is not surprising that steps
would be taken to rein in a governor general who did not take a sufficiently forward-
looking view of Canadian constitutional autonomy. It might be argued that the
measures Blake urged, to spell out more clearly the limits of viceregal authority for
Dufferin's successors, were unwittingly inspired by Lord Dufferin himself.
Edward Blake is an intriguing character, insofar as his apparent ability did not
translate into the degree of political success that might have been expected. Called to
the bar in 1856, the Canadian-bom Blake became a successful and wealthy lawyer.
He entered politics in 1867, at the urging of George Brown, and served as a member
of Ontario's provincial legislature and the Dominion parliament simultaneously. He
briefly served as Liberal premier of Ontario in 1871-72. He left provincial politics
and first served as a minister without portfolio in Alexander Mackenzie's Liberal
administration in 1873-74. He made his greatest mark during his short tenure as
minister of justice in 1875-77. Blake's prominence is evidenced by his leadership of
the Liberal party in opposition from 1880 to 1887. Even while Blake was engaged in
politics, he continued his flourishing law practice, and was conspicuous in numerous
high profile constitutional cases. He was lured away from Canadian political affairs
with an invitation to sit in the British House of Commons for the Irish Nationalist
Party in 1892.2
Despite Blake's accomplishments, he was a "signal failure as a politician".3
Regarded by many as the logical choice for the Liberal leadership, Blake cast a long
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shadow over Mackenzie's administration, yet repeatedly declined to lead, or at times
even to join, the cabinet. Dufferin described Blake as "honourable, high-minded"
and "the first Lawyer in Ontario", but also found him "bitter, extremely sensitive,
and apt to allow his passions to warp his .. .judgment". 4 In portraits, Blake appears
to squint through tiny rimless spectacles. It is not surprising to learn that he blamed
his frequent failure to recognise and acknowledge acquaintances on his poor
eyesight.5 A contemporary described Blake as an "exhaustive debater" who feared
making an incorrect statement and dazed his audiences by overloading his speeches
with detail and references to original documents. This tactic understandably failed to
ingratiate Blake with voters. Unlike Macdonald, the "morose" Blake made no effort
to cultivate personal friendships. Macdonald was not a particularly skilled debater,
but—unlike Blake—had the gift of inspiring the loyalty and affection of those close
to him. Macdonald even took pains to congratulate young opposition members on
their maiden speeches, as one Liberal remembered: "I have seen him turn his chair
around and face a struggling fledgling in his vain attempt to rise from earth, and
interject an encouraging 'Hear! Hear!" to the merest platitude, when everybody else
was waiting impatiently for his last words."6 Blake, by contrast, was sarcastic and
caustic, yet so thin-skinned that he was known to dissolve into tears when criticised
by colleagues.7 Physicians ultimately diagnosed Blake's condition as
"neurasthenia", a nineteenth-century term for an ailment whose symptoms included
Q #
headaches, insomnia, exhaustion and nervousness. Raised in an ardently Christian
family, Blake was reputedly troubled by his inability to feel an emotional connection
to God and was encouraged by his mother to believe that the loss of four of his eight
children in infancy was the penalty for his worldliness.9
Blake's attitude toward the British connection was highly ambivalent.
Dufferin acknowledged that Blake was "out of temper with British Domination" after
paying a call to the Colonial Office and finding that the officials did not immediately
know who he was. Worse yet, the under-secretary had attempted to engage him in
pleasant conversation while he waited by expressing his hopes that all was well with
"our friend" Macdonald.10 Naturally, this only reinforced suspicions that British
authorities favoured the Conservatives. Dufferin had earlier worried that Blake
might put himself at the head of the "Canada First" party, and fall into the orbit of
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Goldwin Smith and others who advocated Canadian independence.11 Blake's famous
"Aurora Speech" of October 1874 was a rallying cry for greater autonomy. Citing
the dangers of being dragged into foreign wars on Britain's behalf, and the general
dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Washington, Blake called for the inculcation of a
national spirit—"our share of national rights". Canadians, he reminded his audience,
had "no right to complain" as long as they chose to avoid "the cares, the expenses
and charges" of autonomy.12
While The Times maintained that "the Canadians may think themselves
1
fortunate in attracting so valued a member of English society", Dufferin was just
the sort of character to raise the hackles of those who wished to challenge tacit
assumptions of colonial inferiority. Dufferin's speeches, while good-natured and
amusing, at times betrayed an attitude of breezy superiority. He assured his
audiences that abuse he suffered in the local press was as transitory "as the discipline
applied occasionally to their idol by the unsophisticated worshippers ofMumbo
Jumbo when their harvests are short, or a murrain visits their flock". He would
remain, he insisted, "indifferent to praise or blame".14 Dufferin's lofty position in
British society and intimate friendships with its leaders might well have daunted
even the most self-confident Canadian. D.M.L. Farr has speculated that Dufferin
made the mistake of playing the part of Viceroy of India—a position he sought and
ultimately won—while ostensibly a constitutional ruler in Canada.15 Dufferin's
discomfort with sitting on the sidelines was evident early on in his term of office. He
confided to Carnarvon that, despite the opportunities for travel and good fishing, "I
shall be glad when my term is over. The Governorship of a Colony with
Constitutional advisers does not admit of much real control over its affairs, and I
miss the stimulus of responsibility."16 The combination of characters—a governor
with something of a "white man's burden" conception of Empire, and a leading
member of the Liberal administration eager to assert Canadian autonomy—set the
stage for friction, but also ultimately a clearer definition of Canada's status.
The very process by which the Liberal government came to power contained
the seeds of future conflict. The "Pacific Scandal" arising from allegations of
bribery surrounding the transcontinental railway contract ousted the long-reigning
Conservatives from government. While normally inclined towards activism, during
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this episode Dufferin played the part of a cautious constitutional ruler, refusing to
take any steps to hurry the apparently corrupt Conservatives from office. The
opposition, he allowed, was "very angry with me because I would not let them 'chop
their fox'...but required them to run him fairly to the ground, in a Constitutional
manner".17 Suspicions arose that Dufferin was being cautious not out of respect for
constitutional principles, but because of a Conservative bias. He privately confessed
that "it cut me to the heart, that a career so creditable to himself, and so serviceable
to his Country, as that of Macdonald's should have ended in such humiliation". To
the chagrin of the Liberals, Dufferin accepted the advice of the Conservatives, in the
dying days of their administration, to fill a variety of patronage posts. Upon
assuming office, Mackenzie considered cancelling the appointments, but Dufferin
dissuaded him, excepting those still formally pending.18 Consequently, Mackenzie
was depicted in a Grip cartoon as "The Political Mother Hubbard", with no bones to
throw to his supporters.19 Further, Mackenzie's bid to have the party imbalance in
the Senate corrected with the appointment of six additional Liberal senators was
vetoed by the Colonial Office.20 Dufferin had reservations about the abilities of the
Liberals, describing them as "untried men, new to official life, and some of them
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imperfectly educated". He considered Mackenzie to be "not 'strong enough for the
place'. He is honest, industrious, and sensible but he has very little talent."22 Lady
Dufferin, too, confessed after hosting a dinner for the new ministers that "I am trying
to become a Grit, but I can't quite manage it." Using a skating metaphor, she
complained that getting used to the Liberals "takes me as much time as the outside
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edge backwards". Mackenzie, for his part, had similar qualms about the governor
general. He wondered at what lapse of judgement had led Dufferin to ask
Macdonald "the drunken debauchee" to be godfather to his child24, and predicted that
his new administration would have to
take some steps to define their position and that of Parliament. With a man of
so little prudence and so much vanity there is no safety without laying down
the line over which he must not pass. Parliament is at present in the humour
to assert its privileges and teach him a lesson.25
Mackenzie's words were prophetic. The rocky beginnings of the Liberal
administration, complicated by the clash of personalities, set the stage for a
protracted process of constitutional wrangling. The mutual distrust that tainted
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Dufferin's relations with his ministers, and the ongoing stress of the unresolved
conflict with British Columbia, added another layer of difficulty to the process.
The tensions arising from the Dominion government's unfulfilled obligations
to British Columbia are an important backdrop to Dufferin's term, and do much to
explain the climate in which Edward Blake was working. In seeking to define
clearly the limits of the governor general's duties, Blake could hardly have dismissed
from his mind his own struggle with Dufferin over fair treatment for British
Columbia. It is little wonder that Blake would make it his personal project to see
permanent Letters Patent established that would not trust to nebulous convention, but
more precisely spell out the constitutional limits of the governor's role.
British Columbians had grounds for apprehension as the Liberals were swept
into office in the wake of the Pacific Scandal. Mackenzie had already intimated that
his railway policy would be more cautious and cost-conscious than that of the
expansive Macdonald. Yet Mackenzie was mindful of the fact that a commitment
had been made, and that any deviation from it would require the approval of British
Columbia, along with adequate compensation. Early in 1874, the Liberal
administration sent an emissary, J.D. Edgar, to British Columbia to negotiate new
terms. The proposed terms called for a coach road and telegraph line initially, with a
railway to the west coast to be commenced within three years of union, but no
completion date named. One and a half million dollars was to be spent annually on
railway building, and a line from Esquimalt to Nanaimo on Vancouver Island was to
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be built immediately. These new terms were rejected out of hand.
Dufferin had been keeping the new secretary of state for the colonies, Lord
Carnarvon, apprised of the growing strain between the Dominion government and
British Columbia. Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, the fourth Earl of Carnarvon,
had earlier expressed his gratitude at having "an old friend like yourself in Canada"
and invited Dufferin to write "fully & unreservedly" to him, "not only as Secretary of
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State but as y[ou]rs most truly & sincerely". Dufferin favoured private letters as
well, since "even [in] a confidential Despatch one has to be so much less frank and
open."28 Both men had passed through the usual hatcheries of aristocrats in the
service of the Empire—Eton and Christ Church, Oxford—although not at the same
time; Carnarvon was five years younger. Carnarvon had briefly been under-secretary
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for the colonies in 1858-59, and, as secretary of state for the colonies in Derby's
administration, had steered the British North America Act through the House of
Lords. Carnarvon had a reputation for indecisiveness; Disraeli called him
"Twitters".29 In March 1874, Dufferin confided to Carnarvon that it would be
impossible to complete the railway according to the original schedule, and with the
collapse of the charter organised by the Conservatives, "the whole undertaking has to
be re-organized on a new basis".30 Two months later, he warned that a settlement
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with British Columbia "seems further off than when I last wrote".
Carnarvon took alarm quickly at the prospect of disharmony in the Dominion.
In June, he received a written protest from the government of British Columbia
which gave rise to a "grave apprehension... that... we may easily drift into a very
serious difficulty". He discussed the matter with Richard Cartwright, Canada's
finance minister, who was then visiting London, but found Cartwright non¬
committal. While Dufferin enjoyed a fishing holiday away from Ottawa, Carnarvon
impulsively cabled a message to Mackenzie offering to arbitrate in the dispute.
While Carnarvon showed every sign ofwishing to plunge himself headlong into the
emerging colonial dispute, Mackenzie's response to the offer was, in the colonial
secretary's words, "of the curtest description".33 Dufferin, upon his return, expressed
to Carnarvon his wish that he had been in Ottawa to induce Mackenzie to adopt "a
different complexion to his answer, as the poor man never dreamt of adopting a
disrespectful tone".34 It is tempting to speculate that Dufferin may have also
regretted that his absence denied him the opportunity of restraining Carnarvon's
enthusiasm, or of testing the waters first to see how his administration might receive
an offer of arbitration. His communication with Carnarvon when he learned of what
had transpired was a model of tact. He assured his chief that public opinion in
British Columbia had become more favourable and that Mackenzie had learned to
temper his "rash expressions". Things were not, therefore, quite as alarming as they
might have seemed. Mackenzie, Dufferin explained, wanted to arrive at a solution
without "having immediate recourse to your good offices". This would be "more
creditable to him as a Minister than were he forced to acknowledge himself incapable
of dealing with the difficulty, by a recurrence to your assistance". Mackenzie had
also expressed fears that hopes of Imperial arbitration might have given rise to
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"extravagant hopes" of compensation on the part of British Columbians. "[A]ll they
seem to have meant by their clumsy telegram", Dufferin insisted, "was, not that they
were indisposed to take advantage of your very friendly and considerate offer, but
that they thought the time had scarcely arrived for troubling you on the subject". If
his government found that they were mistaken, and that the thing was not "settling
itself', "they will undoubtedly be only too anxious to appeal to your assistance".35
Dufferin's next communication with Carnarvon suggests that he may have
twisted Mackenzie's arm a little. He assured the colonial secretary that prime
minister "intends to ask your good offices towards the settlement of the dispute,
should it assume a more formidable character than he originally anticipated". This
was to be accompanied by an expression of Mackenzie's "appreciation of your
kindness and solicitude in undertaking a troublesome and obnoxious duty, for the
purpose of helping himself and his Government out of a difficulty".36 Less than one
week later, Dufferin wrote that, as he had already intimated, "my Government
expresses its willingness to submit to your arbitrament [sic] the question as to
whether or no they have failed or are failing to meet their engagements with British
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Columbia so far as the circumstances of the case admit". While the difference may
be subtle, this sounds as if the Mackenzie government merely wanted the colonial
secretary to endorse their existing railway policy—a policy Dufferin was convinced
was "fair and reasonable".38 This would presumably put an end to any more
expansive hopes on the part of British Columbians. It was also quite a different thing
than weighing both sides of the issue and working out a compromise between them,
which is how Carnarvon appears to have visualised his role. "If a deus ex machina is
absolutely required, I shall be quite content to step down on to the scene & do my
best", he offered immodestly. Carnarvon agreed with Dufferin that "the Canadian
view seems to me by no means unreasonable" but added "I shall however probably
soon know more" since he was to meet with British Columbia premier George
Walkem the next day.39
Carnarvon lost no time in presenting his view. By mid-August he had made
up his mind and communicated his decision to Dufferin. He described "the general
purport" of his despatch of 16 August 1874 as being "to urge some few concessions
wh[ich] I think Canada may reasonably make without prejudicing her position or her
204
interests".40 While Dufferin feared it might be difficult to get parliament to vote
more money in excess of that already offered, he had little doubt that his Government
would be "most anxious to acquiesce in your adjudication the moment it reaches
us."41 He was forced to admit soon afterwards that he was having "a terribly hard
fight" with his cabinet.42 Nevertheless, a few days later he took credit for "inducing"
his ministers to accept all of Carnarvon's terms, with some slight modifications. This
modified plan, summed up in Carnarvon's official despatch of 17 November 1874,
became known as the "Carnarvon terms". The terms included immediate
construction of the Esquimalt -Nanaimo railway, intensified work on surveys for the
main railway line, and immediate construction of a wagon road and telegraph line.43
The Dominion government was to spend two million dollars annually on the
construction of railway in British Columbia, with completion of the project by the
end of 1890.44 Dufferin was relieved that his administration agreed to these terms,
even if they did not do it gracefully. He explained to Carnarvon that the real
opposition came not from Mackenzie, but his colleagues.45
The most troublesome of Mackenzie's colleagues would prove to be Edward
Blake. Having resigned from Cabinet in February 1874, after serving only three
months, Blake's opposition to any concessions to British Columbia was well known.
His "Aurora" speech, delivered a month after the Liberals' acceptance of the
Carnarvon terms, condemned the "insanity" of adhering to the bargain struck by the
Conservatives. He cited the engineering obstacles of the proposed route through
British Columbia's "sea of mountains" and asserted that the province should be
invited to secede rather than "plunge this country into ruin".46 "This", Dufferin
explained to Carnarvon, "is what Mackenzie dreaded when he talked of the difficulty
he should have with his party if he consented to go beyond his original offer".47 This
report worried Carnarvon. Blake's opposition could well be troublesome, he feared,
as "anything which breaks down the B. Columbian settlement as now proposed
would be unfortunate & very mischievous".48 As the year 1874 drew to a close,
however, Dufferin grew more optimistic. "My ministers will accept without demur
your decision on the B.C. case", he predicted, "and I will take care that they write a
handsome acknowledgement in reply". Support for Blake was eroding, Dufferin
observed. His Aurora speech was "disapproved of by his friends" and Liberals were
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beginning to prefer Mackenzie's "sober common sense" to Blake's "brilliancy".49
Dufferin remarked with self-satisfaction that "I never lose an opportunity of
impressing my Ministers with the handsome way in which you have behaved to
them". "[A] Colonial Government", Dufferin noted, "is a kittle team to drive",
especially with "two loose horses like Brown and Blake rampaging about on either
side of the leaders".50 Blake continued to needle his Liberal colleagues by
condemning the Carnarvon terms in the Commons. Since it was Canada, and not the
Imperial government, that was to bear the cost, Canada's decision should be the one
that fixed the terms. If these terms were to be offered, it should be because it is best
for Canada, "not because Lord Carnarvon said so", Blake maintained.51
To Dufferin's surprise and disappointment, the bill for the construction of the
Esquimalt - Nanaimo railway, the only portion of the terms submitted to parliament,
was narrowly defeated in the Senate. While most of the votes against the bill were
Conservative, two Liberals opposed the bill—votes that proved to be decisive in its
defeat. The Liberal government therefore bore most of the blame for the failure of
the bill, not least because, while introducing the bill into the Senate, R.W. Scott, the
Liberal leader in the upper house, announced that it was the product of "the
52 •
interference of the Imperial Government". Dufferin was quick to see the hand of
Blake in this unwelcome development.53
While the defeat of the bill need not be traced directly to any machinations by
Blake, he was quick to marshal the forces of opposition to concessions to British
Columbia. Mackenzie soon realised that it would not be a simple matter of
reintroducing the bill in the next session, and became convinced that Blake was
needed in his ministry. Blake was now willing to re-enter Cabinet, but named
conditions under which he would serve. The railway on Vancouver Island was to be
abandoned, a cash subsidy being paid instead, and the annual expenditure of two
million dollars to construct the railway to the Pacific was to be subject to the
provision that the rate of taxation not be raised.54 Blake entered Mackenzie's
cabinet as Minister of Justice in May 1875. The storm over the Liberal government's
abandonment of the Carnarvon terms would break when the new policy was
announced in the autumn.
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Shortly before Blake entered Mackenzie's cabinet, an issue came to the fore
that may have contributed to the new minister of justice's notion that the power of
the governor general required more careful definition. The issue of the governor's
exercise of the prerogative ofmercy arose over Dufferin's wish to help his
administration negotiate the contentious question of justice for the Red River
insurgents. In the autumn of 1874, Ambroise Lepine, an associate of Louis Riel,
stood trial for the murder of Thomas Scott during the 1870 rebellion. Opinions had
widely circulated that both Riel and Lepine were entitled to amnesty, based on an
agreement reached with the Dominion government at the time. Lord Lisgar,
governor general during the rebellion, had promised the rebels that "in case of your
immediate and peaceable obedience and dispersion, I shall order that no legal
proceedings be taken against any parties implicated in these unfortunate breaches of
the law".55 Archbishop Tache arrived at Red River on 9 March 1870 to join the
commissioners already there. He bore Lisgar's proclamation along with a written
assurance that "the Imperial Government has no intention of acting otherwise or
permitting others to act otherwise than in perfect good faith towards the inhabitants
of the Red River District and of the North-West".56 Unfortunately, Scott had been
killed days before the archbishop's arrival. Dufferin marvelled later that it did not
occur to Tache that Scott's murder should have altered the situation, but found that
"[a]s frequently happens in the case of Priests and women, murder and bloodshed
seem to have made less impression upon him, than they would have done on a more
masculine mind".57 Dufferin warned Carnarvon that the Catholic clergy were now
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attempting to suggest Lisgar broke faith with them and the Manitoba rebels.
Dufferin suggested to Carnarvon that the issue of amnesty for Riel and his
associates might be "one of those occasions upon which the Imperial authorities
might intervene with advantage, and solve a problem beyond the grasp of local
statesmanship".59 Dufferin recognised the divisiveness of the question, with the
Protestants of Ontario crying for revenge for a martyred Orangeman, and the French
and Catholics insisting that the promise of amnesty be honoured. Early in November
1874, Dufferin reported that "to the astonishment of everybody" Lepine had been
found guilty by a mixed jury and sentenced to death. The matter was now a simpler
case where mercy for a convicted criminal might be sought, rather than justice for a
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persecuted patriot.60 A long conversation with "the most intelligent" of his French
ministers convinced Dufferin that his administration could be extricated from its
embarrassment if the imperial government would deal leniently with the case.61
Dufferin telegraphed the colonial secretary to ask his permission to relieve the
Canadian government "of the odium of dealing with the case, and allow me to decide
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in your name as to what is to be done with Lepine". Carnarvon agreed but insisted
that there must be a distinct request from Dufferin's ministers lest he "be accused of
interference and the blame ... very conveniently laid on my shoulders".63 The
colonial secretary also felt strongly that Lepine should receive a prison term, not a
complete pardon. He reminded Dufferin that his instructions as governor general
clearly specified that he was empowered to exercise the prerogative ofmercy
personally, irrespective of his government's advice, but believed that Dufferin should
secure an express request from his government, stating that the problem is beyond
their strength to solve. In any case, he reassured Dufferin that "you can act under
your own powers & may act, knowing that you will have my support".64
The governor general let Carnarvon know that his ministers were grateful for
the assistance, but expressed his own fear that the Liberal administration would be
accused of weakness, "of trying to shelter themselves behind the Governor General".
Dufferin proposed a "slight modification": his government should determine to
invoke the intervention of the imperial government. Dufferin himself should then
telegraph to the Colonial Office to advise this. At the same time he would indicate
that he was prepared to exercise his personal prerogative of mercy but was unwilling
to do so without previously informing the imperial government of his council's
decision. The colonial secretary might then advise the governor general in reply that
he approved of his decision to use the personal prerogative. "By this means",
Dufferin explained, "I should appear to be acting, not merely as the ordinary head of
the Canadian Administration, but as specially charged by The Queen to regulate this
matter".65 The Queen's name "is regarded here with such veneration and commands
such immediate submission, that a decision emanating from that mysterious and
impersonal origin, is more likely to be acquiesced in". It was not that he shrank from
the responsibility, he protested. He did not earn £10,000 a year by "transferring to
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other people the solution of difficult questions". "As to a row," he continued, "I
think I rather like it,—it braces one's nerves, and enlivens the tedium of exile."66
Mackenzie's administration insisted on delaying any action until the Ontario
provincial elections were over, and in January 1875 Carnarvon composed a despatch
along the lines Dufferin suggested.67 Dufferin accordingly commuted Lepine's
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sentence to two years' imprisonment. This approach may have helped dampen
sectional bitterness in Canada, but it did not prevent the opposition from recognising
that the tactic was used as a shield for a political dilemma. A political cartoon
depicted "Loyalty in a Quandary; or, The 'Lepine Case' Made Plain". Mackenzie is
shown with documents labelled "Lepine's Commutation" protruding from his
pocket. He cowers behind a large mask of Dufferin's face which bears the label
"Royal Prerogative". A frustrated Macdonald holds a stick but hesitates,
complaining, "Now, I'd like to know just how to give the fellow a pummeling [sic]
without damaging the figure head!"69 Despite the government's attempt to avoid
controversy, the episode brought the question of responsibility for the prerogative of
mercy into the open. Blake had not been in cabinet when Mackenzie's
administration settled upon the solution of allowing the prerogative to be used
"independently". Had he been, it is unlikely he would have endorsed such a
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measure.
Almost immediately after Lepine's reprieve, Blake took up the cause that
forms the focus of this chapter: a clearer definition of the duties of the governor
general. In March 1875, Dufferin reported to Carnarvon on a "sudden exhibition" of
the "peculiar temperament" of Edward Blake. This was a notice of motion
concerning the question of disallowance, and whether the governor general was
permitted to exercise it independently, or only on advice. Dufferin quickly decided,
however, that he had been unjust to Blake, and that the proposed motion was "not so
uncalled for and gratuitously hostile to the Imperial Government as I had imagined".
Instead, it was inspired by an ongoing debate over New Brunswick's legislation to
eliminate funding for Roman Catholic education in the province, a matter that,
although within provincial jurisdiction, touched upon provisions of the British North
America Act.71
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Blake's motion referred to a despatch dated 30 June 1873 from Lord
Kimberley, then colonial secretary. This despatch asserted that, with respect to
disallowance of provincial legislation, the governor "must act on [his]., .own
individual discretion" and that in this matter he "cannot be guided by the advice of
[his].. .responsible Ministers of the Dominion". This principle, if acted upon, Blake
insisted, would "destroy all Ministerial responsibility and impose on the Governor
General a responsibility not intended by the ... [British North America Act], and at
variance with the Constitution". The British North America Act clearly vested the
power of disallowance with the governor general in council, he argued.72 Dufferin
maintained that a delicate constitutional matter of this sort should not be dealt with
hastily by the House of Commons. Blake, he told Carnarvon, "is not a sound
constitutional Lawyer... and he has proved almost invariably wrong in...various
opinions". Being found in error was galling to Blake, Dufferin suggested, and he
was "in a very bitter frame of mind against the Law Officers of the Crown". Since
he imagined he "caught ...[them] tripping, he had determined to take his revenge".73
Dufferin undoubtedly had in mind the earlier episode, in which Blake, though not in
Cabinet, led protests against the decision of the Queen's Law Advisers to disallow
the Canadian Oaths Bill, which had been enacted to facilitate the taking of evidence
about the Pacific Scandal. Blake, Dufferin noted at the time, "talked of the
impropriety of English Lawyers 4000 miles away over-ruling the legal wisdom
enshrined in the Canadian House of Commons".74 Dufferin now maintained that the
despatch of 1873 was simply intended to guide an inexperienced governor and to
remind him that he was the guardian of the legal rights of the confederated provinces.
"[I]f his Ministers counselled him to sanction an illegal proceeding", it would be his
duty to refuse, in which case the ministers would be compelled to back down or
resign. "I told Mr. Blake", he recounted, that ".. .no Ministry could stand up against
the Governor General" and that if they remained in office, they were avowing
themselves to be responsible for what had been done. This was true, Dufferin
argued, even in exceptional cases, such as when the governor general pardoned a
criminal "contrary to the wishes and opinions of his Ministers". Nonetheless, he
reminded Blake that the imperial government had "the extreme desire... to avoid
everything approaching to an irritating control or interference with the domestic
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concerns of Canada". Dufferin warned Carnarvon that "an excessive jealousy of
British control" was growing among Blake, Goldwin Smith, and others of influence,
and that all despatches dealing with the power of the governor general and the
relations of the two governments should be worded with "the most excessive
caution".75 Dufferin secured Mackenzie's promise that he would convince Blake to
withdraw his motion. After a brief Commons debate in which both Mackenzie and
Macdonald expressed general agreement with the constitutional principles Blake
asserted, the motion was withdrawn.76 The matter, Dufferin told Carnarvon, "is left
in as favourable a position as possible for the Colonial Office to deal with it".77
Ironically, not long afterward—at a time when Blake was seeking a narrower
definition of the governor general's role—Dufferin submitted a plan to the Colonial
Office which would see it transformed into a Viceroyalty. Such a change, he argued
"would be regarded as a fresh intimation of the intention of this country [Britain] to
maintain her connection with her Colonies". Dufferin also believed that asserting the
dominance of the governor general over the lieutenant governors would "exalt the
prestige of the central Executive Authority... and... minimize the importance of the
Provincial Governments", which he believed was in keeping with Macdonald's
original plan for "a Legislative instead of a Federal Union". An increase in salary
would naturally be warranted and Dufferin was confident that his ministers would be
"quite willing" to implement a fifty-percent increase from £10,000, which was "quite
inadequate", to £15,000.78 Unfortunately for Dufferin, this suggestion failed to come
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to fruition and Dufferin was one in a series of governors general who found that he
would have little to show for his years of service in Canada.
Even as Dufferin argued for the elevation of the governor general's status,
events had been set in motion that would instead augur a curtailment of gubernatorial
power. The traditional prerogative ofmercy, so recently brought under scrutiny in
the Lepine case, seemed to be inconsistent with the principle of responsible
government. Both before and after Confederation, the Royal Instructions issued to
the various governors general referred to the power to pardon criminals and specified
that if the governor general should see cause to consider pardon or remission, he
should consult with his privy council and receive their advice. "[B]ut in all such
cases" the Instructions continued, "you are to decide whether to extend or withhold a
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pardon, according to your own deliberate judgment whether the Members of Our said
Privy Council concur therein, or otherwise". The governor general was then to
provide at length the reasons for his judgment for the minutes of the Council.80
Whether or not such instructions were to be taken literally remained to be seen.
In 1869 the Executive Council ofNew South Wales had addressed the
secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Granville, on the subject of the prerogative of
pardon, seeking to clarify the degree of personal responsibility the governor
possessed. Was he to be guided by his council or should he exercise his own
independent judgement?81 Granville responded that the governor was "bound to
allow great weight to the recommendation of his Ministry" unless any Imperial
interest was involved, but asserted that the governor "has undoubtedly a right to act
upon his own independent judgment".82 In 1871, Granville's successor, Lord
Kimberley, issued a circular despatch on the subject of the power of the governor to
grant pardons, referring to questions raised in New Zealand. Kimberley's despatch
dealt with the various types of cases in which pardon might be considered and
warned against the practice of having the governor sign blank pardons to be used
during his temporary absence from the colony. The governor, Kimberley
emphasised, was "bound to examine personally each case". While allowing that the
governor "will of course pay due regard to the advice of his Ministers, who are
responsible to the Colony for the proper administration of justice... and will not
grant any pardon without receiving their advice", Kimberley side-stepped the issue
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of what should happen if he and his ministers should disagree. This prompted a
request from New South Wales for guidance on "a different, although a kindred
point; namely, in what cases the governor ought to consult his Ministers before
granting or refusing a pardon, and how far, if at all, he is bound by their opinion". 4
Kimberley delayed responding to this query until February 1873, in order to receive
answers from other colonies to which his circular despatch had been sent. There was,
he insisted, "no real inconsistency, as is apparently supposed, between my circular
and Lord Granville's despatch of the 4th October 1869". The governor, in exercising
the Queen's prerogative, had a right to independent judgement, but in a colony with
responsible government a governor would, as Granville explained, "be bound to
allow great weight" to the recommendations of his Ministry. He would "be bound
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not to grant any pardon without receiving their advice thereon".85 Once again, he
neatly evaded the issue ofwhat should happen if the governor should disregard his
ministry's advice, after giving "great weight" to it. New South Wales was left to
wrestle with finding a practical formula that would not result in clashes of authority.
The exercise of the prerogative of pardon was a matter in which individual
governors took varying degrees of interest.86 Feo Monck, Lord Monck's sister-in-
law, was told by Macdonald that Sir Edmund Head
had the greatest horror of sentencing a man to be hung—it used to depress
him for weeks, and made him utterly wretched, so that John A. [Macdonald]
used to dread having to announce to him when it was necessary. When Sir
E[dmund Head] went home on leave Sir F[enwick Williams] administered
the Government here, and during his reign came the necessity for a man
being hung. John A., in dread of having to tell Sir F[enwick Williams] of it,
went to him and said 'This man has committed an atrocious murder, and I am
afraid he must be hung.' He was electrified by the cheery answer 'I quite
agree with you; ofcourse he must be hung; hang, hang, hang them all when
they deserve it.'87
It might be predicted that Dufferin would take his duties as dispenser of justice and
mercy very seriously. While on leave at his Clandeboye estate in the summer of
1875, he was indignant to learn of an episode which had arisen in Canada which
seemed to threaten his personal exercise of the prerogative. Blake, then minister of
justice, submitted to the administrator, Lieutenant-General Sir William O'Grady
Haly, a recommendation that the sentence of a condemned prisoner be commuted.
The administrator had doubts about the wisdom of exercising mercy in this particular
case, but before he had time to consider Blake's recommendation, the prisoner had
received a telegram advising him that his sentence had been commuted. When
Dufferin found out what had occurred, he responded with a stiff letter to Mackenzie.
His complaint was not with the particular case, but with the violation of secrecy and
the infringement upon the prerogatives of the Crown. "If the Crown were to step one
hair's breath beyond the line of its proper jurisdiction there would be such an outcry
throughout the land as almost would betoken a revolution", yet one of the Crown's
"most sacred functions" had been interfered with. He insisted that Mackenzie
investigate how this had occurred, so as to prevent "such a gross infraction of duty
on the part of any of Her Majesty's Ministers" in future.88 Carnarvon was quick to
agree with Dufferin's rebuke ofMackenzie. Such a gross act of irregularity "if
213
QQ
sanctioned would make all Gov[ernmen]t. impossible". He made reference in a
later letter to telegrams he had received from General Haly, presumably advising him
of this incident, and wondered if Blake was "at the bottom of the matter".90 As
minister of justice, Blake was known to be very reluctant to impose the death
sentence. He reportedly confided to a grandchild that this fear had been his deepest
reason for not wishing to be a judge.91
Carnarvon had inherited the unresolved question of the degree to which the
colonial governors might exercise the prerogative in opposition to advice. The
motion which Blake had withdrawn in March 1875, which maintained that the
governor's duties were to be carried out on the advice of council, brought the issue
once again to the forefront, and Carnarvon attempted to deal with it in November of
that year. He sent Blake copies of the correspondence with New South Wales for his
perusal but insisted that the question would ultimately have to be decided by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, should a colonial case arise as a test. " I
feel that there is, for the present, at all events, no practical necessity for an
authoritative or conclusive determination"; a "rigid rule" was not in keeping with the
spirit of the Constitution.92 Blake did not agree.
With respect to the governor general's right to disallow provincial legislation,
Blake maintained that this should only be done on the advice of his Dominion
ministers, since provincial legislation, by definition, dealt only with domestic matters
and would not involve imperial issues. The power of disallowance of Canadian
Dominion statutes was vested by the British North America Act in the Queen in
council. It followed, Blake argued, that the power of disallowance of provincial
statutes was to be exercised by the governor general in council. While the governor
could not disallow a provincial statute without or against the advice of his ministers,
neither could the ministers disallow a provincial statute without the assent of the
governor, Blake asserted. In each case, the ministers had to assume responsibility for
actions taken, and must resign in the case of a dispute. Blake challenged
Carnarvon's rejection of a "rigid rule" and argued for "a plain statute of the well-
settled rules". He also took issue with the Colonial Office's interpretation of the use
of the prerogative ofmercy, pointing out that existing interpretation "authorizes and
indeed requires the governor to act in the exercise of that particular prerogative in
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some manner and to some extent differently from the mode in which he is ordinarily
to act", and indeed invests him "with exceptional power". The same principle
applied to this power as to every other power over provincial and Canadian interests
which were vested in the governor in council by the British North America Act. The
governor's ministers, Blake insisted, "are responsible not merely for the advice given
but also for the action taken.... The importance to the people of the advice given by
Ministers is in precise proportion to its effectiveness." Any contrary interpretation
would mean that there was only a shadow of responsible government, and that it did
not exist in substance. Blake went on to claim that the "thorough understanding"
which existed between Dufferin and his advisers "are of themselves sufficient to
render improbable any serious difference of opinion" but a clear statement of their
relative rights and duties was nonetheless necessary.93 In fact, while the quality of
mercy may not have been strained, relations between Dufferin and the Liberal
cabinet frequently were.
In November 1875, Carnarvon suggested to Dufferin that Blake be invited to
England, partly in order to discuss legislation to establish Canada's Supreme Court94
but also as a means of reconciling Blake to imperial authority through personal social
contacts. Dufferin considered Carnarvon's suggestion "a most happy thought" and
reflected that it would be of great service to Blake to bring him "into contact with
men superior to himself both intellectually and professionally". "He lives here
amongst toadies and flatterers" Dufferin explained, and a dose of British civility
"will send him back to us in a better temper with England". Despite his difficult
nature, Blake was "well worth being educated into a more generous and genial frame
ofmind".95 As it happened, Blake's schedule would not permit a visit to Britain until
several months later, in the summer of 1876. By this time, the sources of friction had
multiplied to the point that no amount of aristocratic hospitality was likely to win
Blake over.
The plan for a Supreme Court for Canada had not originally been Blake's
project. Indeed, it had been part ofMacdonald's vision at the time of Confederation
but the scheme had been delayed for a variety of reasons, chief of which was the
difficulty in arriving at a formula acceptable to the province of Quebec.96 The
project was resurrected under the Liberal regime, and Telesphore Fournier, minister
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of justice proposed to eliminate the practice of appeals to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council. An amendment to the bill was moved to this effect, "saving any
right which Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise as her royal
prerogative".97 This amendment became the controversial Clause 47 of the Supreme
Court Bill. Even as the amendment was moved, protests arose in the Commons,
most notably from Macdonald, that the measure would serve to sever an important
QO
tie between Canada and the mother country. The bill nonetheless passed, squeaked
through the Senate, and was given royal assent by Dufferin in April 1875. Dufferin
confided to Carnarvon that he "had some hesitation about assenting" to the measure,
but after discussion with his ministers, decided that it was within the competence of
the Canadian parliament. 9
While Blake had not been an important actor in the drafting of the Supreme
Court Bill, he was the minister of justice by the time the matter came before the
British government. The law officers of the Crown had serious reservations about
the legality of Clause 47, and the prospect of disallowance loomed. Dufferin had the
disagreeable task of breaking the news to Blake, and securing his agreement to delay
opening the Supreme Court until a decision was reached. Blake, Dufferin
complained, was "very eager and excited about the matter" and "evinced a great
capacity for ill temper on the subject, should he be thwarted in his present views".
Among other things, Blake hinted that appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council were being protected in order to generate business for a legal clique in
England.100 Blake prepared a memorandum on the question, and while Dufferin
thought the wording was too strong, he agreed with the principles stated and let
Mackenzie know that he would support their view and recommend to Carnarvon that
the Act be allowed to stand.101 But it would not be that simple. The Lord Chancellor,
Lord Cairns, dismissed Blake's memorandum as "a mass of inaccuracy and bad
reasoning".102 The Supreme Court was only one of the issues that Blake discussed
with imperial authorities during his visit in the summer of 1876. A personal
interview with Lord Cairns left an exasperated Blake complaining that "our whole
relations with the Home Authorities are such as render 'negotiations' intolerable to
me. With every desire to oblige and to do what is right according to their lights they
have no light,"103 While it was ultimately decided to leave the Supreme Court Act
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intact on the understanding that Clause 47 did not in fact eliminate the right of appeal
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the disagreement added fuel to the
fire of Blake's enmity toward the imperial authorities—enmity that made relations
with Dufferin increasingly difficult.
Among the other issues that Blake discussed during his visit to England were
the constitutional powers of the governor general, and the ongoing difficulty between
the British Columbia and Dominion governments. In February 1876 the Colonial
Office had received the lengthy memorandum from Canada's privy council on the
governor general's exercise of the prerogative ofmercy and disallowance of
provincial legislation. Dufferin deduced that this memorandum was "almost entirely
the work ofMr. Blake", and showed Blake's usual spirit, "an irritable desire to limit
and curtail the Imperial authority and influence over the domestic affairs of the
colony".104 Dufferin also let the colonial secretary know that he had dissuaded Blake
and Mackenzie from raising the issue of the Instructions in the House of Commons
"with a view I imagine to gaining a little credit for their championship of the liberties
of Canada". "One has to be very sharp with these people, for they are always intent
upon making a little political capital for themselves", he observed.105
The long-smouldering railway dispute flared up once again early in 1876. In
September 1875, an order-in-council had been issued stating that any terms with
British Columbia would be subject to the government's adherence to the original
provision of the Canadian Pacific Railway Act of 1872 that there be no increase in
the existing rate of taxation. The Carnarvon terms were understood to themselves be
subject to this. Further, since the Esquimalt-Nanaimo Railway had been defeated in
Senate, the provincial government of British Columbia should consider undertaking
that project themselves, and some form of compensation should be offered to British
Columbia for delays which might take place in the construction of the Pacific
Railway. The order-in-council named a figure of $ 750,000. It was not altogether
clear whether this was meant to be compensation for the abandonment of the island
railway, or for delays in construction of the main line. While Mackenzie avowed
authorship of the order-in-council, Blake was obviously its inspiration. He, not
Mackenzie, could claim to have maintained all along that he understood that any
terms made with British Columbia were subject to the provision of no tax increase.
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He had not been in government when the ministry agreed to Carnarvon's
intervention, and accepted the compromise. For Mackenzie to claim now that the
Carnarvon terms were subject all along to this limitation was clearly an act of bad
faith.106 Not surprisingly, in February 1876, Dufferin had to write to tell Carnarvon
that British Columbia had rejected this new offer by the Mackenzie government, and
would likely turn to the Colonial Office for enforcement of the earlier agreement. He
admitted nevertheless that "however right and proper it may be to keep Canada to her
bargain, it must be remembered that the community for whose sake we are about to
hurry forward this tremendous enterprize, scarcely numbers twelve thousand
people". In a somewhat contradictory vein, Dufferin went on to say that "no hint of
any further modification of ... [the railway terms] could be listened to for a
moment".107
Dufferin remained convinced of his ministers' good faith toward British
Columbia through the spring of 1876. In March he reported to Carnarvon on his
long conversations with Blake about the project and was assured as to the
government's bona fide intentions to push forward on the construction of the railway.
"[Ejvery nerve is being strained", he believed.108 By the end of the month the idea
had occurred to Dufferin that he himselfmight go to British Columbia to try to
smooth things over. He could act "in the double capacity" of Carnarvon's agent, and
a representative of the Dominion. Dufferin suggested Carnarvon write to him
proposing it, especially since Mackenzie had not seemed averse to the idea.109
Carnarvon pronounced the idea "an admirable one" and "a great relief to me".110
Dufferin admitted to Carnarvon of the danger "ofmy own Government playing me
false, and subsequently throwing me overboard" but insisted that he would "take
such securities that they could not do this". Blake had reportedly "acknowledged
explicitly" the government's obligation. Dufferin believed his appearance would
satisfy British Columbia and that "she would believe me, even though she has so
completely lost faith in the asseverations ofmy Ministers".111
In planning his mission to British Columbia, Dufferin was conscious,
nevertheless, of his cabinet's growing resentment of imperial interference. They were
very sensitive, he warned Carnarvon, and apt to "scan with extreme jealousy every
phrase which emanates from the Colonial Office". Even worse, they had been so
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ungrateful as to speak in the Commons "with some bitterness of your having dictated
the recent terms made with British Columbia".112 Blake, he said, did not want the
governor general's mission to seem to be in any way ambassadorial, and was wary of
language "which implies a claim on the part of the C[olonial] Offfice] to intervene in
this dispute in the character of an arbitrator".113
Relations between Dufferin and the Canadian government did not improve as
the date of his western journey approached. By May, Dufferin described his
interviews with Mackenzie as "stormy" and began to suspect the prime minister of
"preparing the way for an evasion of the obligations into which he had voluntarily
entered with British Columbia". Mackenzie was using "shifty and ambiguous
language" and Dufferin accused him of planning to "cook... the Public Works
accounts" and spend money elsewhere in Canada to make it appear that additional
taxation would be needed to construct the Pacific Railway. He "also suggested to
Mackenzie that perhaps he was not strong enough to control his Cabinet or at all
events Blake and Cartwright", a charge that would have almost certainly struck a
nerve with the embattled prime minister.114 Fearing that the cabinet was "getting out
of Mackenzie's hands", Dufferin met with Blake and Cartwright in his presence.
This meeting did not reassure Dufferin. Blake evidently had no sense of any moral
obligation vis a vis British Columbia. Further, Dufferin came away more convinced
than ever that Blake and Cartwright had "the upper hand" with Mackenzie, and were
"driving him into a cross-grained perversity of temper towards us, which is quite
uncalled for, and by no means natural to him".115 In this climate of mistrust and
apprehension, Dufferin departed for British Columbia to defend the record of the
Liberal government and vouch for their good faith.
The viceregal party, which included Lord and Lady Dufferin, Dufferin's
military secretary, two aides-de-camp, and three journalists, in addition to various
servants, started from Ottawa on 31 July 1876. They travelled by rail via Chicago
and San Francisco, and then went on to Esquimalt by steamer.116 As they made their
way by carriage from Esquimalt to Government House in Victoria, Lady Dufferin
remarked that progress was at a foot's pace, since "every one of the 5,000 inhabitants
of Victoria must have been out in the streets".117 Their passage through almost every
town was celebrated with arches of welcome, many of which bore political
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messages. Some of the slogans were predictable expressions of loyalty to the crown,
but others were more pointed in their message. These included, "Our Railway Iron
Rusts", "United without Union", "Confederated without Confederation" and, more
110
provocatively, "Carnarvon Terms or Separation". Dufferin spoke to the group
who had erected the so-called "rebel arch" and suggested that he would gladly pass
under their arch if they changed the 'S' for Separation to an 'R' for Reparation.
They refused to do so, however, and the viceregal party detoured to go down another
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street.
Dufferin's many meetings with leading British Columbians reinforced the
fact that all were not of one mind about the railway. A mainland newspaper
disavowed the very vocal contingent from the island, challenging the "cool
assumption on the part of a few Victorians to speak for the whole Province entirely
in the interest of Victoria".120 Dufferin refused to accept an address calling for
separation, but agreed to meet with the deputation.121 Victoria journalists were not
impressed. They complained of the "waste of four mortal hours" listening to "Vice-
Regal subterfuges and queries—all of which had to be suffered under the ban of
secrecy". Dufferin's reassurances were branded "an attempt to hoodwink and bilk
the people in the name of royalty; an effort to shirk royal responsibility whilst acting
as Vice-Regal spy".122 Dufferin reported to Carnarvon that discontent seemed to be
confined to Victoria, and that stemmed from the abandonment of the Esquimalt-
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Nanaimo railway, a concession he now believed had been unwise and impractical.
Dufferin logged long hours in meetings with various supplicants. Lady Dufferin
joined her husband for the scheduled social activities, but complained privately that,
for most of the time, "D. was, as usual, shut up with some argumentative
Victorian".124 Dufferin's secretary confided that His Excellency "finds very great
difficulty in keeping his temper with these foolish people".125
The viceregal party travelled to the mainland, and were feted at various
communities. Prisoners in New Westminster were rousted from their cells to pluck
chickens for the banquet, and were set to work in chains polishing the floor for the
ball.126 After visiting the province's northern coast and interior, Dufferin telegraphed
Mackenzie from Victoria to propose that a conference for provincial and dominion
delegates be held in London. This was "the only chance I see of an amicable
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settlement", he told Carnarvon. Mackenzie "peremptorily" declined to consider the
scheme.127
Dufferin's tour culminated with a speech at Government House in Victoria on
20 September 1876. As it was widely expected that he would announce some new
concession, the speech attracted considerable attention.128 Dufferin's two-hour
speech began with the predictable compliments, praising the beauty and progress of
the province. "But" he conceded, the province's resources were of little service if
they remained "locked up in a distant, and, at present inaccessible corner of the
Dominion". He warned that he had not come to British Columbia on a diplomatic
mission, nor was he entrusted with any announcement from the Dominion or
Imperial government. He insisted that he had no wish to coax his audience into "any
line of action which you may not consider conducive to your own interests" but
testified only to Canada's wish to preserve harmony. Dufferin acknowledged the
lack of progress made on the railway, but enumerated the myriad obstacles—the
economic downturn and, especially, the geographical challenges. Mackenzie's
position, as one who had been called upon to fulfil a promise "which he knew, and
which the country had come to know, could not be discharged", was "a very
embarrassing one". The Carnarvon terms had promised a way out of the difficulty.
Dufferin insisted on Mackenzie's good faith, pointing out that the chief engineer had
been given carte blanche to spend money on surveys. Dufferin acknowledged that
the Esquimalt-Nanaimo railway had been distinctly promised and that non-fulfilment
of the commitment would naturally provoke bitterness. Vowing that he "would
sooner cut my right hand off than utter a single word that I do not know to be an
absolute truth", the governor general maintained that Mackenzie was not responsible
for the defeat of the bill in the Senate. He saw the prime minister the day after the
bill's defeat and "I have seldom seen a man more annoyed or disconcerted". The
Senate nevertheless was exercising its constitutional function, and there was "not the
slightest chance" that Carnarvon would attempt to "coerce" Canada's legislators.
The Dominion government, meanwhile, had not given up, but had offered
compensation of $ 750,000, the adequacy of which Dufferin refused to debate. In the
event of "any re-arrangement of your political relations", Victoria "would be the
chief sufferer", he predicted. Once the main line of the railway was under way, the
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mainland would be "perfectly contented" and New Westminster could become the
seat of government. A governor general, he reminded them, was "a Federalist by
profession, and you might as well expect the Sultan of Turkey to throw up his cap for
the Commune as the Viceroy of Canada to entertain a suggestion for the
disintegration of the Dominion". This is why, he explained, he refused to bow his
head under the separation arch. The arch was "a very good-humoured, and certainly
not a disloyal bit of 'bounce'". "I suppose" he joked, "they wished me to know they
were the 'arch' enemies of Canada. Well, I have made them an arch reply." Dufferin
closed his speech by expressing his hope that his next visit to British Columbia
should be by rail.129 Dufferin's speech, hastily prepared at a very busy time, stopped
short of taking any side in the dispute and avoided implying any specific
obligation.130 Yet despite Dufferin's avowed refusal to defend the actions of his
ministers, the speech veered more in this direction than might be expected in a
statement emanating from a constitutional head of state. Dufferin's proclivity for
peacemaking coloured his approach and he was unable to overcome his natural wish
to win over the people of British Columbia by trying to sell them on his
government's good will.
His public sentiments notwithstanding, Dufferin's grave doubts about the
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Liberal railway policy worsened in the wake of his trip. Privately, Dufferin
confided to the colonial secretary that "I am quite aghast at the blundering ofmy
Ministers, which has been far greater and more inexcusable than I could have
imagined". He recalled that he had warned Kimberley that the Liberals "had not the
experience or the capacity sufficient to keep things straight, and the mess into which
they have got with this Province has only too accurately realised my prediction".132
When he reached Toronto, Dufferin sent Carnarvon a lengthy report of his findings.
The chief complaint in Victoria he found was the ambiguity surrounding the order-
in-council of September 1875 which promised the province $750,000 in
compensation. Dufferin insisted that this amount "has always been explained to me
and is now only talked of by my Ministers, as compensation for the Esquimalt and
Nanaimo Railway", but the order itself actually said the compensation was "for any
delays which may take place in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway".
Dufferin maintained that had he, and not the administrator, been on the scene when
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the order was passed, this badly-phrased expression would have been challenged.
Now, suspicions existed that Mackenzie had deliberately set "a trap to induce British
Columbia to forego her entire treaty rights". Dufferin told Carnarvon that he had
sought to combat this unfounded accusation in his speech, along with the charge that
Mackenzie had engineered the defeat of the Esquimalt-Nanaimo Railway bill in the
Senate. Blake's accession to the cabinet, however, had intensified feelings of distrust
among British Columbians. Dufferin feared that in England his words would be
taken as justifying the "shabby conduct of Canada", but remained hopeful that he had
helped to create a climate in which Carnarvon would be able to intervene
successfully.133
Dufferin immediately set to work on a letter to Mackenzie, once again urging
the mediation of the colonial secretary at a conference of Canadian and British
Columbian delegates in London. Perhaps compensation of $1,000,000 might be
offered instead of $750,000, he proposed. Dufferin foresaw personal "shame and
humiliation" if "the noble Dominion over which I had been sent to preside on behalf
ofHer Majesty, had been shorn of a Province under my administration".134 The
governor general had evidently not drawn any lesson from the failure of Carnarvon's
previous mediation, nor did he fully appreciate the degree of hostility that existed
towards anything that looked like imperial interference. Despite his frequent
admonitions to Carnarvon about the careful handling of his ministers and their
jealousy about Canadian autonomy, Dufferin was unable to resist the temptation to
rush in and save the day.
On the surface, though, it still appeared that the governor general and his
ministers were in complete harmony. Dufferin had spoken carefully so as not to
betray any suggestion of the growing discord that characterized their relations. If
Dufferin had walked the tightrope of non-committal empathy while in British
Columbia, he may have come close to tumbling off the moment his train returned to
the station. In an impromptu speech to the Mayor and Council of Ottawa, Dufferin
made remarks which many journalists and cabinet members present regarded as an
effective repudiation of Mackenzie's policy. Opposition members were jubilant and
Dufferin, according a Liberal observer, left the station looking "as if he would like to
bite his tongue off'. Dufferin saw an opportunity for damage control when George
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Holland of the Daily Citizen, the only reporter who had managed to scribble down a
verbatim report of the speech, did His Excellency the usual courtesy of seeking
approval of the speech before publication. Dufferin accepted a copy for pemsal and
then asked Holland what system of shorthand he used. Holland produced his original
notes, which Dufferin quickly pocketed. He invited Holland to lunch the following
day to review the speech. The journalist's pleas for his notes were unavailing, and
his subsequent meeting with Dufferin yielded a much milder speech, with all
offensive passages carefully expunged. The original was never published.135
If this story is true, Dufferin's quick intervention only ensured that the breach
with his ministers would be kept covert. He had already made the clash inevitable.
Dufferin's pressure on Mackenzie to involve Carnarvon in fresh arbitration prompted
the prime minister to become even more insistent that imperial interference would
not be welcome. Mackenzie instructed Richard Cartwright, his finance minister,
who was on his way to England, to repeat to Carnarvon the same message that Blake
had given: there would be neither arbitration nor a more generous settlement. He
was also to emphasise that the $750,000 in compensation was specifically for delays,
past and future. The Esquimalt-Nanaimo Railway, Mackenzie pointed out, was itself
compensation for delays, and the new offer of compensation was "in lieu, not of the
railroad, as a mere local incident, but of the compensation which the railroad
construction referred to". Lord Dufferin, he argued, made "one huge mistake" in
forgetting that. The Canadian ministry had been wrong to let Dufferin persuade
them to "allow ... [Carnarvon] to sit in judgement upon the question. I do not think
1
we can afford to make the same mistake again." Meanwhile, Dufferin was of the
opinion that Mackenzie, presumably during a lengthy private interview upon the
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governor general's return, had "half promised that at... [Carnarvon's] instance he
would raise the $750,000 to $1,000,000".138 While Edward Blake had returned from
overseas in early $eptember, he was away from Ottawa for a time and Dufferin did
not have the opportunity to meet with him until the beginning of November. The
collision between governor and council could be delayed no longer.
Dufferin reported to Carnarvon that he spent two hours "battling" Blake on
the railway issue and "urged every argument I could think of to induce him to act
with good faith towards British Columbia".139 He followed up the conversation with
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a letter to Blake in which he deprecated the idea that the Carnarvon terms should
ever have been deemed subject to a provision that taxes not be increased in their
fulfilment.140 Over the next couple of days, in subsequent meetings with Blake while
Mackenzie was away, Dufferin grew increasingly optimistic that he was winning the
minister of justice over, convincing him of the need for fair treatment for British
Columbia.141 He went so far as to reassure the premier of British Columbia that "I
am fighting your battle tooth and nail... and I think I already see daylight".
Recognizing that this covert correspondence might have crossed over the line,
Dufferin swore the premier to secrecy, and instructed him to bum the letter.142
Unfortunately, just as relations between Dufferin and Blake were improving, British
newspaper reports appeared criticising Dufferin for his defence of his government's
conduct. Blake was indignant, more so when Dufferin refused to condemn the
reports. The real truth, Dufferin ventured, "is Canada has first blundered into a
horrid mess, and has ever since been seeking to extricate herself by every kind of
shabby and disingenuous plea and manoeuvre".143 From here, matters only
deteriorated further.
Mackenzie soon learned that, in response to new petitions from British
Columbia, Carnarvon proposed delaying his answer until he knew what the
Dominion government planned to do. Mackenzie's indignant reaction was that the
colonial secretary already knew what he proposed to do: his island railway bill
having been defeated in Senate, and offers of compensation refused, he would simply
continue with the construction of the transcontinental railway as planned, as fast as
the country's resources would permit.144 Dufferin met with Mackenzie on 16 and 18
November, and the steadily building tensions came to a head. Dufferin accused
Mackenzie of working with Blake to draft "disgraceful" orders-in-council,
deliberately couched in ambiguous terms, to trap the people of British Columbia.
Mackenzie protested that he, not Blake, had been the author of the minutes. He
expressed his regret at allowing Carnarvon to press his interference upon his
government, and dismissed Dufferin's concerns over his own personal honour.
"[W]e were responsible for the acts of the gov[ernmen]t not him. ... he had nothing
to do with it except as a constitutional governor". Dufferin brushed aside
Mackenzie's offer to resign and, incredibly, proposed once again that Carnarvon be
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used as a mediator. Mackenzie allowed that his government would consider it, but
saw no prospect of agreeing to such a measure.145
Dufferin sent a note the following day asking Mackenzie for a further
meeting, admitting that he had not been satisfied with the earlier one. The prime
minister and Blake accordingly met with Dufferin for two and a half hours.
Unfortunately, this meeting was even stormier than the earlier one, and Dufferin
admitted to the colonial secretary that he and Mackenzie "nearly came to blows".146
Among the issues discussed were Blake's objections to Dufferin's plan to send his
own independent assessment of the British Columbia situation to the Colonial Office,
an action he saw as inappropriate for a constitutional governor. The conversation
soon reverted to the specific criticisms Dufferin had of his government's conduct.147
He accused them of deceit in the wording of their minutes of council and of not
trying to carry the Esquimalt-Nanaimo railway bill in the Senate. After "revert[ing]
over and over again to the same topics" with Blake, Dufferin turned to Mackenzie
and, in a "very excited tone", demanded the prime minister's immediate answer as to
what was meant in his minute of council about the island railway when he referred to
"compensation for delays". Mackenzie declined to provide an immediate verbal
answer and promised a written response instead. Mackenzie recorded that Dufferin
then seemed to grow more calm, and admitted he was right. This seemed a good
opportunity to remind the governor general of Canada's self-governing status.
Indeed, the country was not even "a Colony at all in the ordinary acceptation of the
term", Mackenzie insisted, and was capable of managing its own affairs. Dufferin
agreed. But just as a crisis seemed to be averted, Dufferin asked Mackenzie if his
government took the position that the construction of the island railway, or the
money payment, was a general compensation. The prime minister acknowledged
that it was. At that point the governor general jumped to his feet and violently
pronounced any further discussion to be useless. He felt ashamed, he said,
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presumably for having defended the government's position to British Columbia.
Dufferin admitted to Carnarvon that he had lost his temper and used very harsh
language during the interview. "Mackenzie's aspect was simply pitiable, and Blake
was upon the point of crying, as he very readily does when he is excited."149
Mackenzie's account of the meeting notes that at this juncture, as he and Blake
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moved to leave the room, Dufferin stopped them, saying, "Don't let us quarrell [sic]
about it! Sit down again and let us discuss it quietly and don't mind what has
happened." Little more was resolved, although Mackenzie noted that, at the end of
the meeting, Dufferin apologized that he had been " too hasty but meant no ill". The
prime minister assured him that "it is all between ourselves".150
Dufferin wrote a letter to Mackenzie the following day regretting if he caused
irritation or annoyance by pressing his views, although he had no wish to qualify
them. The reason he "so harped" on the need for intervention by the Colonial Office
was the genuine mistrust British Columbia felt toward the Dominion government.
"If you had any other proposal to suggest", he continued, "I should not be so uneasy,
but you have not". Mackenzie's assertion that Canada was not a crown colony was
true, "but neither are you a Republic". "[W]ithin the walls of the Privy Council I
have as much right to contend for my opinion as any ofmy Ministers". They must
not expect, he insisted, him to accept their advice merely because they give it, "but
they must approve it to my understanding and conscience".151 Mackenzie's response
was cordial, expressing his hope that some ground on which they could agree would
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yet be found. Carnarvon, for his part, continued to be supportive of Dufferin, and
urged him to avoid making his own position "personally disagreeable", since
rumours were circulating that the Conservatives would soon be returned to office. "I
am satisfied that if we can adjourn the conflict—say for another year or eighteen
months—we shall be, as you truly say, in a far better position to fight it."153
Carnarvon responded to the British Columbia petitioners by declaring that he was
unable to pronounce an opinion either on the Island railway or the delays on the main
line, past and future.154
Dufferin delivered a speech a short time later to the National Club, and it is
tempting to see in it a wistful recognition of the limited scope of his duties and an ill-
concealed hostility toward the Liberal administration. His viceregal functions were
restricted, he explained, "to those rather of a negative than of a positive character"
and "probably consist rather in preventing mischief than in accomplishing any
good". The head of state in a constitutional regime, he remarked, had a great, but
latent, power, which "is never suffered to become active". He likened himself to the
"humble functionary" who oversees the workings of a complicated machine.
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This personage merely walks about with a little tin vessel of oil in his hand—
and he pours in a drop here and a drop there, as occasion or the creaking of a
joint may require, while his utmost vigilance is directed to no higher aim than
the preservation of his wheels and cogs from the intrusion of dust, grits, or
other foreign bodies.
Over the laughter of his audience, Dufferin ingenuously—and unconvincingly—
protested that the term "grits", a nickname for the Liberals, was here "entirely
innocent of all political significance".155 While he had managed for the most part to
keep his actions just within the utmost limits of a constitutional governor's sphere,
Dufferin's personal feelings occasionally erupted in such lapses as these.
Fortunately most of these lapses were private, and he kept up the outward appearance
of a correct constitutional head of state, often in opposition to his true feelings. The
shattering of his usually diplomatic demeanour in meetings with his cabinet, his
covert correspondence with the premier of British Columbia, and some of his more
questionable actions during the time of the Pacific Scandal—most notably his
proposal to hide in a closet in the House of Commons—were all examples of what a
psychologist might call "leakage". These incidents betrayed Dufferin's discomfort
with the limits of his role, and sense of personal responsibility for the Dominion's
welfare.
Carnarvon and Dufferin were forced to abandon any crusade for fair
treatment for British Columbia. The province was given to understand that it could
no longer expect the imperial government to champion its cause. Mackenzie was, by
Dufferin's report, "delighted" with Carnarvon's despatch,156 and later assured
Dufferin that if the main line had not been commenced in eighteen months he would
agree to arbitration in London.157 Dufferin suspected that Mackenzie's railway plans
would yet be thwarted by Cartwright and Blake, but believed that the eighteen month
agreement gave them some breathing room and ensured that Canada would have no
excuses when the matter ultimately came before Carnarvon for arbitration—a
measure he still saw as inevitable.158 It is probable, though, that in Mackenzie's
mind the agreement was little more than a sop to quiet the persistent governor
general. The ultimate resolution of the railway conflict was almost certainly aided
by the fact that all of these actors would disappear from the scene: Carnarvon
resigned in January 1878; in October the Liberal government gave way to a new
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Conservative one, with Macdonald again at the helm; days later Dufferin returned to
Britain.
Blake's more modest view of the scope of the governor general's role
prevailed also when the Colonial Office drafted permanent instructions to be issued
to Dufferin's successors. When Blake prepared to meet with Carnarvon in the
summer of 1876, Dufferin warned the colonial secretary that the minister of justice
was not "a man who will be content to arrive at an understanding on a mere practical
basis".159 Carnarvon had responded to Blake's earlier memorandum on the
constitutional powers of the governor general at the beginning of June. He rejected
Blake's claim that the terms "governor general" and "governor general in council"
were used interchangeably in the British North America Act. The distinction, he
insisted, was carefully drawn, "and this distinction is closely observed throughout the
Act". If the term governor general in council had been meant with respect to the
disallowance of provincial acts "that expression would have been used...". Granting
the power of disallowance to the governor general in council—that is, the Dominion
government—would be tantamount to a repeal of the British North America Act
"which gives the exclusive right of legislation in certain matters to the Provincial
Legislatures".160 Blake did not concur. He composed another lengthy memorandum
to Carnarvon on the constitutional limits of the viceregal role. He began by
reminding him that Canada was not a small, young colony, but a Dominion
encompassing several provinces, with traditions of responsible government. The
commission and instructions to the governor general contained numerous anomalies
and did not truly reflect current constitutional usages and Canada's status. He
referred again to the fact that certain powers in the British North America Act were
conferred on the governor and others in the governor in council, but Blake took the
former to be an oversight and assumed that in each instance the governor in council
was implied.
With reference to the prerogative of pardon, Blake challenged the view
expressed in some earlier correspondence that the governor might act on his own
judgement. He allowed that there might be some instances in which imperial
interests were affected, but maintained that it was not possible to formulate a rule for
these cases, but would be best to leave problems to be adjusted by mutual agreement
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when they arose. This was, in essence, a reversal of the existing procedure where
powers were granted with the understanding that they be seldom used. Blake
suggested that the personal prerogative should not be expressly granted as it was in
the current instructions but that there should be an understanding that if necessary the
governor might exert some influence. In any event, Blake objected to the power of
pardon being treated differently than any of the other matters in which Canada
enjoyed self-government.
The granting of any powers to the governor general with respect to marriage
licenses, letters of administration, probates of wills, and for the mentally impaired,
was also obsolete, Blake argued, since these were now matters under provincial
jurisdiction. Blake had no difficulty with the clause in the instructions that delegated
the constitutional powers of the Queen to the governor general—nor should he have
had any, since constitutional conventions had limited the Queen's sphere of action
much more than they had the governor's. He did, however, object to the wording of
this clause, which he thought did not make it sufficiently clear that the governor was
compelled to act through his ministers, "not merely .. .a particular set of Ministers,
but.. .any Ministers". Blake allowed that there were instances in which full freedom
of action was not vested in the Canadian people and imperial interests might be
affected, but believed that it was impossible to formulate any precise limitation. "The
effort to reconcile by any form of words the responsibility of Ministers under the
Canadian constitution with a power to the Governor to take even a negative line
independently of advice cannot, I think, succeed". Here again, Blake maintained that
recourse be taken to "mutual good feeling" and proper consideration of imperial
interests by the Canadian ministers. Blake further pointed out that, contrary to the
instructions, it was not normally the practice of the governor to preside over
meetings of the privy council, but that this might be done only on rare, formal
occasions. The clause in the instructions requiring the governor general to reserve
certain types of bills—namely, those dealing with divorce, those granting land or
money to the governor, those dealing with paper currency, those imposing
differential duties, and those inconsistent with British treaty obligations—was also
obsolete, Blake suggested. The reserve power of disallowance was sufficient to deal
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with such cases, Blake believed, and in practice bills dealing with such subjects had
not been consistently disallowed in the past.161
In essence, then, Dufferin was only partially right. Blake was not content to
have matters rest on an assumed understanding when the written documents might
limit Canada's constitutional freedom of action. But he was willing to rely upon
convention and mutual good will if the situation was reversed. His experience with
Dufferin no doubt made the minister of justice more comfortable with a more tightly
defined sphere of action for the governor general.
Blake responded to Carnarvon's arguments about the distinction between the
governor general and the governor general in council with another memorandum in
September 1876. He rejected Carnarvon's claim that granting the power to disallow
provincial legislation to the governor general in council undercut the division of
powers inherent in the British North America Act. Dominion ministers, Blake
reminded him, themselves represented individual provinces. Any abuse of power by
these elected representatives would have swift constitutional remedies. If the
governor general were to act unaided by the advice of his ministers, power over
provincial legislation would in effect be transferred to the control of the Colonial
Office or the law officers of the Crown, Blake maintained, "which cannot possibly
i fvy
have been intended by the framers of the clause".
Carnarvon acknowledged Blake's views but admitted "I should feel much
difficulty in modifying the opinion which I expressed in my despatch of the 1st
June". He still maintained that there was an intentional difference between the
phrases governor general and governor general in council as they appeared in the
British North America Act. What is more, "high authorities in this country"
supported his interpretation. Nevertheless, Blake's tenacity was apparently
beginning to tell, and the colonial secretary conceded that he was "not...prepared to
insist strongly". Carnarvon made a final attempt to challenge Blake's assertion as to
the impossibility of the governor general acting without the advice of constitutional
advisers. If, after fully hearing his ministers' advice, the governor general chose to
act differently, "he would be acting under the advice of his Ministers,
notwithstanding that he might not feel himself able to act according to that advice",
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Carnarvon argued. "I think this view of the position deserves consideration", he
wrote,
though I should not wish to be understood as now laying down any definite
rule on a subject with respect to which you are aware that I incline to think it
more in accordance with the true spirit of the constitution, that no unyielding
rule should be maintained.163
Blake responded to this with the observation that "it can hardly be assumed that the
Governor is aided by his Ministers' advice in coming to a conclusion adverse to that
advice; it seems ...that, in the case put, the Governor is acting rather against than
under the advice of his Ministers". He reiterated his main contention that "under the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution, Ministers must be responsible for the
Governor's action". This communication was composed mere days after Blake and
Mackenzie's very heated meeting with Dufferin, and it is probable that Blake's
frustration with the governor general's intrusiveness lent him greater resolve. He was
unable, he said, to alter his conclusions, but recognised that the colonial secretary did
not wish to prolong their correspondence on that subject. In any event, he hoped that
the discussion "decreased the probability of future difficulty on a question of very
grave importance".164 Blake no doubt picked up on the tone of fatigue that
characterised Carnarvon's communications on the subject. While the minister of
justice tackled the subject of the governor general's role with obvious energy and
conviction, the colonial secretary's brief replies tended to be reactive and
unconvincing. He seemed to recognise that he had already lost a battle for which he
had no heart.165
Constitutional authorities have generally given much credit to Blake for the
ultimate redrafting of the governor general's commission and instructions. D.M.L.
Farr described Blake's memorandum ofApril 1876 as "perhaps the ablest paper in
the whole treatment of the disallowance topic". Alpheus Todd, a prominent
nineteenth-century observer, clearly admired Blake's contribution to Canada's
constitutional evolution, and considered his interpretations of imperial conventions to
be sounder than those of the colonial secretary.166 Arthur Berriedale Keith asserted
that Blake was
the first to express with perfect clarity the conception of Canada as an
autonomous Dominion with rights only limited in a very few cases where its
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character as a dependency, not a state of international law, gave the Imperial
Government the right of intervention.
He drew, Keith contended, a perfectly clear distinction between the function of the
governor as head of a local government and as an imperial officer. A brief survey
of the changes incorporated into the new instruments confirms the view that Blake's
interpretations prevailed in almost every instance.
In accordance with Blake's view, the new version of the Letters Patent
contained no reference to the governor's prerogative of pardon, and the reference to
it in the Instructions had changed considerably. Instead, the Instructions specified
that the governor general
shall not pardon or reprieve any such offender without first receiving in
capital cases the advice of the Privy Council for Our said Dominion, and in
other cases the advice of one at least of his Ministers; and in any case in
which such pardon or reprieve might directly affect the interests of Our
Empire, or of any country or place beyond the jurisdiction of the Government
of Our said Dominion, Our said Governor-General shall before deciding as to
either pardon or reprieve, take those interests specially into his own personal
consideration in conjunction with such advice as aforesaid.168
The new Commission also omitted any reference to the obsolete powers that now
came under provincial jurisdiction. Likewise, the most significant change in the
Instructions was the deletion of previously included clauses. The new Instructions
no longer implied that the governor general would personally preside over meetings
of the Privy Council. Further, there was no longer a list of bills to which the governor
was compelled to withhold assent.169 The omission of these few clauses, and the
slight rewording of others, signified a real change in the written description of the
governor general's role.170 Blake had succeeded in bringing the instruments more
into line with current practices under responsible government.
That he should have felt the need to do so may well have stemmed from his
contentious relationship with the governor general under whom he served. It was
evident that Dufferin took a high profile approach to the office, and Mackenzie's
warning that "there is no safety without laying down the line over which he must not
pass"171 set the tone for a protracted struggle. The acrimony that lingered over
Dufferin's apparent preference for the Conservative party was enough to cause a
strain. Added to this, the threat of secession by British Columbia ensured an uneasy
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atmosphere. Even more, however, the clash of personalities between Dufferin and
Blake caused difficulty. The strained relationship between the governor general and
his constitutional advisers drew the viceregal office into focus, and almost certainly
contributed to Blake's quest for a sharper definition of the role. While Carnarvon
would have been content to trust to convention, relying upon written documents that
were obsolete, Blake's agitation for a clear statement of the "well settled rules"172
won out. The new permanent Letters Patent and Instructions, which would be issued
to Dufferin's successors, did not of course clear up all confusion surrounding the
governor general's function. There was still considerable scope for interpretation,
and the amount of influence an incumbent could exercise would still depend greatly
on his own character. Nevertheless, the new instruments put an end to numerous
anomalies and represented a step forward in Canadian constitutional evolution.
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"Ceaseless and Watchful Readiness to Take Part"
Within the prevailing paradigm of Canada's evolution from colony to nation, little
attention has been paid to the governor general. Perceived as a vestige of a
dependent past, the viceregal office has not been emphasised in Canadian historical
writing, especially where the post-Confederation period is concerned. This has led to
a pervasive misinterpretation of Canada's constitutional history, and a distorted
understanding of the meaning of Confederation. The true points of significant
change in Canada's relationship to Britain were reflected in changes in the governor
general's function. Despite outward continuity, the viceregal role changed in very
significant ways in 1848, in 1878, and in 1931. Confederation brought with it an
official change in title, but Monck had been known as the "governor general" before
and after 1867, and his duties did not change. Historical treatments of the governors
general have tended to be restricted to individual biographies. As Anthony Kirk-
Greene put it, "a lot of notable work has been done on the Governor-General but
notably little on the Governors-General".1 Separating the office from the man can
be difficult; the viceregal role was not sharply defined, and the character of the office
holder was an important variable. Ideological considerations aside, the logistical
problems posed by a study encompassing the careers of several appointees militate
against it. Such a study by necessity involves research into extensive official
correspondence between the governors general and the Colonial Office, but much of
the most important communication took place by means of private letters. Viceregal
appointees were often personally acquainted with the secretaries of state, and found it
useful to unburden themselves about the difficulties of the office, even if they were
not actually seeking advice and direction from Downing Street. These private letters
provide a revealing window into the challenge of reigning without actually
governing. In addition to the private manuscript collections of the governors general
themselves, those of the secretaries of state and various colonial politicians provide a
useful dimension.
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The period covered by this study—the arrival of Elgin in 1847 to the
departure of Dufferin in 1878—is of particular interest insofar as it witnessed key
constitutional and political developments. The achievement of self-government,
indisputable by 1849, represented the most significant change in the nature of the
governor general's role, and, of course, in the broader imperial relationship. "Much
of Canada's constitutional history", Ricker and Saywell note, "can be written in
terms of changes in the powers of the Governor-General".2 From Elgin's term on,
the local legislatures were free to govern themselves in internal matters, the governor
being mindful only that imperial interests were not compromised. Yet for the
governor this did not mean a dramatic transition from complete autocratic power to
sudden obsolescence. The governor continued to represent the monarch, around
whom the parliamentary system was, and is, organised. Through his reserve powers,
he would act as a guardian of the constitution. He would summon, prorogue and
dissolve the legislature upon the advice of his ministers, and could, as we have seen,
disregard that advice in some rare circumstances. Even if the governor general did
not take the dramatic step of refusing his ministers' advice, the very fact that the
option existed made it more likely that an administration would adhere to proper
parliamentary conduct. Confederation is usually treated as the watershed of
Canadian history, but its impact on the viceregal role was limited. The relatively
aloof position the governor usually took from day-to-day political wrangling after
Confederation was not a product of Confederation itself, but rather of the same new
political alliances that made Confederation possible. The emergence ofmore
structured and disciplined political parties since the Confederation era made
Canadian politics more stable. This decreased the necessity for the governor
general's involvement in the formation of ministries and made his selection of an
executive council a mere formality in most cases. Yet the traditional prerogatives
still remained. In the post-Confederation era, Dufferin, as we have seen, chose not to
invoke his prerogative of refusal of assent when Macdonald requested a prorogation
at the height of the Pacific Scandal. He believed—rightly as it transpired—that
parliament would ultimately pronounce its verdict on the Conservative ministry, but
recognised that in extreme cases he would be warranted in acting to prevent
ministerial abuses of power. The revision and standardisation of the viceregal
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Instructions and Letters Patent in 1878 represented a codification of the evolution of
the governor general's role. While it might have been more in keeping with usual
British constitutional practices to allow the written documents to remain out of step
with actual usage, the clash of personalities between Dufferin and his Liberal
ministers, most notably Edward Blake, lent a greater sense of urgency to a
modernisation of these obsolete documents. This constitutional milestone, generally
ignored in Canadian historiography, makes a logical terminus for a study of the
viceregal role.
The nineteenth-century viceregal role is complicated by the fact that self-
government did not extend to external matters. The governor was appointed by, and
answerable to, the British cabinet and was meant to withhold royal assent to any bills
that fell outside Canada's jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, many observers have tended
to confuse the two separate areas of gubernatorial responsibility—the governor
general's role as guardian of the constitution in Canada and his position as an
imperial functionary. When the governor refused the advice of his ministers, or
otherwise exercised his prerogative powers, he was not doing so at the instance of
Downing Street. In general, the secretaries of state for the colonies avoided intruding
into Canadian domestic political controversies. Yet they were individuals, and some
had a sounder grasp than others of the implications of responsible government. Grey
was a key actor in the development of the doctrine of colonial self-government, and
he and Elgin communicated closely to ensure that they shared the same objectives.
Sir Edmund Head had the misfortune to be subject to the direction of eight separate
secretaries of state during his tenure, some of whom had an imperfect understanding
of colonial issues. Dufferin enjoyed a good relationship with Carnarvon during his
term, but the governor's tendency to supply copious detail about Canadian affairs
probably contributed to Carnarvon's predisposition toward intrusiveness. Further,
Canadians themselves, while jealous of imperial encroachment upon their legislative
freedoms, were wont to appeal to London when domestic events took an unappealing
turn, as was the case when Head refused ministerial advice in 1858, and again during
the Pacific railway controversy. The British cabinet also had to contend with the
pressures of ill-informed opinion at home.3 The chorus of criticism that Elgin faced
over the Rebellion Losses Bill is a case in point; few in Britain seemed to understand
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the consequences inherent in colonial self-government. Since it was a new and
untried concept, this is hardly surprising. Fortunately, there was not usually a high
degree of concern over Canadian affairs, unless British interests were directly
affected. Sir Edmund Head braced himself for an outcry of protest from British
quarters after refusing George Brown's request for a dissolution in 1858, and
supplied the home government with the facts needed to defend his position. The
anticipated questions in parliament were never raised. Indifference and ignorance,
rather than respect for Canada's legislative autonomy, provide the most probable
explanation.4
Proximity to the United States lent another potential complication to the
viceregal role. The governor general functioned as an unofficial diplomat, and had to
simultaneously protect British and Canadian interests. Lord Elgin enjoyed a
celebrated success in the diplomatic sphere by negotiating a reciprocity agreement.
Lord Lisgar, as we have seen, did not fare so well. He managed to help avert a
looming crisis in Canadian-American relations, but his behind-the-scenes mediation
certainly did not earn him any gratitude in Canada. What is more, his role was
misunderstood by Americans, who consistently had difficulty appreciating the nature
of the imperial relationship, and seemed to imagine that the governor possessed the
powers of an autocrat. Lisgar was personally held accountable for Canadian policies
the Americans disliked. The neglect and misjudgement Lisgar has suffered in
Canadian historiography stems from Canada's failure to achieve an ambitious—and
ultimately unrealistic—diplomatic agenda in 1871, but also from the more prosaic
fact that Lisgar has no collected manuscript collection. Most of what Canadian
historians know of the Washington negotiations has been gleaned from Macdonald's
self-serving accounts.
The governor general's role after 1849 became, as Lord Aberdeen later put it,
one of "ceaseless and watchful readiness to take part".5 The real difficulty, of
course, lay in knowing when to take part. Dufferin's airy comment that "government
seems to me very much a matter of instinct,—like steering a ship, or handling a
horse" would not have provided a very useful guide to a successor.6 This self-
confident assertion, made after the fact, belied the agonies of indecision Dufferin
suffered while he wrestled with the question of removing an apparently corrupt
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administration from office. Nor would the governor's written instructions provide
much illumination for an appointee seeking to understand his role. As we have seen,
the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions conferred upon each governor were
hopelessly out of step with actual constitutional usages. Even with revisions to the
instruments in 1878, much ambiguity remained. In extreme cases, a governor might
take the unusual step of consulting a constitutional expert about matters of
convention— Dufferin's recourse to Alpheus Todd's advice has already been
noted—but the experts themselves could disagree. Goldwin Smith prematurely
pronounced the death of the prerogative of refusal of dissolution in the late
nineteenth century. He recounted the numerous changes of ministries during the
terms of Head and Monck, and observed that "in the course of this unimpressive
history... the one remaining prerogative of the Crown was exercised by the Governor
n
General for the last time". He little realised that this supposedly obsolete
prerogative would be invoked almost seventy years after Head's time. The
infrequency with which these reserve powers were used could create the impression
that they had lapsed. If constitutional authorities were apt to be misled in such
matters, members of the general public and press were that much more likely to
misunderstand the prerogative powers. A governor acting within his constitutional
powers might well find himself rebuked for his inability to appreciate Canada's
legislative autonomy. Perversely, failure to take action was just as likely to be
criticised.
The perceived success of each incumbent's term of office depended largely
on accidents of circumstance. The instability of Canadian party politics in the pre-
Confederation era forced the governor general into an active role. Even when he was
not in the midst of a political crisis, the potential always loomed. The apparent
evidence of ministerial corruption in the 1870s renewed at least the possibility of
intervention by the governor general. The Conservative succession crisis that
followed the death of John A. Macdonald in the 1890s, while outside the scope of
this study, provides another example that the governor general might still be required
to act in the event of a crisis.8 The more famous King-Byng affair of 1926 is a later
demonstration, although Mackenzie King's skill in deflecting attention from the real
point at issue has led to a pervasive misinterpretation of the event as an example of
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imperial interference. For the most part, however, the emergence of disciplined
parties, and the clarification over time of constitutional conventions, has meant a
steadily diminishing political role for the governor general since Confederation.
Beside circumstance, the other variable has been character. The individual
governors general have been able to a great extent to define their own approach to
the role. This has been especially evident in the social and cultural realm. Lord and
Lady Dufferin's financial resources and sheer physical energy enabled them to
exploit the viceregal role's potential for social and cultural leadership to an
unprecedented degree. This opened up an avenue for activity among successors that
was seldom controversial.9 Unfortunately, Dufferin's penchant for activity was not
confined to these harmless spheres. Like his predecessors under self-government,
Dufferin believed his role allowed him to exercise moral suasion to guide his
ministers into proper conduct. Dufferin, however, was temperamentally unable to
stand aside when he believed an injustice was being done, and his activism during
the Pacific railway question strained relations without resolving anything. Not
surprisingly, more down-to-earth and less "regal" figures, like Elgin and Monck,
seemed to enjoy more success in negotiating the challenges of self-government,
despite their deficiencies in the social realm. Ironically, given the ceremonial
requirements of the role, it was more suited to those whose egos did not demand
recognition and credit for their efforts.
The evolving nature of the viceregal role, along with the difficult-to-quantify
variables of character and circumstance, have obscured historical understanding of
that office. The fact that no definitive statement of the limits of the governor
general's power and authority exists, and that the reserve powers are seldom
invoked, contributes to our lack of awareness. Only by drawing together issues and
events that presented the opportunity for activity on a governor's part during the
critical period of 1847 to 1878 is it possible to arrive at an understanding. Elgin's
unambiguous commitment to the principle of responsible government, coupled with
his advocacy of Canadian interests within the Empire laid out a new template for the
viceregal role. His acceptance of ministerial advice to prorogue in 1854 further
established a precedent for his successors. Head's subsequent refusal of advice to
dissolve parliament in 1858 offered an alternative interpretation of the governor's
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function and demonstrated that, while the ideal might be an aloof constitutional
figurehead, in a climate of political flux the sovereign's representative still had a part
to play. Monck's attempt to counter the perceived injustice by allowing a
dissolution, and his informal mediation to achieve a more stable government,
demonstrate how much of the role was open to individual interpretation. Neither
Head nor Monck were seasoned parliamentarians. Monck's political experience was
negligible, and Head's was nonexistent. Both, as fate would have it, had to immerse
themselves deeply in the chaotic politics of the united Canadas. Lisgar was a British
parliamentary veteran with a personal history of involvement in the shifting sands of
political alliances after the 1846 split in conservative ranks over protectionism. Yet
he presided over a stable administration and was drawn instead into the diplomatic
sphere. His thankless task was to attempt to find a practical working solution to
settle outstanding grievances between Britain, Canada, and the United States. An
enhanced Canadian role in diplomatic negotiations was a double-edged sword, and
Canadian politicians were loath to accept the political consequences of a diplomatic
compromise. Lisgar, as the imperial representative on the scene, has long served as a
historical scapegoat. The circumstances of Dufferin's term were particularly
challenging for someone who enjoyed "the stimulus of responsibility".10 Dufferin
felt a sense of personal obligation to ensure the well-being of the Dominion and
found it difficult to step aside and allow domestic events to follow their course. His
tendency toward over-involvement added a sense of urgency to Edward Blake's
quest to clarify the limits of the governor general's authority. By tracing the most
important and controversial events that dominated each governor's term of office,
and the individual responses to those conditions, the evolution of the role can be seen
more clearly. In an individual biography, these developments are less evident. All
of these issues and events—collectively, the interplay of character and
circumstance—served to shape the viceregal role during a critical period in Canada's
history.
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